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Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection 拍卖机制与竞买者合谋:贿赂、信号与选择
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2014-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2545762
Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Ro’i Zultan
{"title":"Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection","authors":"Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Ro’i Zultan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2545762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2545762","url":null,"abstract":"The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing theoretical analysis of our setup predicts that the first-price mechanism deters collusion. In contrast, we find the same level of collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first-price auctions.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121453572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds 外部流动性、展期风险和政府债券
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2014-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2500797
Stephan Luck, P. Schempp
{"title":"Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds","authors":"Stephan Luck, P. Schempp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2500797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500797","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses whether financial intermediaries can optimally provide liquidity, or whether the government has a role in creating liquidity by supplying government securities. We discuss a model in which intermediaries optimally manage liquidity with outside rather than inside liquidity: instead of holding liquid real assets that can be used at will, banks sell claims on long-term projects to investors. While increasing efficiency, liquidity management with private outside liquidity is associated with a rollover risk. This rollover risk either keeps intermediaries from providing liquidity optimally, or it makes the economy inherently fragile. In contrast to privately produced claims, government bonds are not associated with coordination problems unless there is the prospect that the government may default. Therefore, efficiency and stability can be enhanced if liquidity management relies on public outside liquidity.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132727553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
History of Law and Economics 法律与经济史
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2014-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2421224
Martin Gelter, Kristoffel R. Grechenig
{"title":"History of Law and Economics","authors":"Martin Gelter, Kristoffel R. Grechenig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2421224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2421224","url":null,"abstract":"The roots of law & economics lie in late 19th century continental Europe. However, this early movement did not persist, having been cut off in the 1930s. After World War II, modern law & economics was (re-)invented in the United States and subsequently grew into a major field of research at U.S. law schools. In continental Europe, law & economics was re-imported as a discipline within economics, driven by economists interested in legal issues rather than by legal scholars. Hence, the European discourse was more strongly influenced by formal analysis, using mathematical models. Today, research in the U.S., Europe, and in other countries around the world, including Latin America and Asia, uses formal, empirical, and intuitive methods. New subfields, such as behavioral law & economics and experimental law & economics, have grown in the U.S. and in Europe during the past two decades.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128595146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 34
The Civil Standard of Proof – What is it, Actually? 民事举证标准——究竟是什么?
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2311210
Marko Schweizer
{"title":"The Civil Standard of Proof – What is it, Actually?","authors":"Marko Schweizer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2311210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2311210","url":null,"abstract":"Common Law distinguishes two standards of proof applicable in civil and criminal matters, respectively. The criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” is much higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard used in civil cases. Continental European Civil Law, on the other hand, recognizes just one standard of “full conviction” applicable in both criminal and civil cases. This study is the first to look at the standard of proof actually used by judges and judicial clerks in a Civil Law country (Switzerland). It is shown that, when asked directly, the members of court express a high decision threshold in line with legal doctrine and case law. But when Swiss judges are asked to estimate the error costs associated with each outcome and the error-cost-minimizing decision threshold is calculated based on the responses, the resulting standard is no different from the Common Law’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard. When using the stated degree of belief in the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations as a predictor for the grant of the plaintiff’s request in a civil action, the probability of grant is 50% at a stated conviction of only 63%. It is further shown that the decision threshold is influenced by the individual’s loss aversion, with individuals with a higher loss aversion having a higher decision threshold. No difference between the estimated decision threshold for members of the courts and members of the general population is found. The results suggest that the standard of proof actually employed by Swiss judges is not much different from the Common Law’s “preponderance of the evidence” standard, despite the doctrinal insistence to the contrary.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132896797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment 不完善制裁的威慑——一个公益实验
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2269644
C. Engel
{"title":"Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment","authors":"C. Engel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2269644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2269644","url":null,"abstract":"Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three alternative channels: (a) identical preferences are common knowledge, but inequity is not pronounced enough to sustain cooperation; (b) heterogeneous preferences are common knowledge; (c) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115726788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery 对称与非对称贿赂惩罚机制
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1983969
C. Engel, Sebastian J. Goerg, Gaoneng Yu
{"title":"Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery","authors":"C. Engel, Sebastian J. Goerg, Gaoneng Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1983969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983969","url":null,"abstract":"In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122565760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Cooperation under Punishment: Imperfect Information Destroys it and Centralizing Punishment Does Not Help 惩罚下的合作:不完全信息破坏合作，集中惩罚无益
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2243478
Sven J. Fischer, Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Nicolas W Meier
{"title":"Cooperation under Punishment: Imperfect Information Destroys it and Centralizing Punishment Does Not Help","authors":"Sven J. Fischer, Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Nicolas W Meier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2243478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243478","url":null,"abstract":"We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131453500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Sticky Rebates: Target Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers 粘性返利:目标返利诱导消费者非理性忠诚
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2013-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1443783
Alexander Morell, A. Glöckner, E. Towfigh
{"title":"Sticky Rebates: Target Rebates Induce Non-Rational Loyalty in Consumers","authors":"Alexander Morell, A. Glöckner, E. Towfigh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1443783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443783","url":null,"abstract":"Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people’s decision behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), both theoretically and experimentally. CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (e.g., a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116979159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs 信念、回报、信息：论内生信念模型中 BDP 特性的稳健性
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2012-03-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2028976
A. Gizatulina, M. Hellwig
{"title":"Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs","authors":"A. Gizatulina, M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2028976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028976","url":null,"abstract":"Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of incomplete-information models satisfying this so-called BDP property (\"beliefs determine preferences\") is negligible, in a geometric and a measure-theoretic sense. In contrast, we show that, in models with finite-dimensional type spaces, this property is topologically generic if the set of objects about which beliefs are formed is sufficiently rich and beliefs are derived by conditioning on the available information; for any agent, this information includes his own payoff parameters.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129592123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision 公共物品供给的机制设计与投票
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1983939
Felix J. Bierbrauer, M. Hellwig
{"title":"Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision","authors":"Felix J. Bierbrauer, M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1983939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1983939","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126474118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
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