联盟战略和减少温室气体排放

Vihang M Patel
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摘要

《京都议定书》所阐述的灵活机制为减排问题提供了一个强有力的框架,不仅具有经济效益,而且有利于贸易增长。在存在流动性或非流动性市场的情况下,为了从排放交易中获得更高的价值,我们已经表明,联合策略为生产优化措施提供了一个相关的替代方案,而生产优化措施有时可能是不可行的。采用基于资源的战略要素市场视角对整个博弈进行了分析。我们还说明了为联盟提供稳定所需的措施,从而说明了联盟战略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Coalition Strategies and Reduction of GHG Emissions
The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies.
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