Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"The Aggregate and the Representation of its Parts","authors":"A. Ostmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1024681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1024681","url":null,"abstract":"The main concern of this contribution is to review the approach Condorcet applied to problems of aggregation and representation. The modern viewpoint usually chosen for these topic is mainly driven by social choice theory. Here the viewpoint was altered and the problems and solutions were presented in a setting which uses cooperative game theory. After the introductory notes on Condorcet's basic ideas, we follow one logical path for an initial analysis of rules (Section 3). We present some new facts on the solutions to stand-offs. After connecting the logical approach and the social choice approach in Section 4, we discuss the probabilistic models introduced by Condorcet (Section 5). In Section 6 we provide additional structural insight, which can be derived from the game theoretic viewpoint. Based on the results of the previous sections, in Section 7 we analyse representation procedures. We develop a major tool for representation, namely the minimal representation of a weighted majority game. We discuss its construction and provide examples based on the results of the German Bundestag election in the year 2005.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127604397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Determine Whether Regional Markets are Integrated? Theory and Evidence from European Electricity Markets","authors":"G. Gebhardt, Felix Höffler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1074983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1074983","url":null,"abstract":"Prices may di er between regional markets if transport capacities are limited. We develop a new approach to determine to which extent such di erences stem from limited participation in cross-border trader rather than from bottlenecks. We derive a theoretical integration benchmark for the typical case where transportation markets clear before the product markets, using Grossman's (1976) notion of a rational expectations equilibrium. We compare the benchmark to data from European electricity markets. The data reject the integration hypothesis: Capacity prices contain too little information about spot price di erential; this indicates that well informed traders do not engage in cross-border trade.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129268527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incentives for Process Innovation in a Collusive Duopoly","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.991071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991071","url":null,"abstract":"Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off, and thereby affects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive case.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133827938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Demand for Storage of Natural Gas in Northwestern Europe: Trends 2005-2030","authors":"Felix Höffler, M. Kübler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.906992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906992","url":null,"abstract":"The seasonal demand for natural gas requires supply flexibility. This \"swing\" is now largely provided in northwestern Europe by indigenous production. Declining reserves will increase the dependency on imports from far-off sources, which are less flexible. Hence, flexibility must be provided by additional storage. We estimate that in 2030 between 10 (with no strategic storage) and 29 (with 10 per cent strategic storage for imports from non-EU countries) billion cubic meter of working gas volume will be required, in addition to the existing 40 billion cubic meters. This estimation is based on production and consumption forecasts for natural gas and observations of the relationship between the supply and demand of gas and the supply and demand of flexibility in the period 1995-2005. We provide different scenarios to check for the robustness of our results. We discuss the impact of third-party access to storage facilities on incentives to close the storage gap, as well as policy implications of strategic storage obligations.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":" 45","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113948994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games","authors":"Martin Beckenkamp, Heike Hennig�?Schmidt, F. Maier-Rigaud","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.968942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968942","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117055322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.957988","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.957988","url":null,"abstract":"From the angle of competition policy, voice-over IP looks like a panacea. It not only brings better service, but it also increases competitive pressure on former telecommunications monopolists. This paper points to the largely overlooked downside. In a pure world of Internet telephony, there would be no charge for individual calls, nor for telephony, as distinct from other services running over the uniform network. Specifically, establishing property rights for either of these would be costly, whereas these property rights were automatic and free of charge in switched telephony. Giving voice-over IP providers classic telephone numbers would enhance systems competition with switched telephony. But this would make it more difficult for clients to swap providers. The anti-competitive caller-pays principle would extend to IP telephony.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130963599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Private Damage Claims and the Passing-On Defense in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases: An Economist's Perspective","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.936153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.936153","url":null,"abstract":"The paper studies the assessment of private damages that the cartelization of a market imposes on buyers in that market and, possibly, on the buyers’ own customers in further market downstream. Abstracting from procedural problems and focussing on conceptual issues, the paper argues that damages comprise not just the overcharge on the actual quantity purchased, but also foregone profits on the units that are not purchased because the cartel price is higher than the competitive price. The paper also argues that the passing-on defense against claims by direct buyers is flawed because it neglects the business loss effect that is associated with a direct buyer’s raising his own price to pass the higher cartel price on to his own customers. If direct buyers are not in competition with each other, a revealed-preference argument shows that the business loss effect on the direct buyer’s profits is necessarily greater than the effect of the increase in revenues per unit that is sold. The overcharge on the actual quantity purchased again is a lower bound for actual damages. The assessment of damages suffered by indirect buyers is independent of this refutation of the passing-on defense. If direct buyers are in competition with each other, there is an additional business gain effect because the cartelization upstream raises rivals’ costs and thereby affects the competition between the direct buyers. In this case, the assessment of damages depends on the treatment of causation i.e., to what extent a direct buyer’s competitors’ price increases are ascribed to the cartelization upstream. Consistency requires that, for claims raised at the level of direct and indirect buyers alike, the same treatment of causation should be used. Either the cartel members should be held responsible for the entire shift in the equilibrium of the strategic game between direct buyers in suits involving indirect buyers, as well as direct buyers, or a ceteris paribus assumption should be applied to the actions of a direct buyer’s competitors, which eliminates the business gain effect resulting from their price increases. In the latter treatment, which seems conceptually and procedurally the simplest, the overcharge on the actual quantity purchased is again a lower bound for actual damages.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130477692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision","authors":"Sven J. Fischer, A. Nicklisch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.936154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.936154","url":null,"abstract":"We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both to the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall efficiency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances efficiency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129658102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Herd Moves? Emergence and Self-Organization in Collective Actors","authors":"Martin Beckenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.929091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.929091","url":null,"abstract":"The puzzle about collective actors is in the focus of this contribution. The first section enters into the question of the adequateness and inadequateness of reductionist explanations for the description of entities. The considerations in this part do not draw on systems and hence not on principles of self-organisation, because this concept necessitates a systemic view. In other words, the first section discusses reductionism and holism on a very general level. The scope of these arguments goes far beyond self-organising systems. Pragmatically, these arguments will be discussed within the domain of corporative actors. Emergence is a concept embedded in system theory. Therefore, in the second part the previous general considerations about holism are integrated with respect to the concept “emergence”. In order to close the argument by exactly characterising self-organising systems and giving the conceptual link between self-organisation and emergence – which is done in the section four – the third section generally conceptualises systems. This conceptualisation is independent of whether these systems are self-organising or not. Feedback loops are specified as an essential component of systems. They establish the essential precondition of system-theoretic models where causes may also be effects and vice versa. System-theory is essential for dynamic models like ecological models and network thinking. In the fourth part mathematical chaos-theory bridges the gap between the presentation of systems in general and the constricted consideration of self-organising systems. The capability to behave or react chaotically is a necessary precondition of self-organisation. Nevertheless, there are striking differences in the answers given from theories of self-organisation in biology, economics or sociology on the question “What makes the whole more than the sum of its parts?” The fracture seems particularly salient at the borderline between formal-mathematical sciences like natural sciences including economy and other social sciences like sociology, for instance in the understanding and conceptualisation of “chaos” or “complexity”. Sometimes it creates the impression that originally well defined concepts from mathematics and natural science are metaphorically used in social sciences. This is a further reason why this paper concentrates on conceptualisations of self-organisation from natural sciences. The fifth part integrates the arguments from a system-theoretic point of view given in the three previous sections with respect to collective and corporative actors. Due to his prominence all five sections sometimes deal with the sociological system theory by Niklas Luhmann, especially in those parts with rigorous and important differences between his conception and the view given in this text. Despite Luhmann’s undoubted prominence in sociology, the present text strives for a more analytical and formal understanding of social systems and tries to find a base for an","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122565990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Noisy Commitments: The Impact of Information Accuracy on Efficiency","authors":"A. Nicklisch, E. Ert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.887263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.887263","url":null,"abstract":"We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in this game does not affect efficiency. We find that accurate commitments promote efficiency, as expected by game theory. However, noisy commitments are found to impair efficiency. We explain this effect by the differences between incentives off the equilibrium path under conditions of accurate commitments and noisy commitments. This difference changes the game structure and in the current game facilitates more random responses.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115468522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}