{"title":"A privacidade digital posta à prova no processo penal","authors":"Paulo Manuel Mello de Sousa Mendes","doi":"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22487","url":null,"abstract":"O artigo 8.º da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos trata do respeito pela privacidade. O Quarto Aditamento à Constituição dos EUA trata igualmente do respeito pela privacidade. O processo penal deve assegurar a proteção da privacidade, na medida do possível, e o direito em ação deve respeitar os limites da cópia de dados eletrónicos e as restrições impostas à análise externa do acervo recolhido. Entre os aspetos críticos da análise externa de dados eletrónicos, avulta a questão do procedimento a adotar pelo investigador criminal diante dos conhecimentos fortuitos, uma questão que é analisada detalhadamente neste artigo. A jurisprudência do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos caracteriza-se por alguma ineficácia na criação de remédios para a violação da privacidade no processo penal, designadamente no tocante à cópia de dados eletrónicos e à análise externa do acervo recolhido, desde logo porque não comina a exclusão das evidências produzidas por computador que tenham sido obtidas ilicitamente, o que deveria ser o caso ser o caso, à luz do princípio do processo equitativo. O conhecimento das diretrizes e do direito jurisprudencial norte-americano representa um contributo valioso para o aprofundamento da jurisprudência de Estrasburgo, na sua dupla função decisória e nomofilácica, assim como para o aperfeiçoamento dos ordenamentos jurídicos nacionais europeus ao nível legislativo e ao nível da prática decisória e jurisprudencial.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126187326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals","authors":"Barbara A. Spellman","doi":"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reason-","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125043337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La decisión sobre la quaestio facti en los acuerdos de culpabilidad","authors":"Diana Veleda","doi":"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22461","url":null,"abstract":"La autora discute una posición relativamente extendida en el ámbito del Derecho Procesal Penal, según la cual la implementación de procedimientos de omisión del juicio penal o acuerdos de culpabilidad implica, necesariamente, la adopción de una noción de verdad distinta a la correspondencia con la realidad. Para ello, primero defiende la vigencia y la importancia de ese concepto de verdad en estos mecanismos y, luego, argumenta que existen razones morales, independientes a la búsqueda de la verdad, que justifican exigir a la fiscalía, a la hora de proponer un acuerdo de culpabilidad, que satisfaga el mismo estándar probatorio necesario para requerir la realización de un juicio ordinario. Finalmente, reflexiona sobre las implicancias que aquella exigencia, junto con otras características propias de este tipo de procedimientos, tienen en el mejoramiento de las condiciones epistémicas en las que tomamos la decisión sobre la quaestio facti en el contexto de los acuerdos de culpabilidad.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133675260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Critical Method for the Evaluation of Evidence: François Gorphe’s (1889-1959) Contribution to a Science of Proof à la française","authors":"O. Leclerc","doi":"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22389","url":null,"abstract":"In his 1924 book La critique du temoignage , the French judge Francois Gorphe (1889-1959) advocated the need that evaluation of evidence be based on the best scientific knowledge available. Drawing upon an extensive knowledge of the experiments conducted by contemporary forensic psychologists, Gorphe urged judges to consider forensic psychology when interrogating witnesses and, ultimately, when evaluating evidence. Gorphe imposed himself as one of the main promoters of a science of proof in France. This paper examines Gorphe’s contributions and the audience they received among forensic psychologists and criminologists in France and abroad. Despite their originality and anchoring in international scientific discussions, Gorphe’s views have not encouraged the creation of an academic domain interested in evidential reasoning in French law faculties. The paper concludes with an examination of the reasons for the limited posterity of Gorphe’s approach.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121841202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Methodological Reflections","authors":"Michael S. Pardo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738774","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738774","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses Ronald Allen’s article, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited, and reflects on how epistemology can contribute to our understanding of the evidentiary proof process. I first situate Allen’s critique of recent philosophical scholarship, distinguishing between general theoretical accounts of proof (including the theory that Allen and I have defended), on one hand, and the applications of specific epistemological concepts or issues to law, on the other. I then present a methodological picture that diverges in some respects from the one that emerges from Allen’s critique. In discussing this alternative methodological picture, I explain how epistemology can contribute to legal evidence and proof while avoiding the problems that Allen identifies.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121968221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen","authors":"D. Enoch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3612501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612501","url":null,"abstract":"This is a comment on a paper by Ronald Allen, in which he criticizes my earlier work on statistical evidence, and the entire philosophical discussion of which it is a part. In response I make several broad methodological points - about the point of theorizing, about the use of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and about idealizations - and point out some more specific mistakes in Allen's discussion of statistical evidence.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121963198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited","authors":"R. Allen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3610994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610994","url":null,"abstract":"We revisit Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, published twenty years ago. The evolution of the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof is offered as evidence of the advantage of a naturalized approach to the study of the field and law evidence. Various alternative explanations of aspects of juridical proof from other disciplines are examined and their shortcomings described. These competing explanations are similar in their reductive, a priori approaches that are at odds with an empirically oriented naturalized approach. The shortcomings of the various a priori approaches are driven by their common methodological commitments to employing weird hypotheticals to engage in intuition mining about the American legal systems that in turn ignore important aspects of the actual legal systems and consistently make impossible epistemological demands. As a result, both their descriptions of and prescriptions for American legal systems are implausible, unlike the relative plausibility theory.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122755177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judging Expert Testimony: From Verbal Formalism to Practical Advice","authors":"S. Haack","doi":"10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i0.22312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i0.22312","url":null,"abstract":"Appraising the worth of others’ testimony is always complex; appraising the worth of expert testimony is even harder; appraising the worth of expert testimony in a legal context is harder yet. Legal efforts to assess the reliability of expert testimony—I’ll focus on evolving U.S. law governing the admissibility of such testimony—seem far from adequate, offering little effective practical guidance. My purpose in this paper is to think through what might be done to offer courts more real, operational help. The first step is to explain why the legal formulae that have evolved over the years may seem reassuring, but aren’t really of much practical use. The next is to suggest that we might do better not by amending evidentiary rules but by helping judges and attorneys understand what questions they should ask about expert evidence. I focus here on (i) epidemiological testimony, and (ii) the process of peer review.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123257160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}