Game Theory and Information最新文献

The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information 私人信息重复博弈中事后激励相容的动态成本

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 2005-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.469521

David A. Miller

{"title":"The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information","authors":"David A. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.469521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.469521","url":null,"abstract":"In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible in each stage game; unlike PPE, EPPPE is robust under to any communication protocol, and to spying. However, robustness comes at a cost to the players: in many games, efficient payoffs in the corresponding static mechanism design problem cannot be supported as average payoffs in an EPPPE, even when players are patient. In two- player repeated allocation games, an optimal EPPPE never employs a (static) efficient outcome function in any stage game. Instead, the players always prefer to give up some static efficiency by sometimes allocating to the player with the lower valuation. Under independent valuations, optimal equilibria are often stationary, but when valuations are globally interdependent, optimal equilibria are never stationary. Applied to the problem of collusion with hidden costs, these results yield new insights into the phenomenon of price wars in collusive equilibria.","PeriodicalId":280771,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Information","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129085342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 19

Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions 联盟战略和减少温室气体排放

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 2005-02-13 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.663645

Vihang M Patel

引用次数: 0

Bayesianism without learning 没有学习的贝叶斯理论

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1999-02-23 DOI: 10.1006/REEC.1999.0186

D. Samet

引用次数: 14

A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods 公共物品自愿供给与非自愿供给的动态关系理论

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1999-01-27 DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00102

G. Glomm, Roger Lagunoff

{"title":"A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods","authors":"G. Glomm, Roger Lagunoff","doi":"10.1111/1467-937X.00102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00102","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a dynamic model of Tiebout-like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods. At issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time. We model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated, sequential location decisions over one of two communities. Each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods. The first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community. The second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote. Opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital. The Markov Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied. Our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state, individuals' locational choices eventually ``select\" the involuntary provision mechanism. This holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a Nash equilibrium of the static game each period. We also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives. These conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time. The results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice.","PeriodicalId":280771,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Information","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133288384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 41

A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration 具有仲裁可能性的议价模型

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1997-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.57949

Paola Manzini, M. Mariotti

引用次数: 4

Loss Aversion in a Multi-Period Model 多时期模型中的损失厌恶

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1997-06-01 DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00832-3

Jonathan Shalev

引用次数: 33

EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY IMPLEMENTATION IN MARKETS WITH REPEATED PAIRWISE BARGAINING 在反复的两两议价的市场中，效率和自愿执行

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1996-10-01 DOI: 10.2307/2999620

M. Jackson, T. Palfrey

引用次数: 40

Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency 双边信息不对称的和解谈判:模型对偶性、信息分布与效率

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1994-09-01 DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(94)90044-2

A. Daughety, Jennifer F. Reinganum

引用次数: 90

The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium 完美序贯均衡的代数几何

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1994-07-01 DOI: 10.2307/2951732

L. Blume, W. Zame

{"title":"The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium","authors":"L. Blume, W. Zame","doi":"10.2307/2951732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2951732","url":null,"abstract":"Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games with perfect recall are Selten's (1975) {it perfect equilibrium/} and Kreps and Wilson's (1982) more inclusive {it sequential equilibrium/}. These two equilibrium refinements are motivated in very different ways. Nonetheless, as Kreps and Wilson (1982, Section 7) point out, the two concepts lead to similar prescriptions for equilibrium play. For each particular game form, every perfect equilibrium is sequential. Moreover, for almost all assignments of payoffs to outcomes, almost all sequential equilibrium strategy profiles are perfect equilibrium profiles, and all sequential equilibrium outcomes are perfect equilibrium outcomes. par We establish a stronger result: For almost all assignments of payoffs to outcomes, the sets of sequential and perfect equilibrium strategy profiles are identical. In other words, for almost all games each strategy profile which can be supported by beliefs satisfying the rationality requirement of sequential equilibrium can actually be supported by beliefs satisfying the stronger rationality requirement of perfect equilibrium. par We obtain this result by exploiting the algebraic/geometric structure of these equilibrium correspondences, following from the fact that they are {em semi-algebraic sets/}; i.e., they are defined by finite systems of polynomial inequalities. That the perfect and sequential","PeriodicalId":280771,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Information","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127759309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 95

Monotonicity of Optimal Policies in a Zero Sum Game: A Flow Control Model 零和博弈中最优策略的单调性:一个流量控制模型

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1994-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-0245-5_15

E. Altman

引用次数: 22