LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Inequity and Seat Lean in the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders","authors":"Jeffrey P. Barton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3898899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898899","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we propose a simple method for detecting problematic partisan gerrymanders. We begin by defining a new standard for determining a party's equitable seat share given its vote share. We provide intuitive, theoretical, and empirical justifications for our definition, and we compare it to previous standards such as the one implied by the efficiency gap. Our measure for the inequity present in a district map is defined in terms of its departure from equitability. Next we define seat lean, which assesses the relative advantage to each party that a map provides for the next election. We base the notion of seat lean on the estimated likelihood of a seat changing parties, and we show that, after a slight adjustment, seat lean is a good predictor for when the inequity in a map is likely to persist. Finally, we propose a standard for the detection of problematic maps: those whose inequity is both too large and too likely to persist. We show that the standard gives intuitive results on several theoretical examples, including competitive sweeps, as well as on a database of past U.S. House elections. We also demonstrate that the measure neither requires nor forbids proportionality.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133611669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Election Law's Efficiency-Convergence Dilemma","authors":"E. Wald","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3678254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3678254","url":null,"abstract":"We are facing a moment of unique reflection in American democracy. Data suggests that marginalized communities feel persistently ignored by political actors—on a bipartisan basis. The scale of wealth inequality is soaring to unprecedented heights. Domestic indifference to foreign interference in our elections has poisoned public confidence in the political process. Mass reckonings with institutionalized racism and police violence have rocked major cities, facing deep and violent resistance from the President and the federal government. A global pandemic disproportionately devastated Black and Brown communities, and the federal government’s response prioritized economic liberty over health and safety. Americans are reconsidering the nature of our relationship to the federal government, and the pressure for reform may now exceed any moment since the New Deal. \u0000 \u0000In this setting, Iowa’s dramatic failure to efficiently administer the Democratic Presidential Caucus hardly seems worthy of a footnote in the history of 2020. Yet, at the time, it became a national story. Iowa’s failure to administer an efficient election was new—but election law’s marriage to economic efficiency is much older. Understanding the depth of efficiency’s roots in the law of democracy requires turning back to that same New Deal era. The conflict between the American Legal Realists and the laissez faire Lochnerism of the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for efficiency’s lasting role in law—and for the century of criticism that sprung up to contest it. Efficiency—and specifically, the conceptions of efficiency proffered by Chicago School Law and Economics and Virginia School Public Choice Theory—emerged victorious from those contests. But, we are facing a moment of unique reflection, and in such a moment, an opportunity arises. By looking back through efficiency’s rise, we can chart a course forward. \u0000 \u0000This article offers a framework with which to do so: the efficiency-convergence dilemma. Part I builds the efficiency-convergence, outlining the intellectual history of efficiency’s role in election law. Part II builds the dilemma, highlighting critical legal theory and heterodox economics traditions that contour the normative concerns with the efficiency-convergence. Part III presents the framework. I develop a typology of efficiency arguments within election law, derived from novel primary source analysis of the legislative history for the Voting Rights Act and the National Voter Registration Act, along with case law and scholarship across election law. I theorize that this typology demonstrates an efficiency-convergence dilemma, functioning to institutionalize racial subordination as a neutral principle undergirding legal thought in the law of democracy. I offer a series of critiques for this efficiency-convergence, built from the critical theories discussed. Finally, Part IV offers two normative implications of the efficiency convergence. The first is to look outside the law,","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122197422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Democracy, Deference, and Compromise: Understanding and Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence","authors":"Scott Bloomberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3209879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3209879","url":null,"abstract":"In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo—cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption. Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive account of campaign finance jurisprudence that identifies various conceptions of corruption found in the case law. The Article then explains how these conceptions of corruption are animated by underlying disagreements about democracy and deference. More particularly, one group of Justices believes that preserving a robust process of public opinion formation is paramount in campaign finance cases, and that individual rights and political process concerns warrant intervention in defining corruption. The other group of Justices believes that the deployment of concentrated wealth in elections impairs legislative responsiveness to public opinion and that the Court should defer to legislative expertise in defining corruption. Having presented this account, the Article proposes a reform to accommodate both groups of Justices’ concerns in campaign finance cases. This reform, which I call the Compromise Methodology, instructs the Court to defer to the legislature’s understanding of the anticorruption interest when the campaign finance law in question protects either: (a) legislative responsiveness to public opinion; or (b) the process of public opinion formation. If the law protects neither of these concerns, then the Court intervenes and finds that the anticorruption interest cannot justify the law. Aside from this reframing of the anticorruption interest, the Compromise Methodology leaves the Court’s ordinary decision-making process intact. The Court can still determine whether a campaign finance law impacts individual rights and whether a law is sufficiently tailored to the anticorruption interest to withstand scrutiny. I argue that the Compromise Methodology locates valuable middle ground in campaign finance jurisprudence.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122547630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disinformation, Digital Information Equality, and Electoral Integrity","authors":"Elizabeth F. Judge, Amir M. Korhani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3518800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3518800","url":null,"abstract":"Digital information attacks to a country’s electoral integrity have been recognized as a cybersecurity threat by several governments. Disinformation, defined as information that is intentionally false or deliberately misleading, is especially hard to regulate in the elections context, where the free flow of political discourse is an integral part of public confidence in the electoral process but must be balanced with the impact of false information that could undermine public confidence in the electoral process and undermine the ability of voters to participate meaningfully in the electoral process. Electoral disinformation campaigns intentionally deceive voters, thereby disrupting the notion of fair elections. Over-regulation of political speech, however, can imperil the political participation of the informed voter, who in turn engages and influences other voters. Policies for regulating electoral disinformation must therefore balance the tension between curbing speech and encouraging voters to engage in political participation through the free flow of information. Canadian elections law offers a possible solution for jurisdictions seeking to effectively regulate disinformation without unduly stifling free expression through the principle of “information equality,” which predates the recent discussions around online disinformation. The principle of information equality as originally conceptualized notably did not necessarily protect access to true or accurate information. Instead, information equality was supposed to ensure that voters have access to the same information at roughly the same time. In the modern context of rising threats of cyber-disinformation, where disinformation can be generated quickly and remotely and spread rapidly and to precise targets, we argue information equality should address the perception and reality of electoral unfairness arising from disinformation, where voters are subjected to poor quality information that is difficult to restrain and difficult to correct. Accordingly, we argue for an updated principle of digital information equality that would seek to protect the quality of information that voters receive at election time, and we apply this principle of digital information equality to address the harms of disinformation in the elections context. By re-invigorating the principle of information equality and adapting it from a theoretical concept to a regulatory device, this paper proposes a new method to regulate electoral disinformation while supporting an informed electorate, respecting democratic principles, and protecting electoral integrity. In so doing, the paper identifies three examples of harmful electoral disinformation that warrant increased regulation and concludes with a series of recommendations for other jurisdictions seeking to regulate disinformation in the electoral context.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129114080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making and Unmaking Citizens: Law and the Shaping of Civic Capacity","authors":"Tabatha Abu El-Haj","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.53.1.making","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.53.1.making","url":null,"abstract":"American democracy is more fragile today than in recent memory. As evidence of stubborn imbalances in political influence grow, so too does public skepticism concerning the relative benefits of our democratic institutions. Scholars have taken note, and two dominant camps have emerged to offer proposals for restoring democratic accountability and responsiveness. The first, like the public, identifies the flood of money into electoral politics as the primary source of our troubles, whereas the second points to political parties as the root of the crisis. More recently, however, a nascent third approach has emerged. Looking beyond the usual suspects—money in politics or the state of our political parties—its focus is on legal reforms that would permit everyday Americans to exercise political power through organizations capable of providing a counterweight to the political influence of wealth.\u0000\u0000This Article seeks to further develop the efforts of this third approach. It argues that a more nuanced understanding of the recursive relationship between governance and civil society—one that appreciates the ways that public policy, as instantiated in legislation, inevitably influences the trajectory of civil society— permits us to envision a broader conception of law’s role in democratic reform. This broader conception is particularly critical given that several traditional routes have been effectively foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Toward that end, this Article identifies opportunities for law and politics—nudged perhaps by good governance philanthropists and technological advances—to make considerable strides toward rebuilding a participatory civil society capable of demanding the recognition of elected officials.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121064698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Концепции, Инструменты и Практики Электронной Демократии (Concepts, Instruments and Practices of e-Democracy)","authors":"Antonov Jaroslav Valerievich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3293190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3293190","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Изложены базовые концепции электронной демократии, определены инструменты и практики электронной демократии.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> It considers the basic concepts of e-democracy, defines the tools and practices of e-democracy.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122299584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?","authors":"Adam Bonica","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2898140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2898140","url":null,"abstract":"For centuries, scholars have puzzled over why so many lawyers are elected to Congress. This paper draws on a wealth of new data to weigh in on why this age-old representation imbalance has endured. While lawyers enter politics at much higher rates, self-selection at best offers a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications about who runs for office, who wins, and the consequences for the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the U.S. system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133460415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Analysis of the Legal Framework on Nomination and Sponsorship of a Candidate for Election as Governor of a State in Nigeria","authors":"A. Bello","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2838976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2838976","url":null,"abstract":"The inelegant drafting of the Electoral Act No. 6 of 2010 is responsible for the high level of judicial determination of election outcomes. Subsequent amendments have increased the confusion counsel take to Election Petition Tribunals. What obtains in Nigeria today is a heightened belief that the tribunals are the venue for obtaining election victory. In this paper, I analyse the legal framework on nomination and sponsorship of a candidate for election as Governor of a State. I argue that nomination and sponsorship are not the same and that once a candidate is sponsored by a political party, whatever the process the party determines to do so, the sponsorship cannot be challenged as non-compliance with provision of the Act and thus a ground for an Election Petition as provided for at s. 138(1)(b). The paper recommends that relevant provisions of the Electoral Act 2010 with the words ‘selection’, ‘nomination’, and ‘choice’ of candidates by political parties be amended by replacing these words with the word ‘selection’ to denote that the process specified is an internal political party matter necessary for the emergence of a political party candidate for an election. In appropriate places, the word ‘nomination’ should also be replaced by the word ‘sponsor’ as the case may be. This will make it possible for the provision of s. 32 ss. (1), (2), (3), (4) & (5) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to remain the only provisions in the Act that have the word nomination in them. This provision is the connection between a political party candidate and his constituents as acknowledgement that both political party and the candidate are in touch with those they aspire to represent in government. The process of nomination specified at section 32 is what cements and completes the processes leading to the presentation of a political party candidate to the Election Management Body as its candidate at an election.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132933261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions","authors":"Keith E. Schnakenberg, Ian R Turner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698862","url":null,"abstract":"Campaign finance contributions may influence policy by affecting elections or influencing the choices of politicians once in office. To study the trade-offs between these two paths to influence, we use a game in which contributions may affect electoral outcomes and signal policy-relevant information to politicians. In the model, a campaign donor and two politicians each possess private information correlated with a policy-relevant state of the world. The donor may allocate his budget to either an ally candidate who has relatively similar preferences or a moderate candidate whose preferences are relatively divergent from the donor's preferred policy. Contributions that increase the likelihood of the moderate being elected can signal good news about the donor's preferred policy and influence the moderate's policy choice. However, when the electoral effect of contributions is too small to demand sufficiently high costs to deter imitation by groups with negative information, this informational effect breaks down.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127034823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disguised Contributions in the Channels of Corporate Political Spending","authors":"Adam R. Fremeth, Brian K. Richter, B. Schaufele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2713969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2713969","url":null,"abstract":"Widespread dissatisfaction with corporate participation in elections persists despite strict regulations. Exploiting within firm-cycle cross-candidate variation and across firm-cycle variation, we demonstrate that corporate spending on US elections exceeds disclosed campaign contributions. Firms constrained by existing campaign contribution limits spend an additional $549,000 on lobbying per election cycle, an amount more than 100 times the contribution limit. Constrained firms also have chief executives that contribute more to politicians and firm foundations that make larger philanthropic donations. While legally permitted, these expenditures may be interpreted by the public as corrupt disguised contributions according to the Supreme Court’s landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision.","PeriodicalId":305821,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Election Law & Voting Rights (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130681428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}