U.S. Administrative Law eJournal最新文献

{"title":"The Irony of Reform: Did Large Employers Subvert Workplace Safety Reform, 1869 to 1930?","authors":"P. Fishback","doi":"10.3386/W11058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W11058","url":null,"abstract":"Between 1869 and the early 1900s state governments regulated safety in mines and factories and reformed the liability for accidents. Reformers sought to reduce workers' risks and ensure that those involved in accidents received reasonable medical care and compensation for lost earnings. Yet large employers often wielded significant clout. This paper explores the extent to which large employers, measured by average number of employees, subverted the safety reform process, including the adoption of safety legislation, its scope, and the resources devoted to enforcement. The findings vary by industry. In coal mining large employers followed a defensive strategy, limiting the breadth of regulation, pressing for regulations that were enforced more against workers than against employers, and weakening enforcement. In manufacturing, on the other hand, safety regulations were introduced earlier in states with larger average establishment sizes. Reformers may have succeeded in imposing regulations on large manufacturing employers. However, the finding is also consistent with large firms working to raise rivals' costs and the analytical narratives suggest that manufacturing employers at times shaped the legislation to their benefit and that the regulations were often poorly enforced.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130317476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Implications of Guilt and Pride for Securities Regulation","authors":"P. H. Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.313840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.313840","url":null,"abstract":"This Article considers how guilt and pride about investing has implications for securities regulation. Both U.S. federal securities laws and the regulations of the National Association of Securities Dealers impose very high standards of professional conduct upon securities professionals. But, exactly what are and should be the legal responsibilities of securities professionals remains the subject of much debate. In particular, disagreement exists over whether broker-dealers are fiduciaries of their clients. A legal consequence of a fiduciary relationship is a duty of fair dealing. This Article is the first to consider the emotional, moral, and psychological consequences of broker-dealers being fiduciaries. This Article explains how finding that securities professionals are fiduciaries can alter expectations about securities professionals' behavior, guilt from breaching their clients' trust or pride from honoring such trust, and securities professionals' behavior itself. This Article demonstrates how fiduciary law can affect behavior even without much enforcement or severe legal penalties.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"148 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123403567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulatory Reform: Assessing the Government's Numbers","authors":"R. Hahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269630","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the costs and benefits of federal regulatory activities. The assessment, based on the government's own numbers, shows that the net benefits for final regulations promulgated from 1981 to mid-1996 approach a net present value of $1.6 trillion. The analysis also shows that the government can significantly increase the net benefits of regulation. Less than half of final regulations pass a neutral economist's benefit-cost test. Net benefits could increase by approximately $280 billion if agencies rejected such regulations. Net benefits could also increase if agencies replace existing regulations with more efficient alternatives, or if agencies substantially improve regulatory programs. The efficiency of official regulations varies by agency and by the type of risk the regulation is designed to reduce. Regulations from the Department of Transportation comprise over half of the total net benefits of final regulations, although they account for less than 10% of all regulations. The net benefits of regulations from the Environmental Protection Agency account for only a third of total net benefits, primarily because of 19 Clean Air Act regulations with high net benefits, although two-thirds of all regulations are EPA regulations. On average, regulations that reduce cancer risk are less efficient than other social regulations, and EPA cancer regulations appear less efficient than other cancer regulations. Regulations that reduce the risk of car, fire, or work-related accidents are generally more efficient than regulations that reduce the risk of cancer and heart disease. The study also shows that the efficiency of regulations ha not declined over time, as some scholars suggest. Furthermore, the introduction of formal regulatory oversight by the OMB does not appear to influence the cost-effectiveness of regulations. The paper shows that agency compliance with regulatory impact analysis requirements in Reagan's Executive Order 12291 and Clinton's Executive Order 12866, the basis for agency estimates of the costs and benefits or regulation, is usually superficial. As a result, the quality of such analyses is generally poor. Partly because of the poor quality of analyses, it appears that agencies do not often use the analyses to improve regulatory outcomes. If Congress and the White House are serious about regulatory reform, they must cooperate to enforce the regulatory impact analyses requirement. Successful enforcement requires high-level political support, statutory language requiring all agencies to adhere to established principles of economic analysis, and rigorous review of agency analyses by an independent entity. At this time, it is unclear whether law makes are willing to exert the political muscle necessary to achieve real reform.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130747771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"In Defense of Nepa: The Case of the Legacy Parkway","authors":"R. Adler","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2568714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2568714","url":null,"abstract":"The Legacy Parkway NEPA process is notable more for its flaws than for its strengths. It took far longer than intended, was fraught with divisive controversy, and ultimately the FEIS was rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Despite all of those problems, however, in the end the NEPA process (and the accompanying Clean Water Act analysis) served its intended purposes. It facilitated a broader public discussion of the values at stake in the controversy, and a wider consideration of alternatives. Litigation is never the preferred way to resolve disputes, and can be expensive, time-consuming, and even painful. The end result, however, was a project that will better serve the transportation needs of the corridor, but with less impact to the internationally significant wetlands and wildlife resources in the Great Salt Lake ecosystem. Examples such as Legacy should prompt the House NEPA Task Force to reconsider its recommendations, many of which would thwart rather than foster the most fundamental goals of NEPA.","PeriodicalId":233762,"journal":{"name":"U.S. Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129726550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}