立法程序是宪法问题

J. Farrier
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章表明,即使在私人诉讼案件中,联邦司法机构也不总是乐于介入。国会的权力授权和立法过程中的相关变化有一个自愿组成部分,这使得这一诉讼领域比战争权力更复杂。在这里,人们可以看到,在权力授权和立法程序案例中,没有意识形态或制度上的节奏。事实上,联邦法院在立法程序案件中的利益是不一致的(最后一个立法权授权案件是在新政期间决定的),当他们进入这些辩论时,比如关于“立法否决权”的辩论,他们因此受到了严厉的批评。从这一章得出的最明显的结论是,法官似乎希望在立法程序和权力下放领域获得某种立足点,而不是经常全力以赴。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Legislative Processes Are Constitutional Questions
This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.
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