U.S. Administrative Law eJournal最新文献_第4页

Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review 成本效益分析与任意性审查

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2016-03-20 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2752068

C. Sunstein

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引用次数: 20

Short Sales and the Antideficiency Rules 卖空和反缺陷规则

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2016-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2895802

R. Bernhardt

引用次数: 0

Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Petitioners, Florida Bankers Ass'n v. US Dep't of the Treasury, No. 15-969 (United States Supreme Court) 法庭之友克里斯汀·e·希克曼教授支持上诉人，佛罗里达银行家协会诉美国财政部案，第15-969号(美国最高法院)

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2016-02-29 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2739989

Kristin E. Hickman

引用次数: 0

Statistics and the Paperwork Reduction Act: An FTC Case Study 统计和文书工作减少法:一个联邦贸易委员会的案例研究

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2016-01-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2721855

F. Scheuren

引用次数: 0

Assessing Court Deference to the Comptroller of the Currency's Regulations: Incidental Powers of Banks and Blackfeet National Bank 评估法院对货币监理官的服从:银行和黑脚国家银行的附带权力

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2015-07-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2491243

Assani Jr Amuzati

引用次数: 0

Naïve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments Naïve任人唯亲和中立能力:行政任命中的任命权、绩效和政策协议

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2015-04-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOPART/MUU016

Gary E. Hollibaugh

引用次数: 46

Buy America Requirements for Federally Funded Rail Projects 购买美国货要求联邦资助的铁路项目

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2015-02-01 DOI: 10.17226/22209

T. Wyatt

{"title":"Buy America Requirements for Federally Funded Rail Projects","authors":"T. Wyatt","doi":"10.17226/22209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17226/22209","url":null,"abstract":"Federal grants for passenger and freight rail development typically have domestic preference conditions or \"Buy America\" requirements. Most recently, in 2008, Congress enacted a Buy America provision applicable to grants for the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail program administered by the Federal Railroad Administration. However, since 1978, passenger and freight rail development funds administered by Amtrak, the Federal Transit Administration, and even the Federal Highway Administration have also been conditioned on Buy America compliance. Although the various transportation grant Buy America provisions often appear similar on their face, there are significant differences in the way they are interpreted and administered by different Federal grant-making agencies. This has led to confusion and concern in the railroad industry, among manufacturers of rail cars and locomotives, railroad construction contractors, and rail development grant recipients (e.g., State Departments of Transportation) who procure rail construction and manufacturing services. The purpose of this paper is to somewhat alleviate the confusion and frustration in the railroad industry by providing guidelines for complying with the various Buy America provisions applicable to rail development, compiled into a single resource. The paper addresses the similarities and, most importantly, the differences among the various Buy America provisions. The paper also details the legislative and administrative history (and, in some cases, the judicial history) that helps explain most of the differences in the way the various Buy America provisions are administered.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"45 19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127158340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship? 监管是美国创业衰退的罪魁祸首吗?

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2559803

Nathan Goldschlag, A. Tabarrok

引用次数: 68

The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism 税务法庭例外论的死亡

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-11-06 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2393412

Stephanie R. Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

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引用次数: 7

[Dis-]Informing the People's Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act 告知人民的自由裁量权:《信息自由法》国家安全豁免下的司法遵从

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-11-02 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/njpmd

Susan Nevelow Mart, Tom Ginsburg

{"title":"[Dis-]Informing the People's Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act","authors":"Susan Nevelow Mart, Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/njpmd","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/njpmd","url":null,"abstract":"As noted by President Obama’s recent Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, pervasive state surveillance has never been more feasible. There has been an inexorable rise in the size and reach of the national security bureaucracy since it was created after World War II, as we have gone through the Cold War and the War on Terror. No one doubts that our national security bureaucracies need to gain intelligence and keep some of it secret. But the consensus of decades of experts, both insiders and outsiders, is that there is rampant overclassification by government agencies. From its inception in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act has presumed disclosure. And from its inception, Congress intended the federal courts to act as a brake on unfettered agency discretion regarding classification. But courts have not played a strong role in this regard. This article examines the interplay of overclassification, excessive judicial deference, and illusory agency expertise in the context of the national security exemption to the Freedom of Information Act.The national security exemption allows documents to be withheld that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and that “are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order.” The history of national security classification and the passage of the FOIA illuminate the tension between legislative demands for transparency and the growth of the national security state with its agency culture of secrecy. That tension has generally been resolved by the courts in favor of secrecy, despite agreement that there is rampant overclassification and pseudo-classification (labeling documents as sensitive but unclassified). This deference in turn leads agencies routinely deny FOIA requests that should in fact be granted. Without adequate court oversight, there is no agency incentive to comply with the FOIA’s presumption of disclosure.We argue that courts have been systematically ignoring their clear legislative mandate. Although the government is entitled to substantial deference, the role of the judiciary is not to rubber stamp claims of national security, but to undertake de novo and in camera review of government claims that the information requested was both required to be kept secret and properly classified. Congress amended the FOIA in 1974 to make this requirement explicit, overruling a judicial attempt to defer completely to government claims that national security classifications are proper.There are many reasons that courts are reluctant to get involved in determining the validity of exemption claims based on national security. Overestimation of risk may be one reason, as is fear of the consequences of error. We also discuss a “secrecy heuristic” whereby people attribute greater accuracy to “secret” documents. Notwithstanding these rationales, courts have, in other contexts, ","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116819604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11