{"title":"TBD","authors":"C. Hoes","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i3.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.11","url":null,"abstract":"I have been noticing a definite uptick in the number of industry groups that are talking about the benefits of system safety. Many of them don’t know that they are “inventing” an approach that has been successfully used for almost 100 years on millions of projects with a combined value of tens of trillions of dollars. It seems that many of these groups believe they came up with the “new” idea that designing safety into projects is better, less expensive and results in fewer false starts than traditional safety approaches — not to mention that it is also more effective in reducing accident losses. \u0000System safety is an engineering process that starts as early as practical and continues throughout the project’s life until there is no longer value in continuing. Conceptually, system safety consists of three simple steps: \u0000 \u0000Identify potential hazards. \u0000Control the risks associated with those identified hazards to acceptable levels. \u0000Repeat. \u0000","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117161968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Implications of STAMP for Warhead Safety at AWE","authors":"Malcolm Jones","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i3.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.14","url":null,"abstract":"STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is a relatively new approach to safety assessment methodology and post-accident cause analysis; its prime developer is Nancy Leveson of MIT. STAMP is a holistic system-level approach to overall organizational structure and to technical operations and design. It takes a comprehensive look at all possible organizational and technical system influences that can ultimately affect the safety of technical processes and product designs in whatever scenarios or environments in which they operate or to which they are subjected. Of course, the process can be applied equally to both reliability of performance and security, in addition to safety.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128157777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Failure Interval Probabilistic Analysis for Risk-based Decisions - Concorde Crash Example","authors":"Jan B. Smith","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i3.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.15","url":null,"abstract":"The DC-6, DC-8, DC-10, Concorde, Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 MAX fatal crashes and nearmisses were analyzed with event interval probabilistic analysis methods. Fleet grounding decisions are the epitome of risk-based decisions, and the most important decision is the first opportunity to ground. The “first opportunity to ground” decision is retrospectively judged to be wrong if, in the immediate future, another accident or cause-and-effect findings leads to the original decision being reversed. Using only data available at the time of the significant events, the analysis examines these risk-based decisions as if it they were made at the event’s instant in time. \u0000The event interval method identified five out of six “first opportunity to ground” decisions correctly, including the Concorde. According to these analyses, the FAA and its predecessor organizations made one correct decision out of five. Use of this method based on statistics and probability would have avoided 503 actual fatalities, plus 9.45 expected value fatalities from additional risk exposure due to flying statistically proven unreliable aircraft. In addition to the reversed decision standard for judging whether these decisions were wrong, the data show that a grounding of the DC-8 and a second grounding of the DC-6 would have been statistically appropriate — but these groundings did not occur. \u0000A specific objective of this paper is to lead the FAA and aircraft manufacturers to using event interval probabilistic analysis in grounding decisions and air-worthiness certification. The cause-and-effect data necessary to identify issues and make corrections are often sparse or nonexistent at the time of the event. Cause-and-effect data can take days or months to acquire and analyze, but event interval timing data are simple because system performance data are available at the instant the event occurs.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121710085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evidence for the Evidence","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i3.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.9","url":null,"abstract":"A few years ago, a colleague contacted me about a paper they were working on concerning the “evidence” they felt was needed to show that safety-critical software was indeed safe. I asked if there was any evidence that the long list of items they were developing had any proven efficacy for safety. That is, is there any evidence that the items actually reduce the risk of a mishap?","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127598192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ionizing Radiation Hazards: Dangerous Goods IV","authors":"R. Zito","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i3.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.16","url":null,"abstract":"The unwanted flow of matter is governed by chemical equations like Fick’s Law (diffusion of mass), the Arrhenius Law (rate of reaction), and most importantly the Nernst Equation (yielding the electrochemical potential of species). In addition to these chemical equations, the other unifying sutra (or “suture”) of eclectic dangerous goods problems, and the one that will be employed in this paper, is the construction of Gaussian surfaces through which energy may flow. This energy could be electromagnetic radiation, heat, ionizing radiation, non-ionizing radiation (light), acoustic energy, or even just fields. Once an equation is developed for the flow through a unit area of a Gaussian surface, a comparison can be made between an exposure and some Exposure Limit. And, there are many different types of limits depending on the conditions of the exposure. But, in general, if an exposure is below the Exposure Limit, then safety is implied. Above the limit, steps must be taken to provide shielding. \u0000In this paper, attention will be focused on the hazards produced by flows of ionizing radiation energy emitted from a source. Ionizing radiation can penetrate deeply into matter and is capable of removing electrons from neutral atoms all along its path. Such widespread damage can disrupt DNA and, ultimately, result in carcinogenic tumors.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133722234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Editor's Desk","authors":"Charles Muniak","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i2.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i2.18","url":null,"abstract":"A few people pointed out that there were some events at our recent International System Safety Conference (ISSC) that included some excellent discussions that were not documented with slides or papers. This is often the case with panels and roundtables. There was concern that important principles were discussed and might be lost. It is now my understanding that, at least in one case, there will be an effort to create a paper to provide some documentation.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122423104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tips and Lessons Learned for Conducting Safety Review Board Meetings","authors":"Robert Smith","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i2.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i2.22","url":null,"abstract":"At some point during a safety program’s lifecycle, presenting to an Independent Safety Review Board is likely. For the program representatives, including their safety lead, program manager, and supporting representatives (e.g., design engineers, software developers, test directors, etc.), this could be comparable to a full-scale audit on their program - and in some cases, it is! The fear that program representatives have with presenting to Safety Review Boards is the unknown. They may ask themselves: \u0000 \u0000What is going to be uncovered, or discovered? \u0000Will they be able to provide sufficient responses to address questions and concerns and defend our safety assessments? \u0000Will the Safety Review Board process delay the schedule? \u0000Are they going to miss a test event milestone? \u0000Will they make their Critical Design Review (CDR)? \u0000Will they meet their certification process? \u0000How much is this going to cost? \u0000Why do they need to provide all of this Objective Quality Evidence (OQE)? \u0000 \u0000This paper provides tips and highlights what programs should do, and should not do, based on lessons learned to have successful Safety Review Board meetings. The end goal of any successful Safety Review Board meeting is to ensure the safety program processes and analytical artifacts are adequate and well-established to properly identify and assess safety risks for the personnel, equipment and environment that will be exposed to potential hazards during the system’s lifecycle.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"135 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128617242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"TBD","authors":"Charles Hoes","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i2.20","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i2.20","url":null,"abstract":"The problem that we encounter is that we are always working with great uncertainty. The bulk of our activities occur before there is even a system to consider; there is only an idea of a system — and perhaps some bits and pieces to see and touch — but nothing that has been assembled and whose function we can observe. So we end up “imagining” what it is going to be like, and we make expert “judgments” (guesses?). Because we are just imagining a future system, we are unsure about many — perhaps most — of the details. Even if we have a finished prototype in front of us, we know very little about how the pieces were made, assembled or tested. We don’t know if there are defects in the design, or defects in manufacturing. We don’t really know about the details of the use environment. We don’t know much about the people who will use it, or what imaginative uses it might be put through.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123212084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Safety in Healthcare","authors":"D. Raheja, M. Escano","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i2.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i2.19","url":null,"abstract":"A Johns Hopkins study in 2018 claims that more than 250,000 people in the United States die every year from medical errors. Other reports claim the numbers to be as high as 440,000. At that time, medical errors are the third-leading cause of death, after heart disease and cancer. \u0000Hospitals make more money when they make mistakes, and reducing mistakes could actually cut into a hospital’s profits, according to a study by the managing director at the Boston Consulting Group, reported in The New York Times. This article shows very profitable examples of the good, as well as bad, practice of medicine.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129725945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Virtual Button and Graphical Interface System Safety Evaluation using System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)","authors":"Jesse Johnston, Mark A. Vernacchia","doi":"10.56094/jss.v56i2.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i2.21","url":null,"abstract":"System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is an extremely valuable methodology, especially when used early in a system’s concept phase, for effective and efficient development of safety requirements that address potential safety issues associated with human machine interactions. \u0000This paper outlines how STPA can be used to explore potential safety concerns associated with interactions between human operators and virtual buttons within graphical interfaces across the planned operational scenarios and expected system behaviors. Appropriately validated system safety requirements can be developed based on this exploratory effort. \u0000The paper shows how STPA includes drivers and operators as system elements within the control structure where these humans are expected to interact with a “system/feature of interest” by means of virtual buttons presented in a graphical interface. The inclusion of humans as elements of the control structure enables a representation of the human as a “human controller” and, as such, enables STPA evaluation techniques to be applied to them just as these techniques would be applied to any “control” element in a control structure.","PeriodicalId":250838,"journal":{"name":"Journal of System Safety","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121930909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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