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The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation Under Decreasing Risk Aversion 风险规避降低下随机所得税的不可取性
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.873432
M. Hellwig
{"title":"The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation Under Decreasing Risk Aversion","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.873432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.873432","url":null,"abstract":"For the standard specification of the utilitarian optimal income tax problem with hidden characteristics, the paper shows that randomized tax schemes are undesirable if preferences exhibit a property of weakly decreasing risk aversion according to the multidimensional risk aversion concept of Hellwig (2004). The property of decreasing risk aversion also implies uniqueness of the optimal income tax schedule and continuity in cases where the type distribution has a continuous density.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131697615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence 排斥与公共产品的提供——实验证据
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.869208
F. Maier-Rigaud, P. Martinsson, Gianandrea Staffiero
{"title":"Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence","authors":"F. Maier-Rigaud, P. Martinsson, Gianandrea Staffiero","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.869208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869208","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant. This effect is in contrast to alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114761213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy 两阶级经济中的最优所得税和公共产品供给
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.869213
Felix J. Bierbrauer
{"title":"Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy","authors":"Felix J. Bierbrauer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.869213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869213","url":null,"abstract":"This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-rider problem in public good provision. There are two groups of individuals with private information on their earning ability and their valuation of a public good. Adjustments of the transfer system are needed to discourage the more productive from exaggerating the desirability of public good provision. Similarly, the less productive need to be prevented from understating their valuation. Relative to an optimal income tax, which focuses solely on earning ability, income transfers are increased whenever a public good is installed and are decreased otherwise.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132670148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Behavioural Analysis: A User Manual for Lawyers 行为分析:律师使用手册
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.834505
Christoph Engel
{"title":"Behavioural Analysis: A User Manual for Lawyers","authors":"Christoph Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.834505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.834505","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioural law and economics is a growing industry. In its neighbourhood, old contacts between lawyers and psychologists are revitalised, and redirected to understanding and designing the law as a governance tool. This is promising work. But lawyers fascinated by behavioural analysis are frequently unaware of the potential pitfalls and caveats. Experimental data do not necessarily respond to legally relevant questions. Often data is missing where it would be most urgent from a legal perspective. Unfortunately, many behavioural phenomena are undertheorised, so that the missing data may not easily be replaced by hypotheses based on general principles. Moreover, the doctrinal interfaces to behavioural analysis must be properly designed, as should be done with the normative theory justifying legal responses to behavioural findings.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"20 2-3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132845450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance 市场纪律、信息处理与公司治理
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.873431
M. Hellwig
{"title":"Market Discipline, Information Processing, and Corporate Governance","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.873431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.873431","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reviews and assesses our understanding of the notion of “market discipline” in corporate governance. It questions the wholesale appeal to this notion in policy discussion, which fails to provide an account of the underlying mechanisms in terms of theory and empirical analysis. Discipline that is provided by the “market” must be compared to discipline that is provided by other institutions, e.g., intermediaries acting as “delegated monitors”. The comparative assessment depends on (i) the information technology, (ii) the role of strategic interactions, and (iii) the disciplinary mechanism itself. Concerning (i), the question is whether the benefits of multiple sources of information exceed the costs. Concerning (ii), strategic interactions concern the free-rider problem in acquiring information that benefits all financiers, as well as distributive externalities involved in exploiting an information advantage to the detriment of other financiers. Concerning (iii), the question is whether investors have explicit intervention rights or whether “discipline” results from managerial acquiescence. As for the acquisition and aggregation of information in organized markets, positive welfare effects arise only if the information is put to productive use, either through improvements in real investment and managerial incentives, or through changes in corporate control. Necessary conditions for such benefits to arise are fairly restrictive, especially if the changes that occur are based on managerial acquiescence rather than the legal intervention rights of investors. The expansion of market-based managerial incentives in the nineties had little to do with these theoretical accounts. The experience of moral hazard that has accompanied this expansion, on the side of gatekeeping institutions as well as corporate management, confirms the predictions of theory about the potential for shortfalls in market discipline and the agency costs of equity finance through the open market.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133790067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 36
Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model 可控性企业设计:一个委托-代理-监督模型
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.796705
C. Engel
{"title":"Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.796705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.796705","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate actors differ from individuals in one important respect: technically, it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to impact on its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technology is inducing corporate actors to hire an interface actor, representing the regulatory cause at the interior of the firm. Regulators are corporate actors as well. Statutes usually do not fully determine their behaviour. Therefore, firms may induce the regulator to give an interface actor access to the regulatory arena. This interface actor has the task of representing the commercial cause in regulatory decision-making. The paper uses a principal-agent-supervisor model to analyse each of these cases separately, and to demonstrate how the reciprocal nature of the relationship may be exploited.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129003469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Cost and Benefits from Infrastructure Competition. Estimating Welfare Effects from Broadband Access Competition 基础设施竞争的成本与收益。估计宽带接入竞争的福利效应
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.643461
{"title":"Cost and Benefits from Infrastructure Competition. Estimating Welfare Effects from Broadband Access Competition","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.643461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.643461","url":null,"abstract":"Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000-04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125658680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 130
Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy 完全复制经济中的利他主义和慈善捐赠
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.703641
Thomas Gaube
{"title":"Altruism and Charitable Giving in a Fully Replicated Economy","authors":"Thomas Gaube","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.703641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.703641","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, an economy is analyzed where one group of agents, the altruists, cares about the well-being of another group of agents, the recipients. It is asked how changes in the size of these groups affect the altruists' charitable giving in the Nash equilibrium. I show that a pure group size effect, i.e., a proportional expansion of both subgroups can lead to less free riding and to a lower degree of underprovision relative to the efficient level of charitable giving.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114346817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Making New Law. The Limits of Expert Advice 制定新法。专家建议的局限性
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.665521
Christoph Engel
{"title":"Making New Law. The Limits of Expert Advice","authors":"Christoph Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.665521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.665521","url":null,"abstract":"Doctrine is a protective tool. It shields individual lawyers from political vulnerability. They are only executing the legislator's will, or they are embedded in the legal system when relying on precedents. All lawyers know that there is an element of fiction in this narrative. Doctrine usually leaves significant room for decision making. The borderline between applying the existing and making new law is never a clear one. And not all lawyers do doctrinal work. Others openly contribute to legal reform. This paper claims that professional lawyers do indeed have a proper role in designing new law. They can help making this a more rational endeavour. Yet there is a long list of caveats to this statement: complexity and uncertainty, epistemic limitations, the autonomy of addressees and their social embeddedness, fundamental normative relativity and the autonomy of law as an institution: all of these have to be taken into account. They make the advice of legal experts more demanding and less reliable. Yet there are ways to maintain a role for expert advice, sketched in the conclusions of the paper.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124844796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Switching Costs in Retroactive Rebates - What's Time Got to Do with it? 追溯性回扣的转换成本——时间与成本有何关系?
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2005-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.666722
F. Maier-Rigaud
{"title":"Switching Costs in Retroactive Rebates - What's Time Got to Do with it?","authors":"F. Maier-Rigaud","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.666722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.666722","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the role of the reference period in assessing switching costs in retroactive rebates. A retroactive rebate allows a firm to use the inelastic portion of demand as leverage to decrease price in the elastic portion of demand, thereby artificially increasing switching costs of buyers. I identify two factors that determine the extent to which retroactive rebates, as a form of infra-personal price-discrimination, can result in potential market foreclosure. These two factors are the rebate percentage and the threshold at which this percentage is retroactively applied. In contrast to the existing literature, the length of the reference period within which a rebate scheme applies is demonstrated to be at best an indirect approximation of the potential foreclosure effects of a rebate.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129122032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
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