排斥与公共产品的提供——实验证据

F. Maier-Rigaud, P. Martinsson, Gianandrea Staffiero
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引用次数: 16

摘要

在一个具有固定合作伙伴设计的线性公共物品实验中,我们分析了排斥对合作的影响。我们的研究结果表明,引入排斥会增加贡献水平。尽管群体规模因排斥而减少,但对收益的净影响是积极而显著的。这种效应与公共物品实验文献中研究的旨在提高合作率的其他机制形成对比。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence
We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment with fixed partner design. Our results show that introducing ostracism increases contribution levels. Despite reductions in group size due to ostracism, the net effect on earnings is positive and significant. This effect is in contrast to alternative mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation rates studied in the literature on public good experiments.
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