Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review

C. Sunstein
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

When an agency fails to engage in quantitative cost-benefit analysis, has it acted arbitrarily and hence in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act? At first glance, the question answers itself: Congress sometimes requires that form of analysis, but if it has not done so, then agencies have discretion to proceed as they see fit. But as recent decisions suggest, the underlying issues are far more complicated than they seem. The central reason is that for all its limitations, cost-benefit analysis is the best available method for testing whether regulations increase social welfare. Whenever a statute authorizes an agency to consider costs and benefits, its failure to quantify them, and to weigh them against each other, requires a non-arbitrary justification. Potential justifications include the technical difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits; the relevance of values such as equity, dignity, and fair distribution; and the existence of welfare effects that are not captured by monetized costs and benefits. These justifications will often be sufficient. But in some cases, they are not, and agencies should be found to have acted arbitrarily in failing to quantify costs and benefits and to show that the benefits justify the costs.
成本效益分析与任意性审查
行政机关没有进行定量的成本效益分析,是否违反了行政程序法?乍一看,这个问题本身就回答了:国会有时需要这种形式的分析,但如果它没有这样做,那么各机构就有自由裁量权,按照它们认为合适的方式进行。但最近的决定表明,潜在的问题远比看上去复杂。主要原因是,尽管成本效益分析存在种种局限性,但它是检验法规是否能增加社会福利的最佳方法。每当法规授权一个机构考虑成本和收益时,如果它未能量化成本和收益,并对它们进行相互权衡,就需要一个非武断的理由。可能的理由包括量化成本和收益的技术困难;价值观的相关性,如公平、尊严和公平分配;以及没有被货币化的成本和收益捕捉到的福利效应的存在。这些理由通常就足够了。但在某些情况下,它们并非如此,应该发现机构在未能量化成本和收益以及未能证明收益证明成本是合理的方面武断行事。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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