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Inconsistency in the Law: In Search of a Balanced Norm 法律的不一致性:寻找平衡的规范
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.628387
C. Engel
{"title":"Inconsistency in the Law: In Search of a Balanced Norm","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.628387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.628387","url":null,"abstract":"The law is not a bunch of scattered rules, it is a body. This simple statement suffices to demonstrate that consistency is crucial for the law. Esteemed philosophers radicalise the statement: If it stops being consistent, to them the law is no longer the law. Consequently, consistency must be an absolute value, not to be traded against whatever competing normative concern. This paper adopts the opposite, consequentialist position. It takes consistency as a value, but one that bears balancing according to the principle of proportionality. In order to rationalise this balancing exercise, the paper does two things. It offers a taxonomy of consistency objects, and of ensuing definitions of consistency. Rules, authoritative statements of fact, output and outcome are taken up in turn. Definitions rely on mathematical set theory, and on basic concepts from statistics, like variance and skewedness. Secondly, the paper opposes the normative values in favour of legal consistency, and the concerns that might justify occasional deviations from this normative goal. It sketches the complementary implications of design for consistency and design for (some) inconsistency.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121656349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Banks Without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-Out Policies 没有降落伞的银行——政府救市政策的竞争效应
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.600901
Hendrik Hakenes, I. Schnabel
{"title":"Banks Without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-Out Policies","authors":"Hendrik Hakenes, I. Schnabel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.600901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.600901","url":null,"abstract":"The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition in the deposit market and depressing other banks' margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank's risk-taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of the banking sector.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115991515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 45
Is There an Optimization in Bounded Rationality? The Ratio of Aspiration Levels 有限理性是否存在最优化?吸气水平比
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.623721
Martin Beckenkamp
{"title":"Is There an Optimization in Bounded Rationality? The Ratio of Aspiration Levels","authors":"Martin Beckenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.623721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.623721","url":null,"abstract":"Simon’s (1955) famous paper was one of the first to cast doubt on the validity of rational choice theory; it has been supplemented by many more papers in the last three and a half decades. Nevertheless, rational choice theory plays a crucial role in classical and neoclassical economic theory, which presumes a completely rational agent. The central points characterizing such an agent are: (1) The agent uses all the information that is given to him. (2) The agent has clear preferences with respect to the results of different actions. (3) The agent has adequate competences to optimize his decisions. As an alternative to this conception, Simon (1955) himself suggests the concept of “bounded rationality”. In this context, Simon (1956) discusses a principle, which he names the “satisficing principle” (for explanations with respect to this notion cf. Gigerenzer & Todd 1999, p. 13). It assumes that, instead of searching for an optimal action, the search for an action terminates if an alternative has been found that satisfies a given “aspiration level”. It will be demonstrated that although the satisficing principle is nothing but a heuristic, there is a mathematical optimization at work when aspiration levels are used in this kind of problems. The question about the optimal aspiration level can be posed. Optimization within the framework of bounded rationality is possible. However, the way in which such an optimization can be achieved is very simple: Optimal thresholds in binary sequential decisions rest with the median.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134295586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional 中小企业和大企业的风险规避。当结果是多维的
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.567101
M. Hellwig
{"title":"Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567101","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, \"commodity specific greater risk aversion\", is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, \"uniformly greater risk aversion\" is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125791673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1129
Social Dilemmas, Revisited from a Heuristics Perspective 从启发式的角度重新审视社会困境
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.539442
C. Engel
{"title":"Social Dilemmas, Revisited from a Heuristics Perspective","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.539442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.539442","url":null,"abstract":"The standard tool for analysing social dilemmas is game theory. They are reconstructed as prisoner dilemma games. This is helpful for understanding the incentive structure. Yet this analysis is based on the classic homo oeconomicus assumptions. In many real world dilemma situations, these assumptions are misleading. A case in point is the contribution of households to climate change. Decisions about using cars instead of public transport, or about extensive air conditioning, are typically not based on ad hoc calculation. Rather, individuals rely on situational heuristics for the purpose. This paper does two things: it offers a model of heuristics, in the interest of making behaviour that is guided by heuristics comparable to behaviour based on rational reasoning. Based on this model, the paper determines the implications for the definition of social dilemmas. In some contexts, the social dilemma vanishes. In other contexts, it must be understood, and hence solved, in substantially different ways.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125948401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments 选择在社会困境实验中的作用
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-11-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.462420
F. Maier-Rigaud, Jose Apesteguia
{"title":"The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments","authors":"F. Maier-Rigaud, Jose Apesteguia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.462420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.462420","url":null,"abstract":"On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The present paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argument, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these findings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma form: the prisoner's dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players are given the possibility of choosing between two different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly higher in the games that were chosen.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"385 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127483038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Law and Economics: Methodological Problems 法律与经济学:方法论问题
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-10-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.462260
Petros A. Gemtos
{"title":"Law and Economics: Methodological Problems","authors":"Petros A. Gemtos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.462260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.462260","url":null,"abstract":"Recent developments in economics and the science of law emphasize their cooperation for a better understanding of social structures and interactions, an effective application of social scientific knowledge and a rational evaluation and implementation of social norms. There are, however, difficult methodological problems in this project : Whereas economics is mainly (with the exception of welfare economics) an empirical science which collects information about economic activities and the functioning of the economic system, the science of law is a normative discipline aiming at solving social conflicts and establishing rational principles for judicial decisions. This paper elaborates on a three level-scheme for the interdisciplinary cooperation of law and economics addressing the different problems positive and normative economics face when applying economic knowledge on legal matters. The economic analysis of law is proposed as a model for a general transformation of the traditionally hermeneutical jurisprudence into an analytic – normative science of law based on theoretical explanation and rational evaluation of the consequences of legal rules and principles.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130427878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach 集体行动的问题:一种新方法
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.399140
K. Holzinger
{"title":"The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach","authors":"K. Holzinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.399140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399140","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of collective action is usually identified with social dilemmas. A wider notion of the term collective action problem is introduced, as dilemmas are not the only problems to arise in collective action. The article first presents a typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis. Five types are distinguished: distribution, defection, co-ordination, disagreement, and instability problems. Second, the article discusses a number of proposals how to resolve these types of collective action problems, such as altruism, norms, focal points, correlated strategies, collective decision-making, external power, and sanctioning. Whereas the \"political\" solutions can be used to resolve all types of problems, the \"motivational\" solutions can only facilitate the resolution of some of the problems, and the \"rational expectation\" solutions can solve some types and help to solve others.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"218 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122989129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 26
European Environmental Governance in Transition? 转型中的欧洲环境治理?
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2002-08-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.324244
K. Holzinger, Christoph Knill
{"title":"European Environmental Governance in Transition?","authors":"K. Holzinger, Christoph Knill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.324244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.324244","url":null,"abstract":"If one considers the different environmental action programs of the EU in which the strategic orientation of the EU environmental policy is defined for the mid-range, one can hardly avoid the impression that there has been a comprehensive transformation in the ideas about political governance. On the one hand, since the middle of the eighties, there has been an increasing demand to introduce economic instruments. On the other hand, especially since the beginning of the nineties, context-oriented governance approaches have been emphasized. Since both the middle of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties, a regulatory policy paradigm switch has been explicitly called for in the respective programs, expressed in the language of \"second generation\" instruments or \"new regulatory approaches\". However, this transformation in the area of regulatory ideas is only partially reflected in changes in the concrete instruments that are used in the environmental policy legal acts of the EU. The discrepancy between the political declarations and action programs, on the one hand, and the actual decisions being made, on the other, is especially clear with respect to the economic instruments. But when measured in reference to the political demands, it also appears that relatively few context-oriented instruments have been introduced. Command-and-control instruments are still the dominant form of environmental policy governance in the EU.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":" 13","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132095851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Constitutional Court - Applying the Proportionality Principle - as a Subsidiary Authority for the Assessment of Political Outcomes 作为政治结果评价辅助机关的宪法裁判所——运用比例原则
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2002-01-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.296367
C. Engel
{"title":"The Constitutional Court - Applying the Proportionality Principle - as a Subsidiary Authority for the Assessment of Political Outcomes","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.296367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.296367","url":null,"abstract":"The Constitutional Court is one of the most characteristic features of the German constitution. The most important power of the Court rests in litigable fundamental rights. According to established jurisprudence, any governmental interference with freedom or property needs justification. It must pursue a legitimate aim, and the interference must be conducive to this end, it must be the least intrusive measure, and it may not be out of proportion. Conceptually, this dogmatic tool could become the vessel for a long-standing dream of (some) political scientists. It could turn the Constitutional Court into an authority for assessing political outcomes. The paper demonstrates the many obstacles, originating both from political sciences and from law. They call for high modesty and prudence. But they do not turn the dream into outright utopia. Systems theory, very liberally employed, allows us to define a subsidiary role for the Constitutional Court in assessing political outcomes. The paper concludes by analyzing the dogmatic consequences for the interpretation of fundamental rights.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122577768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
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