{"title":"In the Eye of the Storm? A Quantitative Content Analysis on the Influence of Surrogate Inspectorates on Media Frames","authors":"Julia Wesdorp","doi":"10.1111/rego.70005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70005","url":null,"abstract":"In the past decades, scholars have provided novel insights on the role of media within regulation. Still, this strand of research has received less attention to the networked nature of contemporary regulatory governance. This article studies surrogate inspectorates, who focus on motivating the implementation/enforcement of regulatory rules, often temporary and without formal capacity. Based on a quantitative content analysis of 2700 newspaper articles, this article studies how the presence of surrogate inspectorates affects the way regulatory agencies are framed within newspaper articles. The results show that (a) media attention for regulatory agencies has increased in the past 12 years and is increasingly negative and (b) that the presence of surrogate inspectorates is associated with more sensational, personalized, conflict, and negative news coverage of regulatory agencies. This study concludes that, as the regulatory network becomes more complex with, for example, surrogate inspectorates, the control of regulatory agencies over media framing diminishes.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Rise of Investor-Driven Climate Governance: From Myth to Institution?","authors":"Rami Kaplan, David L. Levy","doi":"10.1111/rego.70000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70000","url":null,"abstract":"Investor-driven climate governance (ICG) is premised on mobilizing finance to address climate change by leveraging investors to pressure companies to reduce emissions. Examining the rapid growth of ICG from an institutional political economy perspective, we argue that powerful financial and regulatory actors with varied interests coalesced to promote the discourse that climate risks equal financial risks, and to develop a finance-centered mechanism of climate governance. The flourishing field created market opportunities for other actors such as data vendors and accountants, and attracted activists seeking leverage on emitters. In turn, institutionalization exerted isomorphic pressure on financial firms to adopt ICG practices. However, ICG practices of disclosure and emission commitments became increasingly decoupled from actions to reduce emissions due to the weak business case for decarbonizing investors' portfolios and corporate operations; the core economic mechanism was largely a myth. This decoupling created contradictory forces: it erodes the legitimacy of the ICG discourse, but we also identified dynamic feedback loops that strengthen the field, potentially making the myth self-fulfilling. Overall, we conclude that the field's momentum, interests of key actors, and feedback effects are likely to sustain the field, which is deeply institutionalized despite the current headwinds.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143477843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Caught Between Privacy and Surveillance: Explaining the Long-Term Stagnation of Data Protection Regulation in Liberal Democracies","authors":"Nicolas Bocquet","doi":"10.1111/rego.12656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12656","url":null,"abstract":"This article pursues two objectives. First, it aims to trace the genealogy of data protection regulation in major liberal democracies. To do so, it examines the evolution of this regulation in the United States, France, and Germany, among others, and relies on the policy actors' triangle framework. Second, the article provides an explanation for the paradox that emerges from this diachronic analysis: a long-term stagnation of data protection regulation despite the radical transformation of the information environment and surveillance practices over the last three decades. The article finds that this long-term regulatory stagnation can be explained by a constant trade-off between competing and sometimes irreconcilable policy goals and, especially since 9/11, an overlap between state and private interests. Despite post-Snowden reforms, this conflict of interest continues to shape the regulation, raising many democratic concerns.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143462404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Climate Change and the Social Order","authors":"Jens Beckert","doi":"10.1111/rego.70003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70003","url":null,"abstract":"Despite decades of awareness, societies have failed to adequately respond to climate change, as evidenced by rising CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the continued dominance of fossil fuels in global energy consumption. This failure underscores the structural constraints of capitalist modernity, where economic and political incentives, as well as consumer behaviors, obstruct effective climate action. Beyond the challenge of mitigation, climate change raises pressing questions about its social and political consequences. Societies will face increasing losses due to extreme weather events, resource depletion, and declining living conditions, exacerbating social inequalities and undermining the legitimacy of existing political and economic structures. The inability of capitalist modernity to address this crisis fosters a state of social anomie, where normative commitments to sustainability clash with entrenched systemic realities. Social scientists have a crucial role in examining these structural failures and identifying pathways for adaptation, resilience, and transformation. By analyzing the conflicts and contradictions within current societal arrangements, they can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of climate change as a profound challenge to social order and political stability.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143462417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andrea Migone, David Chen, Bryan Evans, Alex Howlett, Michael Howlett
{"title":"“Is Lobbying for Losers?”: Corporate Behavior and Canadian Military Procurement Contracting","authors":"Andrea Migone, David Chen, Bryan Evans, Alex Howlett, Michael Howlett","doi":"10.1111/rego.12658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12658","url":null,"abstract":"Lobbying is a multi‐faceted phenomenon that involves interest groups and corporations contacting politicians and officials in order to try to achieve their policy preferences. While interest group policy‐related lobbying has received a great deal of attention, studies of corporate contract lobbying are rarer even though this is a much older phenomenon. The article critically examines the commonly‐held position that in the latter case “lobbying is for winners”; that is, that large scale corporate lobbying helps secure contracts that might otherwise have gone to a different firm. It argues instead that firms enjoying technological and other market‐related strengths enjoy an “insider advantage” and lobby less than firms in more competitive situations. In other words that in many situations “lobbying is for losers,” a tool used by weaker firms trying to match or offset the technological and other advantages enjoyed by dominant firms. The article draws on government lobbying registers to examine recent defense‐related procurement efforts in Canada to purchase fighter jets, naval surface ships, patrol vessels, and search and rescue aircraft and the contract lobbying they engendered. Evidence from the four cases provides support for the “loser” thesis with respect to large‐scale technologically advanced goods but also the need to carefully define what constitutes an “inside advantage” allowing firms to forego or delay their lobbying activity, often until only <jats:italic>after</jats:italic> a contract has been awarded.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"180 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143435249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Guardians and Spenders in the Budgetary Process: More Than One Type of Relations","authors":"Ilana Shpaizman","doi":"10.1111/rego.70002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70002","url":null,"abstract":"The budget is the outcome of bargaining between spenders and guardians. Most research on budgeting sees all spenders as a unitary actor. This article argues, instead, that there are different relations at play between guardians and each spending ministry. Based on a comparison between four social ministries in Israel, it shows that these relations differ in terms of the level of involvement of guardians in spenders' budgetary inputs and outputs, ranging from near‐complete autonomy within existing budget limits to tight budgetary control and interference in policymaking. The difference is a function of the perceived risk of overspending or ineffectiveness. When the guardian's level of involvement is high, the dynamic between the parties can be conflictual if they do not share the same policy ideas. In a conflictual dynamic, spenders have more chances of forcing their will on guardians if they can use their political power to stand up to them.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143401931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fossil Capital in the Caribbean: The Toxic Role of “Regulatory Havens” in Climate Change","authors":"Jose Atiles, David Whyte","doi":"10.1111/rego.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70001","url":null,"abstract":"Secrecy jurisdictions play a crucial role in the legal framework perpetuating climate change. This paper demonstrates how these jurisdictions sustain the dynamics of climate change by enabling capital accumulation rooted in environmental degradation. A regulatory approach to law and climate change must address the global nature of the legal structure that upholds exploitative and ecocidal social relationships. This paper argues that secrecy jurisdictions are a pivotal yet under-analyzed element of the global legal architecture that facilitates climate change. It, therefore, proposes the term <i>regulatory havens</i> to describe their purpose more adequately. Our analysis includes a case study of the Caribbean, as this geographical region operates as the epicenter for externalizing legal liabilities and extra-legal activities that contribute to climate change while also disproportionately suffering its impacts. The paper outlines how the corporate organizational structure prevalent in regulatory havens enable fossil fuel companies to shield themselves from liability, thus allowing them to detoxify fossil fuel assets. It then sets out a typology of “mechanisms of avoidance” that enable fossil fuel companies to secure key commercial advantages and operate under the radar of regulatory constraints. It briefly analyses the need to dismantle regulatory havens as a prerequisite for building a sustainable economy.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143401603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance in a Crypto-World","authors":"Sinclair Davidson","doi":"10.1111/rego.12661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12661","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the nature of governance both within and by blockchains and the economies they support. There is a widespread assumption that the proper governance model for these economies is political. In this paper, I make an alternative claim, namely that a more accurate model for blockchain governance is as a species of corporate governance. Political and corporate governance are similar, but they solve different problems with different incentives. Political governance, at its base, seeks to create legitimacy for coercive acts. Corporate governance is about solving agency problems with voluntary agreement. I explain why crypto governance is more like the latter, and in so doing draw out some of the lessons of the theory of modern corporate governance that might then usefully apply to the design of blockchain governance mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143375313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outsourced, Inspected, and Effective? The Effect of Inspections on the Safety Performance of Prisons in England and Wales 2004–2012","authors":"Ayako Nakamura","doi":"10.1111/rego.12660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12660","url":null,"abstract":"While outsourcing of public services is today widespread, maintaining their quality remains a challenge. External inspections are seen as essential for overseeing private providers, yet their effectiveness has not been thoroughly investigated. This study evaluates the impact of pre-scheduled inspections on the performance of private and publicly operated prisons in England and Wales between 2004 and 2012, focusing on two key safety indicators: self-harm and violence. Our findings reveal that private prisons' performance in these safety measures was weak, and that pre-scheduled predictable inspections are not effective enough to mitigate this weakness. The findings suggest that governments should consider areas where outsourcing may be inappropriate, and how existing inspection systems can be optimized.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143375314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Blockchain Treasury Governance Dilemma","authors":"Darcy W. E. Allen, Chris Berg, Aaron M. Lane","doi":"10.1111/rego.12659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12659","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain treasuries are pools of cryptocurrency earmarked for funding goods and services within a blockchain ecosystem, such as protocol upgrades. Blockchain participants, such as users and developers, face a trust problem in ensuring that the treasury is robust to opportunism, such as theft or misappropriation of the assets. Treasury governance structures, such as committees or stakeholder voting, seek to create trust in treasury functions. In this paper, we use new comparative economics to examine how treasury governance mechanisms minimize the costs of dictatorship and disorder, thereby bolstering trust. We interpret case studies of innovative treasury governance within this Institutional Possibilities Frontier (IPF) framework, showing that the costs shift throughout the lifecycle of a blockchain community, and those costs are often revealed or learned through governance crises. These changes lead ecosystem participants to choose and innovate on treasury governance.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143083446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}