具有仲裁可能性的议价模型

Game Theory and Information Pub Date : 1997-10-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.57949

Paola Manzini, M. Mariotti

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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们考虑一个交替的报价讨价还价模型，在这种模型中，玩家可能同意在出现分歧的情况下呼叫仲裁员。我们研究的主要信息是，在谈判的背景下，仲裁员的存在——他只有在双方同意的情况下才能活跃起来——可能会完全推动谈判的结果。我们讨论了这一结果对仲裁理论和对合作谈判解决方案的解释的影响。

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A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration

We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We discuss the implications of this result both for theories of arbitration and for the interpretation of cooperative bargainining solutions.

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Game Theory and Information

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