发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
On Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogion II 论《前言》(二)中安瑟伦的本体论论证
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-12-22 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10054
P. Oppenheimer, E. Zalta
{"title":"On Anselm’s Ontological Argument in Proslogion II","authors":"P. Oppenheimer, E. Zalta","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10054","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91378462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Concept Negation in Kant 康德的概念否定论
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-11-09 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10024
M. Siebel
{"title":"Concept Negation in Kant","authors":"M. Siebel","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Kant distinguishes concept negation from copula negation. While the latter results in a negative judgement, i.e. a judgement denying a property of certain objects, the former gives rise to a negative concept, such as ‘immortal’. Since Kant’s remarks on concept negation are scattered and inconclusive, five interpretations are worked out and put to the test: logical negation, pseudo-negation, attribution of a zero degree, possibility-restricted negation and genus-restricted negation. Whereas the first four interpretations fail for a number of reasons, genus-restricted negation turns out to be tenable.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81691262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is Perception Essentially Perspectival? 感知本质上是透视的吗?
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-26 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10052
M. Wallner
{"title":"Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?","authors":"M. Wallner","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10052","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80262500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Kinds of Mental Conflict in Republic IV 《理想国》中的两种心理冲突
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-26 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10053
Galen Barry, Edith Gwendolyn Nally
{"title":"Two Kinds of Mental Conflict in Republic IV","authors":"Galen Barry, Edith Gwendolyn Nally","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Plato’s partition argument infers that the soul has parts from the fact that the soul experiences mental conflict. Alasdair MacIntyre poses a dilemma for the argument that highlights an ambiguity in the concept of mental conflict. According to the first sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires whose satisfaction conditions are logically incompatible. According to the second sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires which are logically incompatible even when they are unsatisfied. The dilemma is therefore this: if the mental conflict is supposed to be the latter kind of conflict, then the partition argument is valid but is likely unsound; if it’s supposed to be the former kind, then the partition argument has true premises but is invalid. We explain this dilemma in detail and defend a dispositionalist solution to it.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73008018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Pittsburgh Kantians: Brandom, Conant, Haugeland, and McDowell on Kant 匹兹堡康德学派:布兰登、柯南特、豪格兰和麦克道尔论康德
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10019
J. Browning
{"title":"The Pittsburgh Kantians: Brandom, Conant, Haugeland, and McDowell on Kant","authors":"J. Browning","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Over the last thirty years, a group of philosophers associated with the University of Pittsburgh—Robert Brandom, James Conant, John Haugeland, and John McDowell—have developed a novel reading of Kant. Their interest turns on Kant’s problem of objective purport: how can my thoughts be about the world? This paper summarizes the shared reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction by these four philosophers and how it solves the problem of objective purport. But I also show these philosophers radically diverge in how they view Kant’s relevance for contemporary philosophy. I highlight an important distinction between those that hold a quietist response to Kant, evident in Conant and McDowell, and those that hold a constructive response, evident in Brandom and Haugeland. The upshot is that the Pittsburgh Kantians have a distinctive approach to Kant, but also radically different responses to his problem of objective purport.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72766401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reconsidering Kant’s Rejection of Indirect Arguments in Transcendental Philosophy 再论康德对先验哲学中间接论证的否定
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10018
Marcel Buß
{"title":"Reconsidering Kant’s Rejection of Indirect Arguments in Transcendental Philosophy","authors":"Marcel Buß","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88078290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Faint Impressions, Forceful Ideas 微弱的印象，有力的想法
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10050
A. Bozzo
{"title":"Faint Impressions, Forceful Ideas","authors":"A. Bozzo","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10050","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000A natural reading of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizations—the intensional and extensional—don’t perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Hume’s willing to proceed with his definitions.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90026930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kant’s Proof of the Existence of the Outer World 康德对外部世界存在的证明
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10020
Bianca Ancillotti
{"title":"Kant’s Proof of the Existence of the Outer World","authors":"Bianca Ancillotti","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper I propose a novel interpretation of Kant’s proof of the existence of the outer world in the Refutation of Idealism. According to this interpretation, Kant’s proof does not provide a regressive explanation of our capacity to determine the temporal order of our experiences. Rather, it expresses a counterfactual reflection on what it takes for something to be actual in contrast to being merely imagined. On the ground of this reflection, Kant argues against the Cartesian sceptic that, even if all our representations of empirical objects other than ourselves failed to be veridical, we would still know a priori that in every situation in which we, as thinking things, actually exist, something outside us in space must necessarily exist.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90960379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Three Kantian Routes to the Synthetic A Priori 康德通往综合先验的三条道路
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10021
R. Audi
{"title":"Three Kantian Routes to the Synthetic A Priori","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Kant influentially distinguished analytic from synthetic a priori propositions, and he took certain propositions in the latter category to be of immense philosophical importance. His distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been accepted by many and attacked by others; but despite its importance, a number of discussions of it since at least W. V. Quine’s have paid insufficient attention to some of the passages in which Kant draws the distinction. This paper seeks to clarify what appear to be three distinct conceptions of the analytic (and implicitly of the synthetic) that are presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in some other Kantian texts. The conceptions are important in themselves, and their differences are significant even if they are extensionally equivalent. The paper is also aimed at showing how the proposed understanding of these conceptions—and especially the one that has received insufficient attention from philosophers—may bear on how we should conceive the synthetic a priori, in and beyond Kant’s own writings.","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78872029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Logic and Exegesis: The Logical Reconstruction of Arguments in the Greek Commentary Tradition 逻辑与释经:希腊注释传统中论证的逻辑重构
IF 0.2
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis Pub Date : 2021-09-07 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-bja10049
Pieter d’Hoine, J. Opsomer, I. Viltanioti
{"title":"Logic and Exegesis: The Logical Reconstruction of Arguments in the Greek Commentary Tradition","authors":"Pieter d’Hoine, J. Opsomer, I. Viltanioti","doi":"10.30965/26664275-bja10049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/26664275-bja10049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29819,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79655170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信