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Labor's Capital, Business Confidence, and the Market for Loanable Funds 劳动力资本、商业信心和可贷资金市场
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.600667
James L. Medoff, R. Sellers, Justin Cheongsiatomy
{"title":"Labor's Capital, Business Confidence, and the Market for Loanable Funds","authors":"James L. Medoff, R. Sellers, Justin Cheongsiatomy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.600667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.600667","url":null,"abstract":"The market for loanable funds provides a useful framework for determining changes in investment and interest rates. In the United States, a significant source of supply originates from labor in the form of pension assets. However, despite the increased contribution by labor to the supply curve over the past several decades, levels of investment have remained less than robust. Here, we highlight the changes in the demand curve for loanable funds in order to explain the empirical trends. Data series provided by the Conference Board capture the confidence of U. S. business and thus provide a gauge of Keynes’ “animal spirits”—an essential factor in the demand curve shifts. Correlation of the data series with both quarterly changes in real interest rates and quarterly changes in payroll employment offers documentation for these macroeconomic claims.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114760300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Computational Framework 具有非对称信息的有限状态动态博弈:一个计算框架
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.570085
Chaim Fershtman, A. Pakes
{"title":"Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Computational Framework","authors":"Chaim Fershtman, A. Pakes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.570085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.570085","url":null,"abstract":"We present a simple algorithm for computing an intuitive notion of MPE for ?nite state dynamic games with asymmetric information. The algorithm does not require; storage and updating of posterior distributions, explicit integration over possible future states to deter- mine continuation values, or storage and updating of information at all possible points in the state space. It is also easy to program. To il- lustrate we compute the MPE of a collusive industry in which ?rms do not know each other?s cost positions. Costs evolve with the (privately observed) outcomes of their investment decisions. Costly meetings are called when a ?rm perceives that its relative cost position has improved. The meetings reveal information and realign pro?ts accod- ingly. We show that parameters determining information ?ows can e¤ect market structure and through market structure, producer and consumer surplus.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127735946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples) 离散动态对策参数的简单估计(含进入/退出示例)
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.566864
A. Pakes, M. Ostrovsky, Steven T. Berry
{"title":"Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples)","authors":"A. Pakes, M. Ostrovsky, Steven T. Berry","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.566864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.566864","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry and exit costs. The idea is to begin with non parametric first stage estimates of entry and continuation values obtained by computing sample averages of the realized continuation values of entrants who do enter and incumbents who do continue. Under certain assumptions these values are linear functions of the parameters of the problem, and hence are not computationally burdensome to use. Attention is given to the small sample problem of estimation error in the non parametric estimates and this leads to a preference for use of particularly simple estimates of continuation values and moments.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124417002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 552
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 稳态学习和汉谟拉比法典
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2004-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.564263
D. Fudenberg, D. Levine
{"title":"Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi","authors":"D. Fudenberg, D. Levine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.564263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.564263","url":null,"abstract":"The code of Hammurabi specified a “trial by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We attack these puzzles from the perspective of the theory of learning in games. We give a partial characterization of patiently stable outcomes that arise as the limit of steady states with rational learning as players become more patient. These “subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria” have self-confirming beliefs at certain information sets reachable by a single deviation. We analyze this refinement and use it as a tool to study the broader issue of the survival of superstition. According to this theory Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"418 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124195576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Reinventing Boston: 1640-2003 重塑波士顿:1640-2003
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.459284
E. Glaeser
{"title":"Reinventing Boston: 1640-2003","authors":"E. Glaeser","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.459284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.459284","url":null,"abstract":"The three largest cities in colonial America remain at the core of three of America's largest metropolitan areas today. This paper asks how Boston has been able to survive despite repeated periods of crisis and decline. Boston has reinvented itself three times: in the early 19th century as the provider of seafaring human capital for a far flung maritime trading and fishing empire, in the late 19th century as a factory town built on immigrant labor and Brahmin capital, and finally in the late 20th century as a center of the information economy. In all three instances, human capital admittedly of radically different forms provided the secret to Boston's rebirth. The history of Boston suggests that a strong base of skilled workers is a more reliable source of long-run urban health.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115771378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 52
Optimal Versus Robust Inference in Nearly Integrated Non Gaussian Models 近积分非高斯模型的最优与鲁棒推理
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.399000
S. B. Thompson
{"title":"Optimal Versus Robust Inference in Nearly Integrated Non Gaussian Models","authors":"S. B. Thompson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.399000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399000","url":null,"abstract":"Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) derived a class of point-optimal unit root tests in a time series model with Gaussian errors. Other authors have proposed \"robust\" tests which are not optimal for any model but perform well when the error distribution has thick tails. I derive a class of point-optimal tests for models with non Gaussian errors. When the true error distribution is known and has thick tails, the point-optimal tests are generally more powerful than Elliott et al.'s (1996) tests as well as the robust tests. However, when the true error distribution is unknown and asymmetric, the point-optimal tests can behave very badly. Thus there is a tradeoff between robustness to unknown error distributions and optimality with respect to the trend coefficients.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125383590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
International Unions 国际工会组织
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.392440
A. Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro
{"title":"International Unions","authors":"A. Alesina, Ignazio Angeloni, Federico Etro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.392440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.392440","url":null,"abstract":"We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union's size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"92 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126076260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 144
Trade, Growth and the Size of Countries 贸易、增长和国家规模
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.367263
Romain Wacziarg, Enrico Spolaore, A. Alesina
{"title":"Trade, Growth and the Size of Countries","authors":"Romain Wacziarg, Enrico Spolaore, A. Alesina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.367263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.367263","url":null,"abstract":"Normally, economists take the size of countries as an exogenous variable which does need to be explained. Nevertheless, the borders of countries and therefore their size change, partially in response to economic factors such as the pattern of international trade. Conversely, the size of countries influences their economic performance and their preferences for international economic policies - for instance smaller countries have a greater stake in maintaining free trade. In this paper we review the theory and the evidence concerning a growing body of research that has considered both the impact of market size on growth and the endogenous determination of country size. We show that our understanding of economic performance and of the history of international economic integration can be greatly improved by bringing the issue of country size at the forefront of the analysis of growth.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131064407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 383
Implementing Tests with Correct Size in the Simultaneous Equation Model 在联立方程模型中实现正确尺寸的测试
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.373120
Marcelo J. Moreira, Brian P. Poi
{"title":"Implementing Tests with Correct Size in the Simultaneous Equation Model","authors":"Marcelo J. Moreira, Brian P. Poi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.373120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.373120","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose a fix to the size distortions of tests for structural parameters in the simultaneous equations model by computing critical value functions based on the conditional distribution of test statistics. The conditional tests can then be used to construct informative confidence regions for the structural parameter with correct coverage probability. Commands to implement these tests in Stata are also introduced. Copyright 2003 by Stata Corporation.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121741696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 45
Fairness and Redistribution: Us Versus Europe 公平与再分配:美国与欧洲
Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series Pub Date : 2003-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.346545
Alberto Alesina, G. Angeletos
{"title":"Fairness and Redistribution: Us Versus Europe","authors":"Alberto Alesina, G. Angeletos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.346545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.346545","url":null,"abstract":"Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality, influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income in the first place depends on equilibrium tax policies. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will chose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium effort will be high, the role of luck limited, market outcomes will be quite fair, and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If instead a society believes that luck, birth, connections and/or corruption determine wealth, it will tax a lot, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. We show how this interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equilibria or multiple steady states. We argue that this model can contribute to explain US vis a vis continental European perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114900937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 63
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