Regulation & Governance最新文献

Social Safety Nets and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence From Paid Family Leave Programs 社会安全网与企业避税：来自带薪家庭假计划的证据

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70218

Yifei Chen, Dan Palmon

引用次数: 0

Economic Governance and Institutional Design 经济治理与制度设计

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-13 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70216

Jens Prüfer

引用次数: 0

Imagining the Invisible: Judicial Epistemology, Carceral Regulation, and the Liberal State 想象不可见：司法认识论、司法监管和自由主义国家

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70215

Netanel Dagan, Adiel Zimran

{"title":"Imagining the Invisible: Judicial Epistemology, Carceral Regulation, and the Liberal State","authors":"Netanel Dagan, Adiel Zimran","doi":"10.1111/rego.70215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70215","url":null,"abstract":"In many systems judges exercise judicial review over prison officials' decisions. However, judges are often symbolically, institutionally, and practically distant from prison realities. In the current paper, we explore how judges negotiate their limited epistemological awareness of prison through the lens of epistemic injustice. Drawing on interviews with 17 (retired) Israeli Supreme Court justices regarding their prison administrative review decisions, we identify three epistemic gaps: first, the prison's heterotopic nature; second, the tension between commitment to liberty and authorizing the “pains of imprisonment” at sentencing; and third, the division of labor between sentencing and prison phases. The findings suggest that judges bridge these epistemological gaps through three imaginaries: (a) “ epistemic distancing ”; (b) “ epistemic assimilation ”; and (c) “ parallel epistemology ”. These epistemic imaginaries allow judges to compensate for their experiential absence but also structure their judicial oversight, shaping how courts administratively regulate imprisonment without fully confronting its lived realities. The findings show how judicial imaginaries of prison are shaped through top‐down narrative constructions rather than bottom‐up experiential encounters and include self‐produced “epistemic estrangement” from the prison world. We further examine the implications of these epistemic blind spots, demonstrating how they enable the legitimization of carceral power while obscuring and marginalizing the lived experiences of incarcerated individuals.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"469 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149151780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From Judicial Regulation to Judicial Governance: Locating the Courts on the Map of Social Ordering 从司法规制到司法治理：法院在社会秩序地图上的定位

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-12 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70211

Thomas Coendet

{"title":"From Judicial Regulation to Judicial Governance: Locating the Courts on the Map of Social Ordering","authors":"Thomas Coendet","doi":"10.1111/rego.70211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70211","url":null,"abstract":"Courts have long been recognized as venues of social control and policymaking. The rise of regulatory capitalism suggests reconsidering the judiciary in regulatory terms, notably through work that casts courts as regulators. This article argues, however, that styling courts as regulators is both analytically and normatively deficient: it obscures the distinctive function of courts and their contribution to social ordering. At the same time, judicial decision‐making plainly exhibits a regulatory dimension. Yet rather than stretching the concept of regulation, this article proposes to capture this dimension through governance theory. On this theoretical foundation, the article outlines a model of judicial governance that elucidates how social ordering emerges from adjudication and how it unfolds over time. In particular, the model highlights the implications of judicial decision‐making for private ordering and draws attention to processes of intermediation through lawyers, media, and advanced digital technologies. It thus opens a set of analytically structured research questions and complements them with a methodological framework to orient future work on judicial governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149151779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Executive Aggrandizement: Understanding the Silent Erosion of Democratic Constraints 行政强化：理解民主约束的无声侵蚀

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70212

Emre Toros

{"title":"Executive Aggrandizement: Understanding the Silent Erosion of Democratic Constraints","authors":"Emre Toros","doi":"10.1111/rego.70212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70212","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of executive aggrandizement face a double measurement problem. Measures of aggrandizement may include institutions that constitute liberal democracy, while broad composites may treat substantively different executive practices as interchangeable. This article develops a measurement‐oriented classification that reduces direct overlap with the V‐Dem Liberal Democracy Index and compares distinct practices under common analytical rules. Using V‐Dem v15 data and a common sample of 17,404 country‐years across 179 countries from 1901 to 2024, country‐ and year‐fixed‐effects models estimate conditional within‐country associations for five lagged practices. Patronal‐distributive allocation, judicial purges, and personalist/mobilizational legitimation are negatively associated with liberal democracy. Executive corruption is consistently imprecise, whereas politicized administrative appointments are negative only in some specifications. Item‐level, restricted‐period, timing, and first‐difference analyses document practice heterogeneity but also show exceptional persistence; negative future‐lead estimates prevent a causal or sequential reading. The primary contribution is a bounded measurement and modeling strategy that preserves comparability while reducing, rather than claiming to eliminate, outcome overlap. Its linked theoretical contribution is a practice‐family account of executive aggrandizement: politically coordinated practices may coexist and remain interdependent without becoming interchangeable indicators or stages in a common causal sequence.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"467 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Regulatory Learning or Regulatory Privilege? How Sandbox Design Shapes the Governance Value of Experimental Regulation 监管学习还是监管特权？沙盒设计如何塑造实验性监管的治理价值

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70213

János Kálmán

{"title":"Regulatory Learning or Regulatory Privilege? How Sandbox Design Shapes the Governance Value of Experimental Regulation","authors":"János Kálmán","doi":"10.1111/rego.70213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70213","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory sandboxes are controlled, time‐limited environments in which selected innovations are tested under regulatory supervision. This article asks how sandbox design can make selective experimentation capable of generating public regulatory value rather than regulatory privilege. It develops regulatory learning asymmetry to distinguish private, supervisory, and public regulatory learning and unequal distributions of access, information, learning, and benefits. A structured reading of public documents from five deliberately diverse FinTech and artificial intelligence cases illustrates a six‐element operational framework. The case material is not used to infer private or supervisory learning; it records only publication, generalization mechanisms, and documented uptake. The framework identifies a public‐learning configuration, a supervisory‐learning configuration that public documents cannot verify, and a regulatory‐privilege risk configuration. Market signaling is treated as a cross‐cutting dynamic. The article offers a bounded diagnostic for assessing whether case‐specific experience becomes contestable and institutionally usable knowledge.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Independent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU 独立机构，守法公民？来自欧盟疫苗授权调查实验的证据

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70205

Benjamin Leidorf‐Tidå, Saar Alon‐Barkat, Madalina Busuioc, Thijs de Boer

{"title":"Independent Agencies, Regulation‐Compliant Citizens? Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Vaccine Authorization in the EU","authors":"Benjamin Leidorf‐Tidå, Saar Alon‐Barkat, Madalina Busuioc, Thijs de Boer","doi":"10.1111/rego.70205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70205","url":null,"abstract":"The effectiveness of regulatory policy in many areas is contingent on citizens adhering to the scientific advice of regulatory bodies. This in turn depends on whether they perceive this advice as credible . One of the biggest threats to regulatory credibility is the concern that regulatory policy can be tainted by short‐term political interests. Consequently, regulation literature points to agency independence as a crucial resource to securing regulatory credibility, which in turn fosters citizen compliance. We test this assumption both observationally and experimentally in the case of the European Medicines Agency's (EMA) risk assessment for the first COVID‐19 vaccine—a prime example of reliance on credibility in regulation under conditions of controversy and concerns over political interference. We conducted a pre‐registered survey experiment with 4000 EU citizens from four countries timed shortly after the vaccine's approval and before its mass distribution. The results provide partial support that independence is beneficial to regulatory credibility and by extension, to regulatory compliance. Citizens who perceive the EMA as more independent found its risk assessment to be more credible and were more willing to take the vaccine. However, our experimental evidence is less conclusive. Thus, while independence might not in and of itself be a “silver bullet” to ensure regulatory credibility and compliance, it does play an important role, and its real‐life substantive significance would scale up considerably at population levels.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From Public to Private Governance, and Back—Eco‐Modulation as De‐Privatization in Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) 从公共治理到私人治理：扩展生产者责任（EPR）中的反生态调节与去私有化

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-10-08 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70208

Harri Kalimo, Antti Jukka, Reid Lifset, Petrus Kautto

引用次数: 0

Artificial Intelligence, Regulatory Capacity, and the Adaptive State 人工智能、监管能力和自适应状态

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-09-24 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70210

Chris Doyle, Martin Cave, William Webb

{"title":"Artificial Intelligence, Regulatory Capacity, and the Adaptive State","authors":"Chris Doyle, Martin Cave, William Webb","doi":"10.1111/rego.70210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70210","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial intelligence is changing not only what regulators govern but the informational environment through which regulation is conducted. Regulators increasingly use advanced analytics to process evidence and target supervisory attention, while regulated organizations deploy AI across their operations. This paper develops the concept of the adaptive regulatory state to analyze how changing informational capabilities generate behavioral and institutional adaptation. Comparative cases from financial supervision, competition, tax administration, and electronic communications identify three possible trajectories: constructive learning, governed co‐evolution, and adversarial escalation. Effective oversight does not require technological parity with regulated firms, but sufficient informational, organizational, and verification capabilities to respond as the regulatory environment changes. Four institutional principles follow: functional rather than technological capacity; effective inspectability and proportionate assurance; learning with bounded revisability; and coordinated but accountable capacity. The adaptive regulatory state is defined by whether regulatory institutions remain capable, accountable, and legitimate as their informational environment evolves.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149124057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Making Water Investible : Development Banking, Regulatory Governance, and the Institutional Production of Sanitation Infrastructure in Brazil 使水可投资：开发银行、监管治理和巴西卫生基础设施的制度性生产

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-09-17 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70206

Charles Corrêa Schramm, João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel

{"title":"Making Water Investible : Development Banking, Regulatory Governance, and the Institutional Production of Sanitation Infrastructure in Brazil","authors":"Charles Corrêa Schramm, João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel","doi":"10.1111/rego.70206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70206","url":null,"abstract":"Why did long‐horizon private investment in Brazilian water and sanitation expand after 2016 despite fragmented authority and persistent political contestation? This article places the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) inside, rather than outside, the credible‐commitment framework. It argues that the bank operated as a credibility intermediary: it assembled service territories at investible scale, financed and coordinated project preparation, translated statutory goals into comparable contracts, and linked concessions to long‐term finance. These functions complemented courts, legislatures, the national standard‐setting role of the National Water and Basic Sanitation Agency (ANA), and post‐award supervision by infranational regulators. Process tracing of laws, concession documents, regulatory instruments, auction records, corporate filings, and attributable investor statements shows how this architecture was repeated across the Temer, Bolsonaro, and Lula administrations, albeit under different political framings. The mechanism is sequence‐sensitive but not universally necessary: Chile demonstrates an alternative route through regional utilities and a central regulator, while Colombia illustrates the continuing constraints of fragmented provision. The article also distinguishes investibility from legitimacy. Financial and contractual discipline can make commitments more legible to investors, but it neither replaces public‐law oversight nor resolves disputes over affordability, participation, and the human right to water.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148993727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0