{"title":"Keynes Without Nominal Rigidities","authors":"S. Marglin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.250790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.250790","url":null,"abstract":"The principal aim of this essay is to restate John Maynard Keynes's (1936) view of the economy as tending towards an equilibrium which will in general fall short of full employment. The approach outlined here, in sharp contrast to what has become standard theory, does not depend on nominal rigidities. The goods market adjusts prices according to excess demand as determined by the IS schedule; competitive price-taking producers adjust output on the basis of marginal profitability as determined by a comparison of price and marginal cost; and the labor market adjusts labor supply on the basis of a comparison of workers' marginal rates of substitution of goods for leisure and the real wage.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122597978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"War, Peace and the Size of Countries","authors":"A. Alesina, Enrico Spolaore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.293780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293780","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between international con‡ict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargain-ing and non-peaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international ’property rights’ may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115790984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy","authors":"N. Mankiw","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.236429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236429","url":null,"abstract":"The macroeconomic analysis of fiscal policy is usually based on one of two canonical models--the Barro-Ramsey model of infinitely-lived families or the Diamond-Samuelson model of overlapping generations. This paper argues that neither model is satisfactory and suggests an alternative. In the proposed model, some consumers plan ahead for themselves and their descendants, while others live paycheck to paycheck. This model is easier to reconcile with the essential facts about consumer behavior and wealth accumulation, and it yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy.","PeriodicalId":221813,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Economics Department Working Paper Series","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131904522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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