Sven J. Fischer, Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Nicolas W Meier
{"title":"惩罚下的合作:不完全信息破坏合作，集中惩罚无益","authors":"Sven J. Fischer, Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Nicolas W Meier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2243478","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.","PeriodicalId":247961,"journal":{"name":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cooperation under Punishment: Imperfect Information Destroys it and Centralizing Punishment Does Not Help\",\"authors\":\"Sven J. Fischer, Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Nicolas W Meier\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2243478\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.\",\"PeriodicalId\":247961,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243478\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243478","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Cooperation under Punishment: Imperfect Information Destroys it and Centralizing Punishment Does Not Help
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.
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