Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"Bargeld, Giralgeld, Vollgeld: Zur Diskussion um das Geldwesen nach der Finanzkrise [The Discussion About Central Banks, Commercial Banks, the Monetary System and Monetary Reform after the Great Financial Crisis] (Paper in German)","authors":"Martin Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3225760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3225760","url":null,"abstract":"Der Aufsatz setzt sich kritisch mit verschiedenen Vorschlagen zur Reform des Geldwesens seit der Finanzkrise und mit den zugrundeliegenden Vorstellungen von „Geld“ auseinander. Das Wort „Geld“ wird in dieser Diskussion fur verschiedene Dinge und in verschiedenen Bedeutungen gebraucht. Als paradox erweist es sich, dass die Diskussion um die Geldpolitik, auch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, gepragt ist von der Vorstellung, dass die Ausgabe von Bargeld eine Verbindlichkeit der Zentralbank darstellt, ebenso die Einlagen der Geschaftsbanken bei der Zentralbank, wahrend gleichzeitig die Diskussion um die Rolle der Geschaftsbanken im Geldwesen gepragt ist von der Vorstellung, dass diese durch ihre Kreditvergabe „Geld“ schopfen und somit die Einlagenfinanzierung von Geschaftsbanken keine Schuldenfinanzierung ist. Beide Vorstellungen sind falsch, die eine, weil die Geldschopfung der Zentralbank diese zu nichts verpflichtet, die andere, weil die Geldschopfung der Geschaftsbanken sehr wohl Verpflichtungen schaffen, die Liquiditats- und Solvenzrisiken mit sich bringen. Der zweite Teil des Aufsatzes geht kritisch auf radikale Reformvorschlage zur Abschaffung des Bargelds und zur Abschaffung der Geldschopfung der Geschaftsbanken (Vollgeld-Initiative) ein. Erstere unterschatzen die Rolle des Bargelds als Grundlage aller auf Nominalwerte gerichteten Forderungen, u.a. der Forderungen an Geschaftsbanken, letztere unterschatzen die Moglichkeiten und die Risiken einer Substitution von Sichteinlagen durch andere „geldnahe“ Titel, z.B. Geldmarktfondsanteile. Die Vorstellung, man konne durch solche Anderungen die Komplexitat der Interdependenz von Geldsystem und Banksystem reduzieren und die Aufgabe der Geldpolitik vereinfachen, ist unrealistisch.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"49 12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121433240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Normative Change and Culture of Hate: An Experiment on Online Environments","authors":"Amalia Álvarez-Benjumea, Fabian Winter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3126089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126089","url":null,"abstract":"We present an online experiment in which we investigate the impact of perceived social acceptability on online hate speech, and measure the causal effect of specific interventions. We compare two types of interventions: counter-speaking (informal verbal sanctions) and censoring (deleting hateful content). The interventions are based on the belief that individuals infer acceptability from the context, using previous actions as a source of normative information. The interventions are based on the two conceptualizations found in the literature: 1) what do others normally do, i.e., descriptive norms; and 2) what happened to those who violated the norm, i.e., injunctive norms. Participants were significantly less likely to engage in hate speech when prior hate content had been moderately censored. Our results suggest that normative behavior in online conversations might, in fact, be motivated by descriptive norms rather than injunctive norms. With this work we present some of the first experimental evidence investigating the social determinants of hate speech in online communities. The results could advance the understanding of the micro-mechanisms that regulate hate speech. Also, such findings can guide future interventions in online communities that help prevent the spread of hate.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126257762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Defendant Should Have the Last Word – Experimentally Manipulating Order and Provisional Assessment of the Facts in Criminal Procedure","authors":"C. Engel, A. Glöckner, Sinika Timme","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3077855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077855","url":null,"abstract":"From a normative perspective the order in which evidence is presented should not bias legal judgment. Yet psychological research on how individuals process conflicting evidence sug-gests that order could matter. The evidence shows that decision-makers dissolve ambiguity by forging coherence. This process could lead to a primacy effect: initial tentative interpretations bias the view on later conflicting evidence. Or the process could result in a recency effect: the evidence presented last casts decisive light on the case. In two studies (N1 = 221, N2 = 332) we test these competing hypotheses in a mock legal case. Legal orders sometimes even expect judges to provisionally assess the evidence. At least they have a hard time preventing this from happening. To test whether this creates or exacerbates bias, in the second dimensions, we explicitly demand experimental participants to express their leaning, after having seen half of the evidence. We consistently observe recency effects and no interactions with leanings. If the legal order wants to preempt false convictions, defendant should have the last word.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115693188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Finanzstabilität, Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit: Stellungnahme für das Bundesverfassungsgericht (Financial Stability, Transparency, and Accountability: Statement for the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany)","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3048181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3048181","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Der Text beruht auf einer am 9. Mai 2017 vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht abgegebenen Stellungnahme in der mundlichen Verhandlung zu einem Verfahren uber den Umfang der Verpflichtung der Bundesregierung zur Information des Parlaments (Az. 2BvE 2/11). Das Gericht hatte um Auskunfte zur moglichen Gefahrdung der Funktionsfahigkeit der Finanzmarktaufsicht und zur moglichen Gefahrdung des Erfolgs der staatlichen Stutzungsmasnahmen durch eine offentliche Beantwortung von Fragen der Bundestagsfraktion Bundnis 90/Die Grunen durch die Bundesregierung im November und Dezember 2010 gebeten. \u0000Die Stellungnahme zeigt, dass die Argumente, mit denen die Bundesregierung eine offentliche Beantwortung ablehnte, in grosen Teilen fehlerhaft waren. Die Ablehnung half, eine offentliche Diskussion uber die Ursachen und die Verantwortung fur die besondere deutsche Betroffenheit durch die Finanzkrise zu vermeiden. In Anbetracht der im internationalen Vergleich sehr hohen Kosten der Krise fur den deutschen Steuerzahler ware eine solche Diskussion angebracht gewesen, auch eine Diskussion daruber, wie zweckdienlich die seitherigen Reformmasnahmen wirklich sein wurden. \u0000Die Stellungnahme vertritt die Auffassung, dass Einschrankungen des Anspruchs eines Finanzinstituts auf Vertraulichkeit vertretbar und ohne Schaden fur die Funktionsfahigkeit der Aufsicht durchzusetzen sind, wenn diese Einschrankungen im Zusammenhang mit einer Staatshilfe stehen, die das Institut vor der Zahlungsunfahigkeit bewahrt hat. Bei Instituten, die eine Unterstutzung durch den Steuerzahler benotigt und erhalten haben, war und ist das Risiko einer erneuten Destabilisierung durch Informationen uber die Vergangenheit gering. \u0000Die Stellungnahme weist auch die pauschale Vorstellung zuruck, dass Transparenz an sich schon die Stabilitat einzelner Banken oder gar des gesamten Finanzsystems gefahrde, da jegliche Information panikartige Marktreaktionen hervorrufen konne. Modelle panikartiger Reaktionen auf „Sonnenflecken“, d.h. Informationen, die irrelevant sind oder keinen Neuigkeitswert haben, sind in der Wirtschaftstheorie popular, aber in der Realitat werden Paniken durch neue Informationen ausgelost, die die Erwartungen der Anleger uber die wirtschaftlichen Aussichten substantiell beeinflussen. \u0000English Abstract: The paper provides a written version of a statement in a hearing of the German Constitutional Court on May 9, 2017, in a case concerning the extent of the Federal Government’s obligation to provide information to members of the Bundestag in public. The Court had asked for an assessment whether the viability of financial supervision and the sustained success of the government’s support for financial institutions in the crisis would have been endangered if the government had publicly answered questions from the parliamentary party of The Greens’ in November and December 2010. \u0000The statement asserts that many of the arguments given by the Federal Government to support its denial of t","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117079469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Selling Money on Ebay: A Field Study of Surplus Division","authors":"A. Gizatulina, O. Gorelkina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2884191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884191","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the division of trade surplus in a natural field experiment on German eBay. Acting as a seller, we offer Amazon gift cards with face values between 5 and 500 Euro. eBay users, the subjects of our experiment, make price offers according to the Buy-it-Now or Best Offer trading protocol. Using a novel decomposition method, we infer the trade surplus from the data and find that on average the buyers offer one quarter of the surplus to the seller. Additionally, we document: (i) insignificant effects of stake size; (ii) poor use of strategically relevant public information; and (iii) differences between East and West German subjects.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123949743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internal Conflict, Market Uniformity, and Transparency in Price Competition between Teams","authors":"Michael Kurschilgen, Alexander Morell, Ori Weisel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2882680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2882680","url":null,"abstract":"The way profits are divided within successful teams imposes different degrees of internal conflict. We experimentally examine how the level of internal conflict, and whether such conflict is transparent to other teams, affects teams' ability to compete vis-à-vis each other, and, consequently, market outcomes. Participants took part in a repeated Bertrand duopoly game between three-player teams which had either the same or different level of internal conflict (uniform vs. mixed). Profit division was either private-pay (high conflict; each member received her own asking price) or equal-pay (low conflict; profits were divided equally). We find that internal conflict leads to (tacit) coordination on high prices in uniform private-pay duopolies, but places private-pay teams at a competitive disadvantage in mixed duopolies. Competition is softened by transparency in uniform markets, but intensified in mixed markets. We propose an explanation of the results and discuss implications for managers and policy makers. (D43, L22, C92).","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"78 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133900735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Institutional Endogeneity and Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas","authors":"Isabel Marcin, P. Robalo, Franziska Tausch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2764872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764872","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design addresses the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous. However, overall efficiency does not differ across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects interact repeatedly.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129645115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game","authors":"Dominik Grafenhofer, Wolfgang Kuhle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2702292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2702292","url":null,"abstract":"We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals that inform them of each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. Even though the precisions of both signal types is exogenous, the precision with which agents forecast each other's actions in equilibrium turns out to be endogenous. As a consequence, there exist multiple equilibria which differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information to forecast each other's actions. Finally, even though all players' signals are of identical quality, it turns out that efficient equilibria are asymmetric.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133007440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Neoliberales Sektierertum oder Wissenschaft? Zum Verhältnis von Grundlagenforschung und Politikanwendung in der Ökonomie (Neoliberal Religious Sect or Science? On the Relation between Academic Research and Real-World Policy Advice in Economics)","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2688898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688898","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Rolle der Wirtschaftswissenschaft in der politischen oder juristischen Diskussion uber den Umgang mit okonomischen Sachverhalten und Zusammenhangen. Die Kunstlichkeit der in theoretischen Modellen oder Laborexperimenten untersuchten Welten wirft die Frage nach dem Geltungsanspruch der in diesen Kunstwelten gewonnenen Aussagen fur solche Diskussionen auf. In der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Praxis wird diese Frage zu wenig untersucht. Das bietet Spielraum fur Ideologien und Vorurteile, die in die Konstruktion der Kunstwelten eingehen und bei der Politikberatung nicht hinterfragt werden. Das ideologische Element wird noch verstarkt durch den Effizienzbias eines Forschungsprogramms, das empirische Beobachtungen als „Losungen“ zu etwaigen Informations- und Anreizproblemen „erklart“. Analysen der Robustheit der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse gegenuber Modifikationen der Annahmen sollten zum Standard der Grundlagenforschung gehoren, ferner auch Analysen der Konkurrenz alternativer „Erklarungsansatze“. Daruber hinaus benotigen wir eine professionelle Routine fur die Anwendung von Erkenntnissen der Grundlagenforschung auf konkrete Sachverhalte und Probleme. Beispiele zeigen, dass der prognostische Gehalt solcher Analysen sehr gros sein kann, wenn man genau darauf achtet, dass die Kunstwelten, theoretische Modelle oder Laborexperimente, auf deren Aussagen man sich stutzt, auch jeweils die wesentlichen Details des Falls erfassen. Die Entscheidung, welche Modelle oder Laborexperimente jeweils „passen“, ist der wichtigste Schritt bei der Anwendung wirtschaftswissenschaftllicher Erkenntnisse in der Praxis.English Abstract: Drawing on personal experience, the paper discusses the relation between academic scholarship and policy recommendations of economists. The artificial nature and the special settings of the worlds studied in theoretical models, laboratory experiments, and even econometric analysis raises the question of external validity of the insights gained from such studies. Attention to this question creates room for ideology and prejudice, which may enter into the assumptions made to construct the special worlds studied in academic research and may not be questioned when the presumed insights from this research are used for policy recommendations. The ideological element is reinforced by an efficiency bias that is induced by a research program of “explaining” real-world phenomena as solutions to some information and incentive problems, an efficiency bias that is not actually supported by theory when the outcomes in question are second-best rather than first-best. The impact of ideologies and biases can be reduced if the profession imposes a standard that requires academic research to provide more extensive discussion of the robustness of insights gained to changes in assumptions and more extensive discussions of the relative performance of different “explanations” for the same empirical phenomena, as well an asses","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"35 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128566215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Boring Banks and Taxes","authors":"Rafael Aigner, Felix J. Bierbrauer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2602140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2602140","url":null,"abstract":"How do taxes in the financial sector affect economic outcomes? We analyze a simple general equilibrium model with financial intermediation. We formalize a trade-off between tax policies that burden the owners of banks and tax policies that burden households. We also study the implications of the financial sector’s exemption from value added taxation (VAT). Main results are that an increased taxation of the banks’ profits goes together with a larger financial sector, as measured by the volume of loans and the employment in banking. We also show that the general presumption that the VAT-exemption is beneficial for banks is unjustified.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121704126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}