获取权限

IF 8.1 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review-Insights Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1257/aeri.20210494

Peicong Hu, J. Sobel

{"title":"获取权限","authors":"Peicong Hu, J. Sobel","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210494","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria, including one in which at least one expert supports the manager's favorite project. Only one outcome, the experts' most preferred equilibrium outcome, survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. We show that no sequential procedure can perform better for the manager than the experts' most preferred equilibrium and exhibit a sequential protocol that does as well. (JEL C72, D23, D82)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Getting Permission\",\"authors\":\"Peicong Hu, J. Sobel\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aeri.20210494\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria, including one in which at least one expert supports the manager's favorite project. Only one outcome, the experts' most preferred equilibrium outcome, survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. We show that no sequential procedure can perform better for the manager than the experts' most preferred equilibrium and exhibit a sequential protocol that does as well. (JEL C72, D23, D82)\",\"PeriodicalId\":29954,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210494\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review-Insights","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210494","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

经理可以接触到专家顾问。经理最多选择一个项目，只有在一位专家提供支持的情况下才能实施。经理同时咨询专家的游戏通常有多个平衡点，其中至少有一个专家支持经理最喜欢的项目。只有一个结果，专家们最喜欢的平衡结果，在弱支配策略的迭代删除中幸存下来。我们证明，对于管理者来说，没有哪个顺序程序能比专家最喜欢的平衡更有效，并展示了一个同样有效的顺序协议。（JEL C72，D23，D82）

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Getting Permission

A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria, including one in which at least one expert supports the manager's favorite project. Only one outcome, the experts' most preferred equilibrium outcome, survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. We show that no sequential procedure can perform better for the manager than the experts' most preferred equilibrium and exhibit a sequential protocol that does as well. (JEL C72, D23, D82)

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

American Economic Review-Insights ECONOMICS-

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.