中小企业和大企业的风险规避。当结果是多维的

M. Hellwig
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引用次数: 1129

摘要

本文讨论了在结果是多维的情况下比较决策者风险厌恶程度的标准。一个较弱的概念,“特定商品更大的风险厌恶”,是基于对特定商品支付的风险溢价的比较。一个更强大的概念,“统一更大的风险厌恶”是基于风险溢价的比较,而不管使用什么商品进行支付。这两个概念都没有假设von Neumann-Morgenstern效用函数是序数等价的。在具有隐藏特征的代理问题中,非增加的消费特定风险厌恶足以使随机化不受欢迎。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional
The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makers when outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, "commodity specific greater risk aversion", is based on the comparison of risk premia paid in a specified commodity. A stronger concept, "uniformly greater risk aversion" is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commodities are used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specific risk aversion is shown to be sufficient to make randomization undesirable in an agency problem with hidden characteristics.
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