U.S. Administrative Law eJournal最新文献_第5页

Delegating Tax 委托税务

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2402047

James R. Hines Jr., Kyle D. Logue

引用次数: 5

A World Turned Upside Down: Reflections on the 'New Wave' Inversions and Notice 2014-52 一个颠倒的世界:对“新浪潮”反转和注意的反思2014-52

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-09-28 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2502513

R. Avi-Yonah

引用次数: 0

Regulatory Exit 监管出口

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2482392

J. Ruhl, James E. Salzman

{"title":"Regulatory Exit","authors":"J. Ruhl, James E. Salzman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2482392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2482392","url":null,"abstract":"Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses and individuals, the topic of exit has barely been touched in administrative law scholarship. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere – welfare support ends; government steps out of rate-setting. In this article, we argue that exit is a fundamental feature of regulatory design and should be explicitly considered at the time of program creation. Part I starts from first principles and sets out the basic features of regulatory exit. It addresses the design challenges of exit strategies and how to measure success of exit. With these descriptive and normative foundations in place, Part II develops a framework that explains the four basic types of regulatory exit strategies, exploring the political economy that determines each strategy and explaining when policy makers are most likely to adopt them. To demonstrate its usefulness in practice, the framework is applied as a case study in Part III to the emerging challenge of fracking. We conclude by describing a new exit strategy model for regulatory design, a hybrid approach of “Lookback Exit.” Exit is a vast, central, yet largely unexplored aspect of administrative governance. By providing a fuller account, we demonstrate why exit warrants focused research and theoretical development in its own right, create a framework for the analysis of exit issues, and identify the key questions for future research. Doing so provides important insights not only to understand the practice we see around us today but also for the design of programs to manage emerging issues.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127455366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trying to Float in a Sea of Regulation: Perception and Reality About Regulatory Overload 试图在监管的海洋中漂浮:对监管过载的感知与现实

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2496436

Debra Borie-Holtz, S. Shapiro

引用次数: 0

Complexity and Simplicity in Law: A Review Essay (Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler (2013)) 法律中的复杂性和简单性:一篇评论文章(Cass R. Sunstein，《更简单》(2013))

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-08-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2484639

D. Driesen

{"title":"Complexity and Simplicity in Law: A Review Essay (Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler (2013))","authors":"D. Driesen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2484639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2484639","url":null,"abstract":"This essay discusses Cass Sunstein’s book, Simpler, in order to advance our understanding of the concepts of complex and simple law. Many writers identify complexity with uncertainty and high cost. This essay argues that complexity bears no fixed relationship to costs or benefits. It also shows that complexity’s relationship to uncertainty is so ambiguous that it is profitable to treat complexity and uncertainty as separate concepts. It develops useful separate concepts of legal and compliance complexity that will aid efforts to simplify law, like the one Sunstein claims to have embarked upon. It also argues that complexity is a hallmark of moderation, since it often arises from compromises reconciling competing interests and values. These basic points constitute important advances in the theory of complexity, which implicitly suggests something like this, but has not cleanly distinguished complex rules from costly or uncertain rules and not explicitly identified complexity with moderation. Sunstein’s book, while quite valuable in many ways, does not greatly advance discussion of how to simplify law, because he assumes that whatever happens to coincide with his political philosophy must be simpler. He is not alone in assuming a happy coincidence between his values and the simplification ideal, but this essay shows that there is little overlap between Sunstein’s endorsement of nudges and cost-benefit analysis and serious efforts to simplify the law. The theory I have articulated above leads to a keener appreciation of the need to accept some tradeoffs between simplicity and other values if we truly wish to make law “simpler.” The essay closes with some thoughts about addressing these difficult tradeoffs.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116462513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate 创新坚持:惩罚创新失败的有限案例

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-08-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2483310

I. Ayres, A. Kapczynski

引用次数: 9

Signaling Through Taxing America's Sin: A Panel Data Study 通过对美国的罪恶征税发出信号:一项小组数据研究

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-06-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2461189

Erik Brockwell

引用次数: 6

Assessing the Impact of Federal Funding on Faith‐Based and Community Organization Program Spending 评估联邦资金对基于信仰和社区组织项目支出的影响

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12036

Marg Sloan, Cleopatra Grizzle

引用次数: 7

A Descriptive Analysis of State Government Debt‐Related Derivatives Policies 州政府债务相关衍生品政策的描述性分析

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/pbaf.12037

Akheil Singla, M. Luby

引用次数: 8

Presidential Government and the Law of Property 总统制政府与财产法

U.S. Administrative Law eJournal Pub Date : 2014-05-12 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2314423

S. Davis

{"title":"Presidential Government and the Law of Property","authors":"S. Davis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2314423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2314423","url":null,"abstract":"This Article introduces a phenomenon that has been overlooked in the literature on property lawmaking: presidential governance of property law. On the conventional account, contributing to the development of the property system is about the last thing we would expect to see presidents doing. Yet the President is uniquely situated to treaty property as a system, not just as a right, and presidents expressly affect the property system. While presidents don’t, can’t, and shouldn’t control property lawmaking, recognizing their influence opens up new lines of inquiry that we miss when we think of property simply as bundle of rights — the now-dominant understanding of property law. Focusing upon the unfamiliar category of presidential governance of property forces us to unpack the link between property’s structure and function on the one hand and institutional choice on the other. This link involves balancing variables of institutional choice that are rooted in both constitutional separation of powers and federalism as well as a pragmatic assessment of how the property system works. The first variable concerns the quality of property decisionmaking. The second involves stability and flexibility, and the risk of turmoil and instability, within the property system. The third focuses upon the mixture of uniform and diverse structures of rights and duties within property law. The balance of these three variables dictates that the breadth and depth of presidential governance of the property system should vary based upon differences among resources and contexts of ownership. Surprising as it may sound given our conventional understanding of what property law is and how it is made, we should not ignore presidential governance of property — not in how we teach property law, or in how we write about it.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127148432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2