{"title":"Conclusion: Lawful but Awful","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501744464-008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501744464-008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114644038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Systemic Constitutional Dysfunction","authors":"J. Farrier","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"This introductory chapter provides an overview of congressional litigation, which provides an outlet for the frustrations and constitutional arguments of members. Members often file the lawsuit because they know the regular legislative process will stall or fail to overcome a presidential veto even if they manage to pass a bill that curtails executive branch power. Member lawsuits deserve attention individually and together as separation of powers phenomena that are distinct from private litigation on the same topics. Private suits are more likely to succeed for a variety of reasons, while member suits provide an index of constitutional dysfunction. Ultimately, member lawsuits do not offer a simple solution to past, present, or future institutional imbalances, but they certainly provide opportunity for fresh analysis on how constitutional separation of powers principles can fall apart without deep and wide support. The chapter then considers the role of federal courts in constitutional conflicts.","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"56 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114040093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legislative Processes Are Constitutional Questions","authors":"J. Farrier","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127818472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"1. War Is Justiciable, Until It Isn’t","authors":"","doi":"10.7591/9781501744464-002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501744464-002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122041386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"So Sue Him","authors":"J. Farrier","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores a diverse set of member lawsuits, spanning the “pocket veto,” three cases related to treaty changes/withdrawals, and a case on the Affordable Care Act that was settled recently. All of these cases highlight the way that conventional partisan warfare creeps into legal battles. The member-plaintiffs in these cases are attacking opposition presidents for institutional behaviors and constitutional interpretations that they appear to forgive in their own presidents. This partisan dynamic dilutes the power and potential significance of the claim. Moreover, if federal courts are being dragged into separation of powers questions just to expand the arena of partisan combat, there is no deep reset of systemic balance of power in the constitutional order. Congressional power should mean more than defending one's own party when in the minority or in the majority under conditions of divided government.","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127171591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Courts Cannot Unknot Congress","authors":"J. Farrier","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter highlights five complex member lawsuits against legislative processes which resulted in mixed outcomes for the member-litigants. First is the deficit-reduction case surrounding the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, known after its sponsors as the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (GRH), where plaintiffs ostensibly won back power but Congress opted to delegate again. Second is a multiplaintiff suit against executive enforcement of a base-closing commission decision that required supermajorities to override. This case emphasizes the risk that Congress takes when it delegates power away and does not have an easy mechanism to regain control over processes and outcomes. Third is the Democratic House members' unsuccessful suit against their own chamber's rule that mandated a supermajority in order to raise taxes. Fourth is the landmark challenge of the 1996 Line Item Veto Act that has been used by later courts to more readily dismiss member standing, even as the item veto itself is ruled unconstitutional by private plaintiffs the next year. Fifth is a hybrid group of House members and private organizations against the Senate filibuster, which stopped the Dream Act.","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114591446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}