Regulation & Governance最新文献_第2页

Systemic Imbalances in Integrity Management Systems: A Meso‐Level Framework From Four Corruption Scandals 诚信管理系统的系统性失衡：四起腐败丑闻的中观框架

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70201

Georgios Kominis, Adina Dudau, Alvise Favotto, Denisse Rodriguez‐Olivari

{"title":"Systemic Imbalances in Integrity Management Systems: A Meso‐Level Framework From Four Corruption Scandals","authors":"Georgios Kominis, Adina Dudau, Alvise Favotto, Denisse Rodriguez‐Olivari","doi":"10.1111/rego.70201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70201","url":null,"abstract":"Integrity management systems (IMSs) are increasingly promoted to embed ethical conduct, mitigate corruption risks, and strengthen organizational accountability. Yet empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains sparse and contradictory, offering little insight into how these systems operate in practice and why they often fail in heavily formalized organizational settings. This paper addresses that gap by developing a meso‐level framework for diagnosing systemic imbalances in IMSs. Drawing on systems theory and management control literature, we conceptualize IMSs as an integrity management package structured through four levers: belief, boundary, diagnostic, and interactive systems of control. We deploy this framework through an explanatory, multi‐case design spanning four major corruption scandals in infrastructure, defense, healthcare, and banking in the UK, Italy, Greece, and the Nordic–Baltic region, drawing on a triangulated dataset built through systematic web scraping. The cross‐case analysis shows that integrity failures are not explained simply by the absence of formal controls, but by recurring imbalances among control levers. Organizations tend to privilege boundary and diagnostic systems, such as rules, procedures, monitoring, and performance metrics, while under‐investing in belief and interactive systems that should enable ethical culture, dialogue, challenge, and learning. We theorize this imbalance as a compliance façade: formally robust but weakly embedded in organizational practice. The paper thereby reframes the compliance versus values debate in ethics scholarship, offering the first empirically grounded, cross‐sectoral model of how integrity is embedded, sustained, and undermined in organizations, with implications for redesigning IMSs across public, private, and hybrid settings.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148909168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Corruption and Uneven Development: Why Anti‐Corruption Fails in the EU 's Most Vulnerable Regions 腐败与不平衡发展：为什么反腐败在欧盟最脆弱地区失败

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-31 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70199

Ina Kubbe, Stoyan Panov, Wisnu Setiadi Nugroho, Fatih Kırşanlı

{"title":"Corruption and Uneven Development: Why Anti‐Corruption Fails in the EU 's Most Vulnerable Regions","authors":"Ina Kubbe, Stoyan Panov, Wisnu Setiadi Nugroho, Fatih Kırşanlı","doi":"10.1111/rego.70199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70199","url":null,"abstract":"This article challenges the assumption that legal harmonization within the European Union ensures effective anti‐corruption governance. Despite EU‐compliant frameworks, institutional integrity remains highly uneven across subnational territories. We introduce the Regional Integrity Framework (RIF), a diagnostic approach that integrates citizen perceptions, procurement indicators, and enforcement activation measures to capture regional integrity performance. The analysis suggests that formal convergence can conceal functional divergence, as peripheral regions often exhibit weaker administrative capacity, limited oversight, and uneven institutional activation. A mixed‐methods application that combines panel analysis with an illustrative comparison of Sofia and Vidin, Bulgaria, demonstrates how the RIF can diagnose territorial integrity gaps within a shared legal framework. Conceptually, the study reframes anti‐corruption as a territorially embedded problem of institutional activation; methodologically, it offers a transferable framework for identifying enforcement asymmetries and governance disparities in multi‐level systems.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148858818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Legislative Financial Asset Disclosure, Firm Motivations, and Macroeconomic Outcomes in the US States 美国立法金融资产披露、企业动机和宏观经济结果

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-28 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70203

Justin H. Kirkland, Patrick E. Shea

{"title":"Legislative Financial Asset Disclosure, Firm Motivations, and Macroeconomic Outcomes in the US States","authors":"Justin H. Kirkland, Patrick E. Shea","doi":"10.1111/rego.70203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70203","url":null,"abstract":"Financial asset disclosure laws are widely implemented to combat conflicts of interest among policymakers, yet their economic impact remains poorly understood. This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of how these transparency measures affect macroeconomic outcomes across the 50 US states. We theorize that these disclosure and recusal laws could have divergent impacts on macroeconomic performance: they might enhance economic outcomes by curtailing the exploitation of political connections by business firms, or conversely, they could impede economic growth by altering firm behavior and deterring business leaders from seeking public office, thereby potentially reducing the pool of economically savvy policymakers. Using new data on state‐level disclosure policies, we find that asset disclosure laws are associated with a worsening macroeconomic environment in states. To uncover the mechanisms driving these counterintuitive results, we conduct two pre‐registered survey experiments with 2000 small business owners. Our experimental evidence suggests that stringent disclosure requirements deter business investment and expansion. This research has implications for legislative challenges for legislative design, transparency, and economic policy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148842973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Legal Corruption in the Government: An Experimental Study on the Role of Civil Servants' Political Ideology 政府中的法律腐败：公务员政治思想作用的实验研究

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-26 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70200

Kee Hoon Chung, Don S. Lee, Soonae Park

引用次数: 0

The Rational Design of Space Agreements: How Bilateralism Shapes Powerful States' Design Preferences 空间协议的理性设计：双边主义如何塑造大国的设计偏好

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70202

Jean‐Frédéric Morin, Philippe Evoy, Cynthia Couette

{"title":"The Rational Design of Space Agreements: How Bilateralism Shapes Powerful States' Design Preferences","authors":"Jean‐Frédéric Morin, Philippe Evoy, Cynthia Couette","doi":"10.1111/rego.70202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70202","url":null,"abstract":"The global governance of outer space relies heavily on international agreements, yet the institutional forms of these agreements remain underexplored. This article introduces a new dataset on various design features of 952 space agreements, offering the first large‐N overview of institutional design in space governance. Building on rational design theory, this article analyzes how these design features interact with one another and with negotiation structures. Our results reveal systematic trade‐offs and suggest that power asymmetry has contrasting effects depending on the context: Powerful states tend to favor greater delegation, precision, and enforcement in bilateral agreements, while often resisting them in multilateral settings. These findings underscore the importance of accounting for both power dynamics and bilateralism, two contextual factors often overlooked in rational design theory. By making the dataset publicly available, the article seeks to foster further research on the causes and consequences of institutional variation in space governance and to advance comparative institutionalist scholarship across issue‐areas of global governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"188 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148809792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Civil Servants' Compliance with Conflict‐of‐Interest Regulation: Evidence from a List Experiment 公务员对利益冲突监管的遵从：来自列表实验的证据

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-24 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70197

Don S. Lee, Minsung Michael Kang, Soonae Park

{"title":"Civil Servants' Compliance with Conflict‐of‐Interest Regulation: Evidence from a List Experiment","authors":"Don S. Lee, Minsung Michael Kang, Soonae Park","doi":"10.1111/rego.70197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70197","url":null,"abstract":"While regulatory governance scholarship has paid significant attention to the normative importance of ethics reform in government, empirical evidence on compliance remains scant. Drawing on insights from the social value activation model and behavioral ethics, this study examines civil servants' compliance propensity under conflict‐of‐interest regulation. Specifically, we examine how a legitimate ethics reform is associated with the voluntary compliance of two legally treated groups: those with policy implementation duties and those with frequent stakeholder engagement. The results of our list experiment with a representative sample of South Korean civil servants ( n = 1977) show that both target groups exhibit higher estimated compliance propensity with the second provision of the Act, restricted and prohibited actions, but that only policy implementation duties are associated with higher compliance propensity with the first provision, reporting and disclosure obligations. Our findings suggest that ethics reform compliance is shaped not only by formal rules and deterrence, but also by administrative role exposure, perceived legitimacy, and the value‐based dimension of civil servants.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148809793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Why Comply? Explaining Sectoral Patterns in GRECO 'S Anti‐Corruption Recommendations 为什么遵守?解释GRECO反腐败建议中的部门模式

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-20 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70198

Susana Coroado, Robert Gillanders

{"title":"Why Comply? Explaining Sectoral Patterns in GRECO 'S Anti‐Corruption Recommendations","authors":"Susana Coroado, Robert Gillanders","doi":"10.1111/rego.70198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70198","url":null,"abstract":"Why do states vary in their compliance with international anti‐corruption recommendations? Research often treats the state as a unitary actor and explains variation at country‐level. This article challenges that assumption by examining variation in compliance across institutional sectors within countries. Using original data from the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the analysis shows a clear sectoral pattern. Recommendations addressed to prosecutors are implemented most frequently, followed by those targeting judges, while recommendations directed at members of parliament show the lowest levels of compliance. The article explains this variation through the political economy of target compliance. Reform outcomes depend on the interaction between the political costs imposed by reform and the degree of control that targeted actors exercise over its implementation. We find little evidence that country‐level factors shape reform outcomes, while sector‐specific incentives provide a stronger explanation for compliance patterns. By highlighting the importance of the target population, the article contributes to research on international compliance, anti‐corruption governance, and international monitoring mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2026-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148767498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Does Corruption Increase Inequality? Evidence From a European Fact‐Based Assessment 腐败会加剧不平等吗？来自欧洲基于事实的评估的证据

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-13 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70196

Iva Parvanova, Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi

引用次数: 0

A Duty to Care or a Duty to Comply? Gambling Operators' Interpretation of the Legal Concept of Duty of Care and Their Responsibility for Preventing Gambling‐Related Harm 关心的义务还是遵从的义务？赌博经营者对注意义务法律概念的解释及其预防赌博相关伤害的责任

IF 3 2区社会学

Regulation & Governance Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1111/rego.70195

Maria Persson, Therese Reitan, Jenny Cisneros Örnberg

引用次数: 0

Bold Claims, Low Wages: Why Voluntary Sustainability Standards ( VSS ) Struggle to Implement Living Wages 大胆的主张，低工资：为什么自愿可持续性标准（VSS）难以实现生活工资