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The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: Customary Law in the Lab 行为与规范期望的共同进化:实验室中的习惯法
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1983946
C. Engel, Michael Kurschilgen
{"title":"The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: Customary Law in the Lab","authors":"C. Engel, Michael Kurschilgen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1983946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983946","url":null,"abstract":"Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims. We show that the willingness to overcome a dilemma transcends self-interest. Cooperation is significantly higher in the presence of a meta-rule for the formation of customary law. Yet only if it is backed up by sanctions, law is significantly more effective than mere comity. Customary law guides behaviour into the normatively desired direction as normative expectations and behavioural patterns coevolve.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125525663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What Numbers to Choose for My Lottery Ticket? Behavior Anomalies in the Chinese Online Lottery Market 我的彩票应该选什么号码?中国网络彩票市场的行为异常
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1926526
J. Ding
{"title":"What Numbers to Choose for My Lottery Ticket? Behavior Anomalies in the Chinese Online Lottery Market","authors":"J. Ding","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1926526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1926526","url":null,"abstract":"The Chinese Online Lottery provides field evidence of three anomalies. The first anomaly, which has previously not been documented when there is a financial incentive to overcome, is the guidance effect. Since the target game in this project is a pari-mutuel game, which means people will share the jackpot with other winners, the best strategy should be to choose the least popular numbers among others – information that people could obtain on the webpage. However, to my surprise, instead of doing so, people would choose the most popular numbers among others. The second anomaly tested is the gambler’s fallacy. Although it is proved that the gambler’s fallacy does exist, the influence lasts only three days, which is much shorter than prior research. Furthermore, the dataset’s availability makes it possible to show how the two fallacies unfold over time within a round. This was unlikely before the phenomenon of online betting. The result demonstrates that later entrants are subject to more fallacies than earlier ones. Finally, the paper adds to the evidence showing the additional, culturally contingent pull of special numbers. In China, bettors prefer to choose the lucky number 8, even it won the game in prior rounds, but they are reluctant to choose the unlucky number 14 even it has not been picked for a long while.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129147522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
From Posteriors to Priors Via Cycles: An Addendum 通过循环从后到前:附录
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1839226
M. Hellwig
{"title":"From Posteriors to Priors Via Cycles: An Addendum","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1839226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1839226","url":null,"abstract":"Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given specification of posteriors of different players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the partition of this player has a nonempty intersection with any element of the partition of any other player, then it suffices to verify the cycle equations for all cycles of length 4 or less.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131256862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? 危机后的资本监管:一切照旧?
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1645224
M. Hellwig
{"title":"Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1645224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645224","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the reform of capital regulation of banks in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2009. Whereas the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seems to go for marginal changes here and there, the paper calls for a thorough overhaul, moving away from risk calibration and raising capital requirements very substantially. The argument is based on the observation that the current system of risk-calibrated capital requirements, in particular under the model-based approach, played a key role in allowing banks to be undercapitalized prior to the crisis, with strong systemic effects for deleveraging multipliers and for the functioning of interbank markets. The argument is also based on the observation that the current system has no theoretical foundation, its objectives are ill-specified, and its effects have not been thought through, either for the individual bank or for the system as a whole. Objections to substantial increases in capital requirements rest on arguments that run counter to economic logic or are themselves evidence of moral hazard and a need for regulation.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127768533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 182
On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two-Person Cooperation Game 二人合作博弈中框架效应的普遍性研究
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1626159
Sebastian J. Goerg, G. Walkowitz
{"title":"On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two-Person Cooperation Game","authors":"Sebastian J. Goerg, G. Walkowitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1626159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1626159","url":null,"abstract":"In this experimental study, involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel), we test for a presentation bias in a two-person cooperation game. In the positive frame of the game, a transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player, and in the negative frame, a negative one. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem, no framing effect is observed. These findings are also reflected in associated first-order beliefs. We argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of different presentations of identical decision problems within (cross-cultural) research on subject-pool differences.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125033916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 55
The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process 司法机构在公共决策过程中的角色
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1617196
Giuseppe Albanese, M. Sorge
{"title":"The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process","authors":"Giuseppe Albanese, M. Sorge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1617196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1617196","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to influence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117166452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Pareto-Frontier in a Simple Mirrleesian Model of Income Taxation 所得税简单镜像模型中的帕累托边界
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1604373
Felix J. Bierbrauer, P. Boyer
{"title":"The Pareto-Frontier in a Simple Mirrleesian Model of Income Taxation","authors":"Felix J. Bierbrauer, P. Boyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1604373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1604373","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. We show how the second-best frontier which incorporates incentive constraints due to private information on productive abilities relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource constraints into account. In particular, we argue that the second-best frontier can be interpreted as a Laffer-curve. We also use this second-best frontier for a comparative statics analysis of how optimal income tax rates vary with the degree of inequity aversion, and for a characterization of optimal public-good provision. We show that a more inequity averse policy maker chooses tax schedules that are more redistributive and involve higher marginal tax rates, while simultaneously providing less public good.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131557296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Incentive Problems with Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A Uni…fied Approach 具有单维隐藏特征的激励问题:一种统一的方法
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.949440
M. Hellwig
{"title":"Incentive Problems with Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A Uni…fied Approach","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.949440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.949440","url":null,"abstract":"The paper develops a technique for studying incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics in a way that is independent of whether the type set is nite, the type distribution has a continuous density, or the type distribution has both mass points and an atomless part. By this technique, the proposition that optimal incentive schemes induce no distortion \"at the top\" and downward distortions \"below the top\" is extended to arbitrary type distributions. However, mass points in the interior of the type set require pooling with adjacent higher types and, unless there are other complications, a discontinuous jump in the transition from adjacent lower types.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127712190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 47
Ambiguous Act Equilibria 模糊行为平衡
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2010-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1586771
Sophie Bade
{"title":"Ambiguous Act Equilibria","authors":"Sophie Bade","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1586771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1586771","url":null,"abstract":"A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of \"independent strategies\" as well as of \"common priors\" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially di erent predictions – even for the case with just two players.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"683 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116109972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 86
Game Over: Empirical Support for Soccer Bets Regulation 游戏结束:对足球博彩监管的实证支持
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2009-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1724602
E. Towfigh, A. Glöckner
{"title":"Game Over: Empirical Support for Soccer Bets Regulation","authors":"E. Towfigh, A. Glöckner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1724602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1724602","url":null,"abstract":"In many countries, betting in sports is highly regulated. In Germany, however, there are current debates whether regulation should be loosened. A crucial part of the argument is that sport bets could be qualified as ‘games of skill’ that are considered to be less dangerous by German Law than ‘games of chance’, and are thus assumed to need less regulation. We explore this hypothesis in three incentivized online studies on soccer betting (N=214) and provide evidence against two crucial parts of this argument. First, we show that there are no overall effects of skill on accuracy in soccer bets and monetary earnings do not increase with skill. Hence, soccer betting cannot be considered a game of skill. Second, we show that soccer betting induces strong overconfidence and illusion of control, particularly for people who assume they have high skill, and that these biases lead to increased betting. Cognitive biases that might cause financial harm for bettors or even lead to problematic or pathological gambling behavior are even stronger for soccer bets compared to bets on the outcome of lotteries. Concerning the main aims of legal regulation for gambling in German law, our results strongly speak for regulation of soccer bets.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127288922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
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