{"title":"立法程序是宪法问题","authors":"J. Farrier","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.","PeriodicalId":315952,"journal":{"name":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Legislative Processes Are Constitutional Questions\",\"authors\":\"J. Farrier\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.\",\"PeriodicalId\":315952,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Legislative Processes Are Constitutional Questions
This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.