LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"FOIA, Inc.","authors":"Margaret B. Kwoka","doi":"10.1017/9781108697637.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108697637.009","url":null,"abstract":"Government transparency is imagined as a public good necessary to a robust democracy. Consistent with that vision, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to allow oversight and accountability of governmental activities, imagining the prime intended users to be journalists. But this democracy-enhancing ideal is at odds with FOIA’s reality: at some agencies, commercial — not public — interests dominate the landscape of FOIA requesters. This Article provides the first in-depth academic study of the commercial use of FOIA, drawing on original datasets from six federal agencies. It documents how corporations, in pursuit of private profit, have overrun FOIA’s supremely inexpensive processes and, in so doing, potentially crowded out journalists and other government watchdogs from doing what the law was intended to facilitate: thirdparty oversight of governmental actors. It also reveals a cottage industry of companies whose entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell them at a profit, which distorts the transparency system even further. Counterintuitively, limiting commercial requesting will not solve this problem. Instead, this Article proposes a targeted and aggressive policy of requiring government agencies to affirmatively disclose sets of records that are the subject of routine FOIA requests — a surprisingly large number of the documents sought by commercial requesters. By meeting information needs in a more efficient manner that is available equally to all, affirmative disclosure will enable federal agencies to reclaim public records from the private market and free up resources to better serve FOIA requests that advance its democratic purpose.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129099957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance and Capture","authors":"J. Shugerman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2579382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2579382","url":null,"abstract":"Independent regulatory agencies are some of the most powerful institutions in the United States, and we think of them today as designed to be insulated from political control. This Article shows that their origins were the opposite: this model first emerged in the late nineteenth century because it offered more political control.The modern executive’s design of unitary presidential control over most offices, along side “independent” regulatory agencies, took shape in the winter of 1886-1887. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, giving the President the unchecked power to dismiss principal officers, and ending the Senate’s power to protect those officers. Shortly afterward, Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission, the first model for the modern independent agency. These two statutes are a basic foundation for the modern executive branch: the unitary executive’s power over most offices, alongside independence regulatory commissions that are sometimes called a “fourth branch of government.”This structural change was triggered by a sudden and significant transformation in American campaign finance. In the nineteenth century, parties relied on “assessments,” officeholders paying a percentage of their salary as a kickback to their party. Due to the federal prohibition of patronage “assessments” in 1876 and 1883, the parties were forced to adopt our more recognizable modern system of large special interest campaign contributions. The Senate had less incentive to fight for its power over federal offices and assessment money, and it suddenly needed to increase its access to railroad money. The Interstate Commerce Commission was the Senate’s means of attracting that money. The existing scholarship on the Interstate Commerce Commission generally contends that Congress was “shifting responsibility,” decreasing its own power so that it could punt difficult issues and delegate them to a new commission. To the contrary, this Article shows that the Senate and the President were seizing power, not punting away thorny questions. The ICC was a rejection of a far more independent enforcement model (private civil litigation in federal or state courts) towards a model of shared political accountability model (a commission nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms. This story shows how sudden changes in campaign finance triggered dramatic changes in constitutional design, and set the foundation for the modern executive branch.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124179472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dividing 'Citizens United': The Case v. The Controversy","authors":"L. Tribe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2575865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2575865","url":null,"abstract":"In the five years since \"Citizens United\", that notorious and much-misunderstood Supreme Court decision has become more than just a case: it has become a symbol, a rallying cry. For some, it is an emblem of free speech values at their best. For others, it is a symptom of a deep sickness in our body politic. But we should not forget that it was a case first, with a plaintiff who wanted to distribute a political movie and was told \"no.\"As a case dealing with a particular controversy over a proposed publication, I believe \"Citizens United\" was rightly decided, for the reasons I discuss in Part I, even if it was resolved in a way that was symptomatic of judicial overreach all too common on the current Court. But as a symbol and a symptom, \"Citizens United\" has broader significance reflected in the Court's eventual opinion. It represents a bizarrely cramped and naive vision of political corruption and improper influence in the electoral process — one that has become characteristic of Roberts Court campaign finance law. And, more broadly, it is part of a trend in First Amendment law that is transforming that body of doctrine into a charter of largely untrammeled libertarianism, in which the regulation of virtually all forms of speech and all kinds of speakers is treated with the same heavy dose of judicial skepticism, with exceptions perversely calculated to expose particularly vulnerable and valuable sorts of expression to unconvincingly justified suppression. It is those trends, rather than the outcome of \"Citizens United\" as applied to the facts before the Court, that need to be revisited. Part II provides a first cut at rethinking campaign finance law. This effort is informed by the recognition that there are few if any easy answers in this field. The First Amendment requires hard choices about seriously conflicting yet equally foundational constitutional values: democracy, liberty, equality. Each one of these values is contested; no single value or theory can or should reign supreme. But, as I strive to show, the Supreme Court has started to privilege — throughout First Amendment law — an overly skeptical and distrustful understanding of democracy and a too rigid and mechanical approach to liberty, leaving equality increasingly out of the picture. I believe the Court would do well to rethink that approach.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130886984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Políticas Públicas E Processo Eleitoral: Reflexão a Partir Da Democracia Como Projeto Político (Public Policies and Electoral Process: Reflection on Democracy As a Political Project)","authors":"A. Suxberger","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2866403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2866403","url":null,"abstract":"Portuguese Abstract: O artigo analisa a relacao entre politicas publicas e processo eleitoral. Resgata a compreensao juridica das politicas publicas e debate a relacao entre \u0000politicas publicas e processo eleitoral. Ainda, pretende fixar uma advertencia a respeito da compreensao da democracia e da tipologia das garantias. A ideia de democracia implica superar a ideia de democracia como status, para apresenta-la como projeto politico. A mencao a uma tipologia de garantias busca respeitar a complexidade do tema e superar a apresentacao geracional da teoria dos direitos fundamentais. A partir da contribuicao de Maria Paula \u0000Dallari Bucci ao tema das politicas publicas, propoe-se um dialogo entre o problema da efetividade dos direitos sociais e a compreensao da democracia como projeto politico. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The paper reviews the relation between public policies and electoral process. It goes back to a juridical approach of public policies and debates how the electoral process relates to public policies’ modeling. The idea of democracy requires going further its comprehension as a status, in order to present it as a political project. Considering a typology of social guarantees is a necessary stage to respect the complexity of the subject and surpass the theory of fundamental rights as generations. Regarding Maria Paula Dallari Bucci’s contribution to the study of public policies, it intends a dialogue between the lack of effectiveness of social rights and the comprehension of democracy as a political project.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116499748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Knowledge of Campaign Finance Regulation and Attitudes towards Politics","authors":"N. Avkiran, Direnç Kanol, B. Oliver","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2474482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2474482","url":null,"abstract":"We use an experimental design to measure how campaign (political) finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are actually exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most of the observational studies in the literature, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Our findings regarding the positive effect of knowledge of campaign finance regulation on perception of political corruption have crucial and urgent implications for public policy, as well as for informing the public about campaign finance regulation. At a time when public cynicism about politics is high, a significant reduction in perceptions of political corruption through successful dissemination of campaign finance regulation would be a boost to the legitimacy of democracies. The findings, however, suggest that the effect of information on regulation could be dependent on the context.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115780678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financing Elections and 'Appearance of Corruption': Citizen Attitudes and Behavior in 2012","authors":"Molly J. Wilson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2231695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2231695","url":null,"abstract":"As political spending reaches new highs in the 2012 election cycle, and as the controversy surrounding wealthy donors and interest groups grows, polls demonstrate a surge of cynicism among Americans who profess a belief that the American political system is corrupt. The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United made possible the most recent expansion of political spending. In this case, the question was whether allowing corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts of money on political advertising would result in corruption or the appearance of corruption. The majority on the Court determined that it would not. Many observers have disputed the majority’s conclusion with respect to corruption; the effect on the appearance of corruption has received far less attention. This Article focuses on this latter question, arguing that there is a growing appearance-of-corruption problem in American politics. The 2012 election cycle saw a modest growth in small donor giving and volunteerism, but voter turn-out was down from the previous two presidential elections. Meanwhile, polls reveal that more than ever, Americans’ believe that money is corrupting the political process. This Article explains the connection between the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions and the current disillusionment of the American public. The Article also explains why data from the 2012 election likely underestimates the problem, and why the repercussions of our appearance-of-corruption problem are likely to grow if the law continues to permit unchecked political campaign spending.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122308480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting","authors":"Stefano DellaVigna, E. Kaplan","doi":"10.1162/QJEC.122.3.1187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/QJEC.122.3.1187","url":null,"abstract":"Does media bias affect voting? We analyze the entry of Fox News in cable markets and its impact on voting. Between October 1996 and November 2000, the conservative Fox News Channel was introduced in the cable programming of 20 percent of US towns. Fox News availability in 2000 appears to be largely idiosyncratic, conditional on a set of controls. Using a data set of voting data for 9,256 towns, we investigate if republicans gained vote share in towns where Fox News entered the cable market by the year 2000. We find a significant effect of the introduction of Fox News on the vote share in Presidential elections between 1996 and 2000. Republicans gained 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in the towns which broadcast Fox News. Fox News also a􀀎ected the Republican vote share in the Senate and voter turnout. Our estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 28 percent of its viewers to vote Republican, depending on the audience measure. The Fox News effect could be a temporary learning effect for rational voters, or a permanent effect for non-rational voters subject to persuasion.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129515286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act","authors":"D. Polsby, R. Popper","doi":"10.2307/1289797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1289797","url":null,"abstract":"A fundamental problem of our representative democracy is this: how far may a legislature go in controlling who is elected to it? The compactness of districts is pertinent to this inquiry. We argue that compactness in some sense is ordinarily a property of single-member territorial districts. We offer proof that gerrymandering - whether it is conducted under the auspices of the Voting Rights Act or its freelance legislative tinkering - can spoil the game for representation by single-member districts. In order to avoid that destiny, an antigerrymandering principle must be defined and administered outside normal political channels.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126632401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}