Regulation & Governance最新文献_第2页

Understanding Literal Compliance in the European Union's Multilevel Fiscal Governance 解读欧盟多层次财政治理中的字面合规

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70025

Tiziano Zgaga, Eva Thomann

引用次数: 0

Is That a Threat? How Types of Stakeholder and Reputational Threat Matter for Gaining Influence in Regulatory Rulemaking 这是威胁吗？利益相关者类型和声誉威胁如何影响监管规则制定

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-28 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70027

Rik Joosen

引用次数: 0

Beyond Compliance: The Role of Corporate Governance in Shaping Whistleblower Protection Policies 超越合规：公司治理在制定举报人保护政策中的作用

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-27 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70035

Nandana Wasantha Pathiranage, K. N. Thilini Dayarathna, Christine Jubb, Wahed Waheduzzaman

引用次数: 0

The Governance of the European Digital Identity Framework Through the Lens of Institutional Mimesis 从制度模仿的角度看欧洲数字身份框架的治理

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70032

Linda Weigl, Marta Reysner

引用次数: 0

The Resilience of New Public Management. By Irvine Lapsley and Peter Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. 400 pp. $145 (hardback). ISBN: 978-0-19-888381-4 新公共管理的弹性。欧文·拉普斯利和彼得·米勒著，牛津：牛津大学出版社，2024年。400页，145美元（精装本）。ISBN: 978-0-19-888381-4

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70031

Danture Wickramasinghe

引用次数: 0

Assuring Social Distancing Through Regulatory Intermediaries: The Role of Local Facilities in Deterring COVID‐19 in South Korea 通过监管中介机构确保社会距离：韩国当地设施在阻止COVID - 19中的作用

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-21 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70033

Jong Hun Lee, Seung‐Hun Hong

{"title":"Assuring Social Distancing Through Regulatory Intermediaries: The Role of Local Facilities in Deterring COVID‐19 in South Korea","authors":"Jong Hun Lee, Seung‐Hun Hong","doi":"10.1111/rego.70033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70033","url":null,"abstract":"Amid the COVID‐19 Pandemic, many countries worldwide have resorted to social distancing to maintain a certain physical distance to avoid direct contact between people. Despite the abundant literature on social distancing, how this mode of direct state intervention, which inevitably requires a lot of regulatory resources, was implemented has been a rare source of scientific inquiry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by presenting a case study that explores how regulatory resource deficits faced by regulators implementing social distancing were addressed in the regulator‐intermediary‐target (RIT) network. This paper highlights the role of local facilities as regulatory intermediaries in implementing social distancing in South Korea. Although social distancing was purported to keep physical distance among individuals, authorities' enforcement activities were primarily, though not entirely, targeted at local facilities. Analyzing in‐depth interviews with 30 local frontline inspectors conducted in September 2021, this paper finds that local facilities played a key intermediary role in deterring the spread of COVID‐19 as a private regulator. We argue that this role, constructed in the RIT network, was one reason South Korea could successfully deter the spread of the virus without a lockdown in the early stage of the Pandemic.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144113648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Politics of Regulatory Oversight: How Analysts Expand, Shield, or Bend Their Mandate While Reviewing Regulations 监管监督的政治：分析师在审查监管时如何扩大、保护或扭曲他们的职责

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-15 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70029

Samantha Ortiz Casillas

{"title":"The Politics of Regulatory Oversight: How Analysts Expand, Shield, or Bend Their Mandate While Reviewing Regulations","authors":"Samantha Ortiz Casillas","doi":"10.1111/rego.70029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70029","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory review—assessing the legality, use of evidence, and correct calculation of costs and benefits in regulations before they are enacted—is a core function of regulatory oversight bodies. In principle, reviewing aims to improve the effectiveness of regulations through economic rationality, tools, and methods. In practice, the work of oversight bodies occurs amid the politics of the rulemaking process and can be a way for the executive to control the regulatory agenda. Based on a 13‐month ethnography of Mexico's regulatory oversight body, I examine how analysts enact the technical and legal requirements of regulatory improvement while facing political tensions and interference. Using negotiated order theory, I show how analysts respond to political attention, conflict, or interference by expanding, shielding, or bending their mandate and conducting their work accordingly. Reviewing to improve regulations takes on different meanings and forms, allowing analysts to protect their work, organization, and techno‐legal mandate in the long term. The article contributes to a better understanding of regulatory review and oversight bodies. More importantly, it draws attention to how workers make ambitious statecraft projects like regulatory improvement possible by continuously reconciling the legal, technical, and political dimensions of their work.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144066144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Is Less More? Field Evidence on the Impact of Anti-Bribery Policies on Employee Knowledge and Corrupt Behavior 少就是多？反贿赂政策对员工知识和腐败行为影响的实证研究

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-13 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70023

Nils Köbis, Sharon Oded, Anne Leonore de Bruijn, Shuyu Huang, Benjamin van Rooij

{"title":"Is Less More? Field Evidence on the Impact of Anti-Bribery Policies on Employee Knowledge and Corrupt Behavior","authors":"Nils Köbis, Sharon Oded, Anne Leonore de Bruijn, Shuyu Huang, Benjamin van Rooij","doi":"10.1111/rego.70023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70023","url":null,"abstract":"Companies increasingly adopt internal norms to enhance compliance with legal rules. However, the rapid growth in volume and complexity of such internal rules may obstruct employee knowledge and understanding of such internal rules, and therefore also their compliance. The present study seeks to understand whether shorter and more accessible formats of internal company norms will yield better knowledge and understanding of such norms. The study consists of an extensive online field experiment randomly assigning 1235 employees of an international technology company to four treatments. In the long policy condition, employees received a 19-page traditional policy written in standard legalese language. The short policy condition entailed a shortened two-page version of this classic policy, and in the infographic condition, employees received an illustrated overview of the essential rules on a single page. A fourth group received no policy and served as a control condition. After reading the policy, employees completed several measures assessing their rule knowledge, perceived social norms, and played an incentivized bribery game. We find that (a) none of the types of policies presented improves rule knowledge or reduces corrupt behavior compared to the control treatment, and (b) no differences exist between the policies in influencing rules knowledge or reducing corrupt behavior. Instead, we find robust evidence indicating that people form their beliefs about corporate norms and decide how to behave in situations presenting high-corruption risk based on what they consider to be the norm. The paper discusses its implications for existing literature on codes of conduct and internal norms, on ethics training, as well as on legal knowledge development.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143940201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Drivers of Noncompliance With Vaccine Mandates—The Interplay Between Distrust, Rationality, Morality, and Social Motivation 不遵守疫苗规定的驱动因素——不信任、理性、道德和社会动机之间的相互作用

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-05-05 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70018

Katie Attwell, Hang Duong, Amy Morris, Leah Roberts, Mark Navin

{"title":"Drivers of Noncompliance With Vaccine Mandates—The Interplay Between Distrust, Rationality, Morality, and Social Motivation","authors":"Katie Attwell, Hang Duong, Amy Morris, Leah Roberts, Mark Navin","doi":"10.1111/rego.70018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70018","url":null,"abstract":"COVID‐19 amplified the issue of public resistance to government vaccination programs. Little attention has focused on people's moral reasons for noncompliance, which differ from—but often build upon—the epistemic claims they make about vaccine safety and efficacy, disease severity, and the trustworthiness of government. This study explores the drivers of noncompliance with the COVID‐19 vaccination program in Western Australia, using in‐depth interviews with refusers. Distrust in the government and concerns about safety, efficacy, and necessity (rationality) drive noncompliance when vaccination is voluntary. When governments mandate vaccines, rationales expand to include cost–benefit analyses of consequences, consideration of available alternatives, and moral justifications, with policytakers expressing “morality policy reactance” toward mandates as morality (rather than regulatory) policies. Our theoretical framework of vaccine noncompliance drivers shows distrust, rationality, and morality as interrelated and supported by social motivation. We consider policy implications and suggest holistic measures.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143905812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Drivers of Science Referenced in US EPA Regulatory Impact Analyses: Open Access, Professional Popularity, and Agency Involvement 美国环保署法规影响分析中引用的科学驱动因素：开放获取、专业普及和机构参与

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2025-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70026

Tyler A. Scott, Sojeong Kim, Liza Wood

引用次数: 0