{"title":"Incomplete Contract. Bargaining and Divisional Structures","authors":"T. Bao, Yongqing Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1461313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1461313","url":null,"abstract":"When complete contracting is not possible, allocating control structure becomes the second-best arrangement. This paper analyzes the design of optimal divisional structure within an organization where ex post bargaining between the potential divisional managers is possible. In much the same light as Aghion and Tirole (J Political Econ 105(1):1¨C29, 1997), we study the control problem in the context of search for projects. Our model shows that when the managers cannot bargain with one another, internal integration is preferred to internal separation. Where bargaining is possible, formal divisional structure defines both the ex post bargaining position of the two managers and their incentive to search ex ante. When the managers tend to arrive at a more favorable project to the principal via bargaining, the general leader of a firm may want to choose separation instead to increase the probability of bargaining, as the symmetrical incentive requires both managers to search and get informed.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126050383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou, Apostolis Pavlou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1447253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1447253","url":null,"abstract":"We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream competition is not too strong. Examining whether the merger’s potential efficiency gains can overcome its anti-competitive effects in terms of welfare, we show that when firms merge usually both of the above mentioned efficiencies are realized and they are passed on to consumers. This holds to a lesser extend when firms trade through linear contracts.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115145970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Firm as an Intrinsic Motivation Device","authors":"Abhijit Ramalingam, Michael T. Rauh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1198362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1198362","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we develop a new theory of the firm where the market is primarily an incentive system whereas the firm is an intrinsic motivation device. The firm is more efficient than the market when asset specificity and subjective risk are sufficiently high because it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on risk. An efficient firm is unambiguously the more ethical institution in the sense that the component of production effort due to intrinsic motivation and the agent's rents in exchange for commitment are higher. The exception is when the market approximates the first best.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130988239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How 'Europeanized' are the European Electricity Industries? A Cross-Country Analysis of Markets and Policies","authors":"P. Nardi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1622728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1622728","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will show whether and to what extent it is possible to identify an impact of the European Commission (EC) on the Members States (MS) electricity policies and markets, in terms of convergence and integration among them. Mainstream recognizes a quixotic situation, which leads not to a convergence, but a convergence towards clusters of MS. In order to identify these clusters, a cluster analysis has been applied to a dataset, including country-specific data on electricity as of 2005. The final stable clusters do confirm the existence of three main groups, recalling a frequent taxonomy in the literature (Borzel, 2005), plus a fourth group including only Cyprus and Malta, whose dimensions and geographical aspects determine their similar results. It could be concluded that the EC has not (yet) enough strength to influence MS: the process of integration among markets will probably follow easily an already integrated industry.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130439531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Foreign Acquisitions, Plant Survival, and Employment Growth","authors":"R. Bandick, H. Görg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1448548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1448548","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the effect of foreign acquisition on survival probability and employment growth of target plant using data on Swedish manufacturing plants during the period 1993-2002. An improvement over previous studies is that we take into account firm level heterogeneity by separating the targeted plants into those within Swedish MNEs, Swedish exporting non-MNEs, and purely domestic firms before foreign takeover. The results, controlling for possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy using an IV and propensity score matching approach suggest that acquisition by foreign owners increases the lifetime of the acquired plants only if the plant was an exporter. The effect differs depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical. We also find robust positive employment growth effects only for exporters, and only if the takeover is vertical, not horizontal.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130306997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Concurrency at Air Transport - Integration and Unbundling","authors":"Andre Luis Dias Soutelino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1404007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1404007","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains two tendencies of air transport: integrations and unbundling. The vertical integration happens on two ways: operational and industrial. The operational vertical integration refers for every service of the operation such as catering, cargo and maintenance. The industrial vertical integration is growing each day because the airlines are looking for acquiring airports and tour operators. On the same direction of the industrial vertical integration, the horizontal integration is also growing because of high costs of the operations. But the newest tendency is the unbundling on air transport. The unbundling gives more transparency on the relationship between the consumers and the airlines and let the airlines improve their profits.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131838356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effect of Foreign Firms and Their Linkages on Domestic Firms in the Indian Manufacturing Industry: Evidence from 1989-2004","authors":"Chidambaran G. Iyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1264264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264264","url":null,"abstract":"Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been an area that has invoked interest both among researchers and policy makers. FDI is one of those areas, which has benefits both for the host country and the home country. Multinational corporations or foreign firms are supposed to have frontier technology, hence when they enter a market they are expected to have spillover effects on local firms. Most of the studies in India till now have focused on intra-industry spillovers and have found evidence for intra-industry spillovers in the Indian industry. The present study focus is on inter-industry spillovers (for e.g. auto components to assemblers) as literature expects inter-industry spillover to be unambiguously present than intra-industry spillovers and also as there are very few studies in this area. This paper establishes that there exist spillover effects on domestic firms due to horizontal, backward and forward Linkages with foreign firms in the Indian manufacturing industry that affect domestic firms productivity. An interesting result of this chapter is that inter-industry spillovers are found to be negative for few industries.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114314191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Co-Presence not Communication: How ICT's Really Enable Software Services Offshoring","authors":"K. Srikanth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.928072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.928072","url":null,"abstract":"The successful execution of complex interdependent work in a distributed fashion - such as offshore software development - is an anomaly, given the well known inadequacies of ICT mediated communication vis-a-vis face to face communication. In this paper, we draw on qualitative data from 60 distributed and collocated software services delivery projects to understand how ICT's are actually used in distributed software development. We find that in these projects, ICT based tools are typically not used as channels of direct communication between locations. Instead ICT tools are used to avoid the need for direct communication by creating common ground across locations and thereby enabling tacit coordination.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131559851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trade and Financial Integration in East Asia: Effects on Co-Movements","authors":"Kwanho Shin, Chan-Hyun Sohn","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00862.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00862.x","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we explore three important areas where deeper trade and financial integration in East Asia can influence: (1) business cycle co-movements in the region, (2) the extent of risk sharing across countries and (3) price co-movements across countries. We find evidence that trade integration enhances co-movements of output but not of consumption across countries. Especially the fact that trade integration does not raise co-movements of consumption as much as that of output is interpreted as trade integration does not improve the extent of risk sharing. Co-movements of price arise most significantly as trade integration deepens, lowering the border effects and allowing better opportunities for resource reallocation across countries. In contrast, financial integration demonstrates much weaker evidence of enhancing co-movements across countries. Deeper financial integration improves price co-movements weakly but does not enhance output or consumption co-movements at all. However, since the current level of financial integration in East Asia is quite low, our evidence is too early to firmly determine the role of financial integration.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127079602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategy and Structure: A Repeated Game Approach","authors":"F. Balmaceda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.930059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930059","url":null,"abstract":"According to Williamson (1975), a divisionalized and fully decentralized structure, the so called M-form, is the optimal structure via which firms that pursue diversification gain economic benefits from internalizing transactions. However, empirical evidence shows that a centralized, multi-divisional structure, the so called CM-Form, is the optimal structure when related diversification is the objective, while the M-form is optimal when seeking unrelated diversification. This paper proposes a repeated game model to study the link between strategy and structure. The main prediction of the model is that a related strategy is, overall, better served by a centralized structure, while an unrelated strategy is better served by a decentralized structure.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114072693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}