{"title":"The Limits of Multiproduct Price Discrimination","authors":"Nima Haghpanah, Ron Siegel","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210426","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a multiproduct seller who has access to information about consumer preferences that he can use for second- and third-degree price discrimination. We characterize markets for which such information can lead to the efficient allocation with consumers obtaining the entire surplus gain relative to the profit-maximizing allocation without the additional information. This benchmark is achievable for all markets with a given set of consumer types if and only if it is optimal for the seller to offer only the best product in each market. Analogous results characterize when the “surplus triangle” of Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) is achievable. (JEL D11, D21, D42, D83)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49530119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rapid Dynamics of Top Wealth Shares and Self-Made Fortunes: What Is the Role of Family Firms?","authors":"A. Atkeson, Magnus Irie","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210560","url":null,"abstract":"We derive an analytical link between the fast dynamics of inequality at the top of the wealth distribution and the prevalence of newly created fortunes. Specifically, in the context of a random growth model of wealth accumulation, the shape of the top of the wealth distribution changes rapidly only if the pace with which new fortunes are created is fast. Quantitatively, the decision of a few families to bear a large amount of idiosyncratic risk in the form of family firms is crucial in accounting for both the prevalence of new fortunes and the dynamics of top wealth inequality. (JEL D22, D31, G32, L25)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45724242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polarization, Valence, and Policy Competition","authors":"Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169","url":null,"abstract":"We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ preferences are uncertain. Existing work predicts that the low-valence candidate “gambles for resurrection” by adopting non-centrist policies in order to differentiate from a stronger opponent. We show that this prediction is reversed in a highly polarized environment: the strong candidate chooses policies less aligned with the electorate but nonetheless wins the election with higher probability. (JEL D11, D72)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41753930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Bergemann, T. Heumann, S. Morris, Constantine S. Sorokin, Eyal Winter
{"title":"Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions","authors":"D. Bergemann, T. Heumann, S. Morris, Constantine S. Sorokin, Eyal Winter","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210504","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction. The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but creates higher information rents for bidders. The information disclosure policy that maximizes the revenue of the seller is to fully reveal low values (where competition is high) but to pool high values (where competition is low). The size of the pool is determined by a critical quantile that is independent of the distribution of values and only dependent on the number of bidders. We discuss how this policy provides a rationale for conflation in digital advertising. (JEL D44, D82, D83, M37)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47425945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alyce Adams, Raymond Kluender, Neale Mahoney, Jinglin Wang, Francis Wong, Wesley Yin
{"title":"The Impact of Financial Assistance Programs on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Kaiser Permanente.","authors":"Alyce Adams, Raymond Kluender, Neale Mahoney, Jinglin Wang, Francis Wong, Wesley Yin","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210515","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Most hospitals have financial assistance programs for low-income patients. We use administrative data from Kaiser Permanente to study the effects of financial assistance on healthcare utilization. Using a regression discontinuity design based on an income threshold for program eligibility, we find that financial assistance increases the likelihood of an inpatient, ambulatory and emergency department encounter by 3.6 pp (59%), 13.4 pp (20%), and 6.7 pp (53%), respectively, though effects dissipate three quarters after program receipt. Financial assistance also increases the detection and management of treatment-sensitive conditions (e.g., drugs treating diabetes), suggesting financial assistance may increase receipt of high-value care.</p>","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":"4 3","pages":"389-407"},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9634821/pdf/nihms-1816284.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40456798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pretest with Caution: Event-Study Estimates after Testing for Parallel Trends","authors":"J. Roth","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210236","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses two important limitations of the common practice of testing for preexisting differences in trends (“ pre-trends”) when using difference-in-differences and related methods. First, conventional pre-trends tests may have low power. Second, conditioning the analysis on the result of a pretest can distort estimation and inference, potentially exacerbating the bias of point estimates and under-coverage of confidence intervals. I analyze these issues both in theory and in simulations calibrated to a survey of recent papers in leading economics journals, which suggest that these limitations are important in practice. I conclude with practical recommendations for mitigating these issues. (JEL A14, C23, C51)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41728758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen, Emily K Weisburst, Morgan C Williams
{"title":"Police Force Size and Civilian Race.","authors":"Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen, Emily K Weisburst, Morgan C Williams","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20200792","DOIUrl":"10.1257/aeri.20200792","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We report novel empirical estimates of the race-specific effects of larger police forces in the United States. Each additional police officer abates approximately 0.1 homicides. In per capita terms, effects are twice as large for Black versus White victims. Larger police forces also make fewer arrests for serious crimes, with larger reductions for crimes with Black suspects, implying that police force growth does not increase racial disparities among the most serious charges. At the same time, larger police forces make more arrests for low-level \"quality-of-life\" offenses, with effects that imply a disproportionate impact for Black Americans.</p>","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":"4 2","pages":"139-158"},"PeriodicalIF":8.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10062144/pdf/nihms-1870754.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9287613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments.","authors":"Tal Gross, Timothy J Layton, Daniel Prinz","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20200830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200830","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Insurance is typically viewed as a mechanism for transferring resources from good to bad states. Insurance, however, may also transfer resources from high-liquidity periods to low-liquidity periods. We test for this type of transfer from health insurance by studying the distribution of Social Security checks among Medicare recipients. When Social Security checks are distributed, prescription fills increase by 6-12 percent among recipients who pay small copayments. We find no such pattern among recipients who face no copayments. The results demonstrate that more-complete insurance allows recipients to consume healthcare when they need it rather than only when they have cash.</p>","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":"175-190"},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9281685/pdf/nihms-1720474.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40515372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Global Version of Samuelson's Dictum","authors":"Yaqing Xiao, Hongjun Yan, Jinfan Zhang","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210186","url":null,"abstract":"Samuelson’s Dictum refers to the conjecture that there is more informational inefficiency at the aggregate stock market level than at the individual stock level. Our paper recasts it in a global setup: there should be more informational inefficiency at the global level than at the country level. We find that sovereign CDS spreads can predict future stock market index returns, GDP, and PMI of their underlying countries. Consistent with the global version of Samuelson’s Dictum, the predictive power for both stock returns and macro variables is almost entirely from the global, rather than country-specific, information from the sovereign CDS market. (JEL G12, G14, G17)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48263813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Commitment Benefit of Consols in Government Debt Management","authors":"Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes, P. Yared","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210341","url":null,"abstract":"We consider optimal government debt maturity in a deterministic economy in which the government can issue any arbitrary debt maturity structure and in which bond prices are a function of the government’s current and future primary surpluses. The government sequentially chooses policy, taking into account how current choices—which impact future policy—feed back into current bond prices. We show that issuing consols constitutes the unique stationary optimal debt portfolio, as it boosts government credibility to future policy and reduces the debt financing costs. (JEL E62, G12, H61, H63)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45682264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}