{"title":"Partners in Organizing: Engagement between Migrants and the State in the Production of Mexican Hometown Associations","authors":"Natasha N. Iskander","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2102679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2102679","url":null,"abstract":"The massive historic protests in 2006 against anti-immigrant legislation in the United States have sparked renewed interest in immigrant community mobilization. Analysts have turned to Mexican immigrants in particular, not in the least because Mexicans represent the largest immigrant group in the United States by far. In this focus, many scholars and policy makers both have trained their attention on one form of Mexican civic organization that played an important, yet somewhat unanticipated role in the pro-immigrant marches of the mid-2000s: hometown associations, often called HTAs (Bada, Fox, and Selee 2006; Garcia-Acevedo 2008; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007). Broadly defined as organizations formed by migrants from a same community of origin (Fox and Bada 2009), they have been roundly lauded as structures that provide migrants with a wide array of support (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2010). HTAs have been characterized as organizations through which migrants not only maintain their cultural identity and sustain their affective connection to their hometowns, but also as structures through which compatriots from the same community or region of origin can provide one another with social and material backing in the US (Bada 2011; Orozco 2004).","PeriodicalId":241506,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Partnership Form (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131096710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Public Private Partnership Paradox","authors":"Stephen Gray, Jason Hall, Grant Pollard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1582312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1582312","url":null,"abstract":"A public private partnership (PPP) is a contractual arrangement between government and the private sector, usually for the delivery of a piece of social infrastructure or a social service. Over the past 10 years, PPP activity around the globe amounts to many billions of dollars. The key features of a PPP arrangement are (a) that government will make a series of cash payments to the private sector, usually over a long “concession” period in excess of 20 years; and (b) that the risk (particularly the systematic risk) of the project is shared between the government and private sector. Governments must determine whether the payments to be made under the PPP (given their amount and risk) represent value for money relative to the cash flows (and risk) that would be involved with traditional or alternative government procurement options. The standard valuation framework based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) suggests that alternative streams of cash flows should be discounted to present value at a rate reflecting their systematic risk. In the context of PPPs, it has been argued that the standard framework produces a paradox whereby government appears to be made better off by taking on more systematic risk. This has led to a range of approaches being applied in practice, none of which are consistent with the standard CAPM valuation approach. In this paper, we demonstrate that the proposed approaches suffer from internal inconsistencies and produce illogical outcomes in some cases. We also show that there is no problem with current accepted theory, and that the apparent paradox is not the result of a deficiency in the current theory, but rather is caused by its misapplication in practice. In particular, we show that the systematic risk of cash flows is frequently mis-estimated, and the correction of this error solves the apparent paradox. In this regard, we show that our results are consistent with the substantial 1970s and 1980s literature on the discounting of cash outflows – a literature that was apparently ignored when PPP evaluation frameworks were developed.","PeriodicalId":241506,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Partnership Form (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127803943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Performance Of Asymmetric Alliances – The Case Of French SMEs In The Aircraft Industry","authors":"Zoubeyda Mahamadou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695110","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to explore and discuss empirically about the effects of asymmetries between Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs) on the performance of these companies in an alliance. We address both direct effects and indirect ones related to trust from the perspective of ten French SMEs operating in the aircraft manufacturing industry. \u0000 \u0000Our empirical results suggest that asymmetries between partners have different direct and indirect effects on performance. These effects depend both on the type of asymmetry and the specific dimension of performance under consideration. We observe significant positive direct and indirect effects of resource complementarities on the overall performance of the alliance. In addition, we find that there is a direct and significant negative influence on relational performance of differences in size and organizational culture.","PeriodicalId":241506,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Partnership Form (Topic)","volume":"15 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133847037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}