公私合作悖论

Stephen Gray, Jason Hall, Grant Pollard
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引用次数: 6

摘要

公私合作伙伴关系(PPP)是政府和私营部门之间的一种合同安排,通常是为了提供一项社会基础设施或社会服务。在过去的10年里,全球的PPP活动达到了数十亿美元。公私合作安排的主要特点是:(a)政府将向私营机构支付一系列现金,通常在超过20年的长期“特许”期内支付;(b)项目的风险(特别是系统风险)由政府和私营部门共同承担。政府必须确定在PPP下支付的款项(鉴于其金额和风险)是否代表了相对于传统或替代政府采购方案所涉及的现金流(和风险)的货币价值。基于资本资产定价模型(CAPM)的标准估值框架建议,可选择的现金流应以反映其系统风险的比率贴现为现值。在公私伙伴关系的背景下,有人认为标准框架产生了一个悖论,即政府似乎通过承担更多的系统性风险而变得更好。这导致了在实践中应用的一系列方法,其中没有一个与标准CAPM评估方法一致。在本文中,我们证明了所提出的方法在某些情况下存在内部不一致性并产生不合逻辑的结果。我们还表明,目前公认的理论没有问题,明显的悖论不是当前理论缺陷的结果,而是由于其在实践中的误用造成的。特别是,我们表明现金流量的系统风险经常被错误估计,而这种错误的纠正解决了明显的悖论。在这方面,我们表明我们的结果与20世纪70年代和80年代大量关于现金流出折现的文献一致——当PPP评估框架被开发时,这些文献显然被忽视了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Public Private Partnership Paradox
A public private partnership (PPP) is a contractual arrangement between government and the private sector, usually for the delivery of a piece of social infrastructure or a social service. Over the past 10 years, PPP activity around the globe amounts to many billions of dollars. The key features of a PPP arrangement are (a) that government will make a series of cash payments to the private sector, usually over a long “concession” period in excess of 20 years; and (b) that the risk (particularly the systematic risk) of the project is shared between the government and private sector. Governments must determine whether the payments to be made under the PPP (given their amount and risk) represent value for money relative to the cash flows (and risk) that would be involved with traditional or alternative government procurement options. The standard valuation framework based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) suggests that alternative streams of cash flows should be discounted to present value at a rate reflecting their systematic risk. In the context of PPPs, it has been argued that the standard framework produces a paradox whereby government appears to be made better off by taking on more systematic risk. This has led to a range of approaches being applied in practice, none of which are consistent with the standard CAPM valuation approach. In this paper, we demonstrate that the proposed approaches suffer from internal inconsistencies and produce illogical outcomes in some cases. We also show that there is no problem with current accepted theory, and that the apparent paradox is not the result of a deficiency in the current theory, but rather is caused by its misapplication in practice. In particular, we show that the systematic risk of cash flows is frequently mis-estimated, and the correction of this error solves the apparent paradox. In this regard, we show that our results are consistent with the substantial 1970s and 1980s literature on the discounting of cash outflows – a literature that was apparently ignored when PPP evaluation frameworks were developed.
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