{"title":"如何将统计证据理论化(以及其他一切):对艾伦的评论","authors":"D. Enoch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3612501","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This is a comment on a paper by Ronald Allen, in which he criticizes my earlier work on statistical evidence, and the entire philosophical discussion of which it is a part. In response I make several broad methodological points - about the point of theorizing, about the use of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and about idealizations - and point out some more specific mistakes in Allen's discussion of statistical evidence.","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen\",\"authors\":\"D. Enoch\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3612501\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This is a comment on a paper by Ronald Allen, in which he criticizes my earlier work on statistical evidence, and the entire philosophical discussion of which it is a part. In response I make several broad methodological points - about the point of theorizing, about the use of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and about idealizations - and point out some more specific mistakes in Allen's discussion of statistical evidence.\",\"PeriodicalId\":252725,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612501\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612501","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen
This is a comment on a paper by Ronald Allen, in which he criticizes my earlier work on statistical evidence, and the entire philosophical discussion of which it is a part. In response I make several broad methodological points - about the point of theorizing, about the use of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and about idealizations - and point out some more specific mistakes in Allen's discussion of statistical evidence.
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