{"title":"双头垄断企业过程创新的激励机制","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.991071","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off, and thereby affects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive case.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Incentives for Process Innovation in a Collusive Duopoly\",\"authors\":\"C. Engel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.991071\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off, and thereby affects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive case.\",\"PeriodicalId\":247961,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"192 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991071\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991071","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Incentives for Process Innovation in a Collusive Duopoly
Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude. Gains from collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution. In the first period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Innovation changes the status quo pay-off, and thereby affects the distribution of the gains from collusion. The resulting innovation incentive is strictly smaller than in the competitive case.
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