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The Pitfalls of Subsystem Integration: When Less is More 子系统集成的陷阱:当少即是多
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-05-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1381624
Sanjiv Erat, Stylianos Kavadias, C. Gaimon
{"title":"The Pitfalls of Subsystem Integration: When Less is More","authors":"Sanjiv Erat, Stylianos Kavadias, C. Gaimon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1381624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1381624","url":null,"abstract":"In various industries end-product manufacturers acquire core subsystems from upstream technology provider firms and focus primarily on efficient end-product integration. We examine the strategic interactions between a technology firm that introduces a new subsystem and the respective end-product manufacturers “integrators”. We analyze how the fraction of end-product functionalities prepackaged into the subsystem impacts the optimal introduction strategy and the relative value appropriation power across the industries. Offering a subsystem that performs many end-product functions has a dual effect on the provider's profits. On the positive side, the provider extracts a higher ease-of-use rent from the integrators because of the easier/cheaper integration. On the negative side, such subsystems may curtail the adopters' ability for competitive differentiation and render adoption less valuable. We discuss the role of subsystem functionality in value appropriation in technology markets, and we highlight the perils of subsystem overintegration. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Kamalini Ramdas, entrepreneurship and innovation.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126724908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948 垂直整合会降低价格吗?1948年派拉蒙反托拉斯案证据
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1960171
Ricard Gil
{"title":"Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948","authors":"Ricard Gil","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960171","url":null,"abstract":"I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"22 16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130503798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Financial Markets and Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions in Africa 非洲的金融市场和跨境并购
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1914478
E. Agbloyor
{"title":"Financial Markets and Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions in Africa","authors":"E. Agbloyor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1914478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1914478","url":null,"abstract":"Cross border M&As have increasingly become a major component of total FDI flows in both developing and developed economies. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between financial markets and cross border M&A activity on the African continent. We focus on cross border M&A transactions where the equity stake acquired is equal to or exceeds 10% of the voting equity of the target firm. Our sample consists of a maximum of 14 African countries with data covering the period 1993-2008. We use panel data techniques and estimate our empirical models via a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation which corrects for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Our findings suggest that banking sector development promotes cross border M&A activity on the African continent. We do not find strong and compelling evidence that stock market development promotes cross border M&A activity. We also provide new and exciting evidence that cross border M&A activity promotes both stock market development and banking sector development in the African context.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125710606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Macroeconomic Drivers Behind Risk Arbitrage Strategy 风险套利策略背后的宏观经济驱动力
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1705548
Stephane Dieudonne, S. Bouacha, F. Cretin
{"title":"Macroeconomic Drivers Behind Risk Arbitrage Strategy","authors":"Stephane Dieudonne, S. Bouacha, F. Cretin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1705548","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705548","url":null,"abstract":"This document is a quantitative analysis of risk arbitrage strategy across a sample of 1,911 M&A deals announced between January 1998 and September 2010 in the US and Canada. The study highlights the macroeconomic factors that might affect the risk/yield calculation for a risk arbitrage position. The main factors are: US unemployment, the investor confidence indicator, the investment grade credit spread, P/E and price on the S&P 500, short term interest rates and the yield curve. Ultimately, it is hoped that this document will provide managers with an interpretation of the mergers & acquisitions market as well as a decision-making tool to complement traditional qualitative analysis.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116433306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Structure-Performance Relation in Nepalese Banking Industry 尼泊尔银行业的结构-绩效关系
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1665132
Dinesh Gajurel
{"title":"Structure-Performance Relation in Nepalese Banking Industry","authors":"Dinesh Gajurel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1665132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1665132","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims at testing the structure-performance hypotheses in the context of Nepalese banking industry for the period of 2001-2009 under the Berger and Hannan (1993) empirical framework. The empirical results suggest that traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis and quit life hypothesis are at work in explaining concentration-profitability relation and there are weak supports for efficiency structure hypotheses. The results of this study hold significant policy and managerial implications.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127902518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Dubious Value of International Acquisitions by Emerging Economy Firms: The Case of Indian Firms 新兴经济体企业国际收购的可疑价值:以印度企业为例
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1586852
Aneel G. Karnani
{"title":"Dubious Value of International Acquisitions by Emerging Economy Firms: The Case of Indian Firms","authors":"Aneel G. Karnani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1586852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1586852","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the question whether companies from emerging economies create shareholder value through foreign acquisitions. The popular business press usually views these foreign acquisitions very positively. The stock markets have often reacted negatively to the acquisitions. The management always claims that the acquisition is in the long term strategic interests of the firm. This article attempts to shed light on these conflicting positions: short term versus long term, and financial versus strategic logic. Using a mix of stock market reaction for a small sample and three in-depth case studies, I conclude that large foreign acquisitions from India have not created shareholder value. The causes of this under-performance are: too little integration, agency problems, and easy capital. Finally, I use a case study to illustrate a successful approach to foreign acquisitions: significant synergies, reasonable price, and deep integration.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130362167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Status in the Workplace: Evidence from M&A 职场地位:来自并购的证据
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1544547
Illoong Kwon, Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom
{"title":"Status in the Workplace: Evidence from M&A","authors":"Illoong Kwon, Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1544547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1544547","url":null,"abstract":"Using mergers and acquisitions as a natural experiment, this paper analyzes how changes in workers?status in the workplace affect their turnover decisions. The evidence suggests that workers have different preferences for status depending on reference group. When compared with co-workers in the same occupation, workers positively value their status. However, when compared with workers in other occupations in the same firm, workers negatively value their status. Workers seem to give up absolute wage increase for higher status within occupation, which suggests that preference for status stems from status?social value, not from its instrumental value for future income.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129389007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Incomplete Contract. Bargaining and Divisional Structures 不完整的合同。议价和部门结构
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1461313
T. Bao, Yongqing Wang
{"title":"Incomplete Contract. Bargaining and Divisional Structures","authors":"T. Bao, Yongqing Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1461313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1461313","url":null,"abstract":"When complete contracting is not possible, allocating control structure becomes the second-best arrangement. This paper analyzes the design of optimal divisional structure within an organization where ex post bargaining between the potential divisional managers is possible. In much the same light as Aghion and Tirole (J Political Econ 105(1):1¨C29, 1997), we study the control problem in the context of search for projects. Our model shows that when the managers cannot bargain with one another, internal integration is preferred to internal separation. Where bargaining is possible, formal divisional structure defines both the ex post bargaining position of the two managers and their incentive to search ex ante. When the managers tend to arrive at a more favorable project to the principal via bargaining, the general leader of a firm may want to choose separation instead to increase the probability of bargaining, as the symmetrical incentive requires both managers to search and get informed.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126050383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains 上游横向兼并与效率提升
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1447253
Chrysovalantou Milliou, Apostolis Pavlou
{"title":"Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains","authors":"Chrysovalantou Milliou, Apostolis Pavlou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1447253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1447253","url":null,"abstract":"We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream competition is not too strong. Examining whether the merger’s potential efficiency gains can overcome its anti-competitive effects in terms of welfare, we show that when firms merge usually both of the above mentioned efficiencies are realized and they are passed on to consumers. This holds to a lesser extend when firms trade through linear contracts.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115145970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 44
The Firm as an Intrinsic Motivation Device 企业作为一种内在激励手段
ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-06-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1198362
Abhijit Ramalingam, Michael T. Rauh
{"title":"The Firm as an Intrinsic Motivation Device","authors":"Abhijit Ramalingam, Michael T. Rauh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1198362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1198362","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we develop a new theory of the firm where the market is primarily an incentive system whereas the firm is an intrinsic motivation device. The firm is more efficient than the market when asset specificity and subjective risk are sufficiently high because it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on risk. An efficient firm is unambiguously the more ethical institution in the sense that the component of production effort due to intrinsic motivation and the agent's rents in exchange for commitment are higher. The exception is when the market approximates the first best.","PeriodicalId":230377,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Integration (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130988239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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