{"title":"为奇怪的假设辩护","authors":"Barbara A. Spellman","doi":"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reason-","PeriodicalId":252725,"journal":{"name":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"In Defense of Weird Hypotheticals\",\"authors\":\"Barbara A. Spellman\",\"doi\":\"10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reason-\",\"PeriodicalId\":252725,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio\",\"volume\":\"5 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33115/UDG_BIB/QF.I2.22477","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Professor Allen (this issue) critiques the value of using “weird” hypotheticals to mine intuitions about legal systems. I respond by supporting the value of “thin” hypotheticals for providing information about how people reason generally, rather than for revealing peoples’ specific answers. I note that because legal systems are the products of many minds thinking about how other minds operate, the object of inquiry is metacognition—that is, understanding how reason-
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