对称与非对称囚徒困境博弈中的合作

Martin Beckenkamp, Heike Hennig�?Schmidt, F. Maier-Rigaud
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引用次数: 45

摘要

实验研究了固定伙伴设计中40期囚徒困境博弈中不对称对合作的影响。我们区分了高收益和低收益对称囚徒困境,以及由两种对称囚徒困境组合而成的非对称博弈。不对称显著降低了合作,因为低类型的参与者更容易在相互合作后叛变,而高类型的参与者更容易发起合作。不对称对合作的稳定性也有显著的负面影响,使得长序列的相互合作极为罕见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games
We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.
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