{"title":"Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567101","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, \"commodity specific greater risk aversion\", is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, \"uniformly greater risk aversion\" is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1129","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567101","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1129
Abstract
The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, "commodity specific greater risk aversion", is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, "uniformly greater risk aversion" is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.