发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Experts and Decision Making: First Steps towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts 专家和决策:迈向新手、中级和专家统一决策理论的第一步
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2009-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1337449
B. Herbig, A. Glöckner
{"title":"Experts and Decision Making: First Steps towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts","authors":"B. Herbig, A. Glöckner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1337449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337449","url":null,"abstract":"Expertise research shows quite ambiguous results on the abilities of experts in judgment and decision making (JDM) classic models cannot account for. This problem becomes even more accentuated if different levels of expertise are considered. We argue that parallel constraint satisfaction models (PCS) might be a useful base to understand the processes underlying expert JDM and the hitherto existing, differentiated results from expertise research. It is outlined how expertise might influence model parameters and mental representations according to PCS. It is discussed how this differential impact of expertise on model parameters relates to empirical results showing quite different courses in the development of expertise; allowing, for example, to predict under which conditions intermediates might outperform experts. Methodological requirements for testing the proposed unifying theory under complex real-world conditions are discussed.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124502245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics 重新审视环境困境:制度工效学视角下的结构性后果
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2009-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1337447
Martin Beckenkamp
{"title":"Environmental Dilemmas Revisited: Structural Consequences from the Angle of Institutional Ergonomics","authors":"Martin Beckenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1337447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337447","url":null,"abstract":"The structure of a social dilemma lies behind many environmental problems. Mingling temporal aspects of resources with the structure of the social dilemma often leads to wrong conclusions. Therefore, it is worth analytically separating temporal aspects from structural aspects of the dilemma. This article concentrates solely on the structural aspects of the dilemma and the grades of complexity with respect to the number and stakes of the people involved, as well as the asymmetry of endowments and the salience of the optimal use of the resource in order to come close to the welfare optimum. Dilemmas with sufficient complexity are extremely vulnerable to individual defectors, and therefore institutions are necessary for the solution of the dilemma. Consequently, research in environmental psychology should not only target the individuals, but focus on institutional design with respect to (1) the structural diagnosis of environmental dilemmas; (2) methods that provide an insight into the structural problem of environmental dilemmas; (3) the impact of institutions on internalizing norms; and (4) the impact of structural knowledge about the dilemma of accepting institutions that help to solve the environmental dilemma. In analogy to software-ergonomics, psychology should initiate research in institutional ergonomics that helps to create addressee-friendly institutions.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115680730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma 社会困境中合作的非对称强制执行
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1431904
N. Nikiforakis, Hans-Theo Normann, Brian Wallace
{"title":"Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma","authors":"N. Nikiforakis, Hans-Theo Normann, Brian Wallace","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1431904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431904","url":null,"abstract":"We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134291882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 70
A Note on Deaton's Theorem on the Undesirability of Nonuniform Excise Taxation 关于不统一消费税不可取性的迪顿定理的注解
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1310004
M. Hellwig
{"title":"A Note on Deaton's Theorem on the Undesirability of Nonuniform Excise Taxation","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1310004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1310004","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides an extension and a new proof of Deaton's theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when income taxes are affine and preferences over consumption goods are separable from labour-leisure choices, homothetic, and identical across agents.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133887436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law 国际法中的民主目的论原则
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1135197
Niels Petersen
{"title":"The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law","authors":"Niels Petersen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1135197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1135197","url":null,"abstract":"In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin wall, legal scholars initiated a debate on the existence of a right to democratic governance in international law. Many of the adherents to the democratic entitlement school seem to assume that democratization is a simple shift in the political status, a change from one form of government to another. This contribution seeks to analyze this underlying assumption by taking a look at the current discussion on democratization theory in the political sciences. Through this lens, it will reconsider the international practice and the corresponding legal documents related to the existence of a possible democracy principle. In this respect, a special emphasis will be put on three areas of potential precedents – resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the practice of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States or the African Union, and military interventions in the name of democracy. The analysis will show that the legitimacy principle of international law is, at the same time, more modest and more demanding than the claim of the democratic entitlement school. It will be argued that democracy is no strict obligation, but rather a teleological principle. States are obliged to develop towards democracy and to consolidate and to optimize democracy, once electoral institutions have been established.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130043307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Fifty Years of Exploring the Interface Between Law and Economics 五十年来探索法律与经济学之间的联系
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1134782
C. Engel
{"title":"Fifty Years of Exploring the Interface Between Law and Economics","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1134782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1134782","url":null,"abstract":"In the US, law and economics is so well established that many law schools have given up on a separate law and economics course. It seems obvious that economic theory matters for the interpretation and the evolution of the law. More recently, the empirical law movement has been gaining momentum which, in its majority, is an application of econometrics to legal issues. Compared to its American counterpart, German legal scholarship looks very different. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker has been one of the first German law professors to argue in economic terms, and he has always contrasted German with US law. Yet even this pioneer of a transnational perspective on German law cautions against the dangers of taking economics too seriously. He insists on the law being a tool for governing life, which excludes overly stringent methodology. In economic argument he misses freedom as a normative category that does not collapse with efficiency. He believes that evolutionary economics is much better suited to help the law than neoclassical models. And he is very critical of Richard Posner's work, which he dubs; A Legal Theory without Law.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131307327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cartels, Managerial Incentives, and Productive Efficiency in German Coal Mining, 1881-1913 卡特尔、管理激励和德国煤矿的生产效率，1881-1913
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1160135
C. Burhop, Thorsten Lübbers
{"title":"Cartels, Managerial Incentives, and Productive Efficiency in German Coal Mining, 1881-1913","authors":"C. Burhop, Thorsten Lübbers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1160135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1160135","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germany’s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124890489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 25
Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision 税收与公共物品供给的最优民主机制
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-03-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1133400
Felix J. Bierbrauer, Marco Sahm
{"title":"Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision","authors":"Felix J. Bierbrauer, Marco Sahm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1133400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133400","url":null,"abstract":"We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"395 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133545766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Do People Make Decisions Under Risk Based on Ignorance? An Empirical Test of the Priority Heuristic Against Cumulative Prospect Theory 人们在风险下做决定是基于无知吗?优先启发式对累积前景理论的实证检验
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1101442
A. Glöckner, Tilmann Betsch
{"title":"Do People Make Decisions Under Risk Based on Ignorance? An Empirical Test of the Priority Heuristic Against Cumulative Prospect Theory","authors":"A. Glöckner, Tilmann Betsch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1101442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101442","url":null,"abstract":"Brandstatter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore information. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice patterns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predic-tions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115412951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 118
A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints 单调性约束控制问题的一个极大值原理
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2008-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1101438
M. Hellwig
{"title":"A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1101438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101438","url":null,"abstract":"The paper develops a version of Pontryagin's maximum principle for optimal control problems with monotonicity constraints on control variables. Whereas the literature handles such constraints by imposing an assumption of piecewise smoothness on the control variable and treating the slope of this variable as a new control variable subject to a nonnegativity constraint, the paper obtains the maximum principle without such an additional assumption. The result is useful for studying incentive problems with hidden characteristics when the type set is a continuum and preferences satisfy a single-crossing constraint.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123734175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信