{"title":"Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights","authors":"J. Jansen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1507667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1507667","url":null,"abstract":"I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equilibrium at most one firm shares some of its technologies. For similar technology distributions, there exists an equilibrium in which nobody shares. If the technology distributions are skewed towards efficient technologies, then there may exist equilibria in which one firm shares all technologies, only the best technologies, or only intermediate technologies. No other equilibria can exist.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133019918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prices versus Quantities in Electricity Generation","authors":"Mark Hahmeier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1463253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463253","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the prices versus quantities issue, originally raised by Weitzman [8], in the context of carbon dioxide emissions and with a special focus on electricity generation. Within a simplied model of the electricity market, in which we explicitly allow for a monopolistic gas supplier, we employ a game-theoretic approach and ask, from a welfare perspective, for the superior regulatory regime in response to an expected exercise of market power. Our analysis studies the optimal regulation in each regime and shows that, in the presence of market power in the gas market, taxes rather than permits are the regulator’s welfare-maximizing regime choice.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132995519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents","authors":"A. Gizatulina, M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1463254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463254","url":null,"abstract":"For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123177336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Historical Market for Technology Licenses: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Electrical Engineering in Imperial Germany","authors":"C. Burhop, Thorsten Luebbers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1463249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1463249","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. A regression analysis shows that licensing contracts closed before a patent was granted and contracts closed between firms and individual inventors had a higher probability of including a profit-sharing clause. This supports Jensen and Thursby’s (2001) model, who propose equity-sharing licensing contracts to solve moral hazard problems. Moreover, we show that milestones were a substitute for profit shares. Furthermore, exclusive licences offered a significantly higher profit share to the licensor.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126373652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance","authors":"C. Traxler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1470635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1470635","url":null,"abstract":"A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below-average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare result. For a right-skewed distribution of taxed income, we show that the political distortion from majority voting is increasing in the median voter's avoidance. Vice versa, keeping the decisive voter's avoidance constant, the political inefficiency is decreasing in the average level of avoidance in the economy.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121162979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parallel Constraint Satisfaction in Memory-Based Decisions","authors":"A. Glöckner, Sara D. Hodges","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1423728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1423728","url":null,"abstract":"Three studies sought to investigate decision strategies in memory-based decisions and to test the predictions of the parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model for decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Time pressure was manipulated and the model was compared against simple heuristics (take the best and equal weight) and a weighted additive strategy. From PCS we predicted that fast intuitive decision making is based on compensatory information integration and that decision time increases and confidence decreases with increasing inconsistency in the decision task. In line with these predictions we observed a predominant usage of compensatory strategies under all time-pressure conditions and even with decision times as short as 1.7 s. For a substantial number of participants, choices and decision times were best explained by PCS, but there was also evidence for use of simple heuristics. The time-pressure manipulation did not significantly affect decision strategies. Overall, the results highlight intuitive, automatic processes in decision making and support the idea that human information-processing capabilities are less severely bounded than often assumed.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125415511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods","authors":"Felix J. Bierbrauer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1423724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1423724","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125219971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Real Wages and Labour Productivity in Britain and Germany, 1871-1938: A Unified Approach to the International Comparison of Living Standards","authors":"S. Broadberry, C. Burhop","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1423742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1423742","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the period 1871-1938, the average British worker was better off than the average German worker, but there were significant differences between major sectors. For the aggregate economy, the real wage gap was about the same as the labour productivity gap, but again there were important sectoral differences. Compared to their productivity, German industrial workers were poorly paid, whereas German agricultural and service sector employees were overpaid. This affected the competitiveness of the two countries in these sectors. There were also impor-tant differences in comparative real wages by skill level, affecting the extent of poverty.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124270122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation? An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced Decision Modes","authors":"N. Horstmann, Andrea Ahlgrimm, A. Glöckner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1393729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393729","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, numerous studies comparing intuition and deliberation have been published. However, relatively little is known about the cognitive processes underlying the two decision modes. In two studies, we analyzed the effects of decision mode instructions on processes of information search and integration, using eye-tracking technology in a between-participants (Study 1) and a within-participants (Study 2) design. Our findings indicate that the instruction to deliberate does not necessarily lead to qualitatively different information processing compared to the instruction to decide intuitively. We found no difference in mean fixation duration and the distribution of short, medium and long fixations. Short fixations in particular prevailed under both decision mode instructions, while long fixations indicating a conscious and calculation-based information processing were rarely observed. Instruction-induced deliberation led to a higher number of fixations, a more complete information search and more repeated information inspections. We interpret our findings as support for the hypothesis that intuitive and deliberate decision modes share the same basic processes which are supplemented by additional operations in the deliberate decision mode.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"308 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122982921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coherence Shifts in Probabilistic Inference Tasks","authors":"A. Glöckner, Tilmann Betsch, N. Schindler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1160146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1160146","url":null,"abstract":"The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non-reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel-constraint-satisfaction model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively af-fect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model’s simulation, we predicted the direction of such coherence shifts.Cue validities were measured before, after (Exp. 1) and during judgment (Exp. 2 & 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real-world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast-and-frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city-size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132408758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}