F. Maier-Rigaud, P. Martinsson, Gianandrea Staffiero
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Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence
We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant. This effect is in contrast to alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.