Polarization, Valence, and Policy Competition

IF 8.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
{"title":"Polarization, Valence, and Policy Competition","authors":"Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20210169","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ preferences are uncertain. Existing work predicts that the low-valence candidate “gambles for resurrection” by adopting non-centrist policies in order to differentiate from a stronger opponent. We show that this prediction is reversed in a highly polarized environment: the strong candidate chooses policies less aligned with the electorate but nonetheless wins the election with higher probability. (JEL D11, D72)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review-Insights","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ preferences are uncertain. Existing work predicts that the low-valence candidate “gambles for resurrection” by adopting non-centrist policies in order to differentiate from a stronger opponent. We show that this prediction is reversed in a highly polarized environment: the strong candidate chooses policies less aligned with the electorate but nonetheless wins the election with higher probability. (JEL D11, D72)
极化、价态与政策竞争
我们研究了两个寻求职位的候选人之间的选举,当一个候选人具有效价优势时,他们在党派问题维度上两极分化。候选人通过在选民的偏好不确定的第二个问题维度上选择政策来竞争。现有的研究预测,低价候选人通过采取非中间派政策来“赌复活”,以区别于更强大的对手。我们的研究表明,在高度两极分化的环境中,这种预测是相反的:强势候选人选择的政策与选民的立场不太一致,但仍然有更高的概率赢得选举。(凝胶11,凝胶72)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信