没有学习的贝叶斯理论

D. Samet
{"title":"没有学习的贝叶斯理论","authors":"D. Samet","doi":"10.1006/REEC.1999.0186","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter. This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.","PeriodicalId":280771,"journal":{"name":"Game Theory and Information","volume":"321 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1999-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bayesianism without learning\",\"authors\":\"D. Samet\",\"doi\":\"10.1006/REEC.1999.0186\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter. This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.\",\"PeriodicalId\":280771,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Game Theory and Information\",\"volume\":\"321 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1999-02-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Game Theory and Information\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1006/REEC.1999.0186\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Game Theory and Information","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1006/REEC.1999.0186","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14

摘要

根据标准定义,贝叶斯行为人是通过将他的先验信念建立在他所学到的东西上,即他已经确定的事实上,从而形成后验信念的人。这里表明,贝叶斯主义可以在不假设代理获得任何特定信息的情况下进行描述;如果一个行为人的先验在其后验信念的条件下与后验信念一致,那么他就是贝叶斯的。这个条件被证明是贝叶斯模型的特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Bayesianism without learning
According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter. This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信