{"title":"Unraveling how intermediary-beneficiary interaction shapes policy implementation","authors":"Cynthia L. Michel","doi":"10.1111/rego.12592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12592","url":null,"abstract":"As a result of policy growth, implementing agencies often face new mandates without the necessary capacity expansion to comply with, thus resorting to intermediaries. However, intermediaries are not innocuous to the implementation process, especially when they are expected to play the double role of target and intermediary, responsible for translating/interpreting regulation for beneficiaries. How does the interaction between beneficiaries and intermediaries-target shape policy implementation? I argue that such interaction is not only determined by the role the intermediary adopts, and their relation with the beneficiary, but also by the motivations beneficiaries have for engaging in the regulatory process, and their capacity to do so. I develop a theoretical framework for understanding their interaction and apply it to a new regulatory policy in Mexico to provide social security for paid domestic workers. I explore the mechanisms by which the interaction between intermediaries and beneficiaries affects the outcome of the regulatory process.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140552017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why data about people are so hard to govern","authors":"Wendy H. Wong, Jamie Duncan, David A. Lake","doi":"10.1111/rego.12591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12591","url":null,"abstract":"How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140533215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles‐based approach","authors":"Stuart Mills","doi":"10.1111/rego.12590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12590","url":null,"abstract":"Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well‐meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles‐based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp
{"title":"Involving citizens in regulation: A comparative qualitative study of four experimentalist cases of participatory regulation in Dutch health care","authors":"Bert de Graaff, Suzanne Rutz, Annemiek Stoopendaal, Hester van de Bovenkamp","doi":"10.1111/rego.12589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12589","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on responsive regulation argues that citizens should be involved in regulatory practices to avoid capture between regulator and regulatee. It also argues that including citizens can add an important perspective to regulatory practices. However, we know little about how citizens' perspectives are brought into regulatory practices. This paper draws on existing qualitative research to compare and analyze four cases of experimental participatory regulation in Dutch health care, focusing on the theoretical assumptions that citizen involvement (a) prevents capture, and (b) stimulates the inclusion of new perspectives. Our results show that involving citizens in regulation can increase transparency and trust in regulatory practices and familiarizes regulators with other perspectives. It is, however, up to the regulator to work on deriving benefits from that involvement—not only the practical work of organizing participatory regulation, but also the conceptual work of reflecting on their own assumptions and standards. We do find evidence for weak forms of capture and argue for the need to extend capture to involve multiple actors. We reflect on these results for theory development and regulatory practice.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Europe's crisis of legitimacy: Governing by rules and ruling by numbers in the eurozone. By Vivien A.Schmidt, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2020. pp. 385. USD 35.99 (paperback). ISBN: 9780198797050","authors":"Eva K. Lieberherr","doi":"10.1111/rego.12588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12588","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating risk: How private information shapes global safety standards. By Rebecca L.Perlman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, US$ 29.99. 2023. pp. 227. ISBN: 978‐1‐009‐29193‐4","authors":"Graeme Auld","doi":"10.1111/rego.12587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12587","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140196183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unofficial intermediation in the regulatory governance of hazardous chemicals","authors":"Erik Hysing, Sabina Du Rietz Dahlström","doi":"10.1111/rego.12586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12586","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory intermediaries—organizations that operate between regulators (public and private) and target groups—perform a range of important functions. While most previous research has focused on intermediaries that have been delegated official authority, in this paper we focus on unofficial and informal intermediary functions aiming to advance the governance of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) chemicals. Chemical pollution is a growing environmental and health concern, leading to both public and private regulatory initiatives. By studying a particular segment—paperboard food packaging in Sweden—the study generates insights into critical functions performed by unofficial intermediaries (Svenskt Vatten and ChemSec) in this regulatory regime, which extend and expand regulatory reach in various ways. The study also shows the importance of different types of intermediaries that interact in dynamic ways, and the role of material artifacts in processes of intermediation. These unofficial functions are arguably important for the functioning of complex, hybrid forms of governance, but they also prompt critical questions about the effectiveness, legitimacy, and role of intermediaries in generating needed transformative change.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"178 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek
{"title":"European administrative networks during times of crisis: Exploring the temporal development of the internal market network SOLVIT","authors":"Reini Schrama, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Ellen Mastenbroek","doi":"10.1111/rego.12585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12585","url":null,"abstract":"European administrative networks (EANs) are an increasingly prominent form of European Union (EU) governance. Although these networks are typically portrayed as important and flexible forms of organization, we lack knowledge of their temporal dimension, including their development in times of crisis. This paper provides a first analysis of network interaction as it unfolds before and during times of severe crisis for the EU internal market. Specifically, we examine interactions in the EU internal market network SOLVIT. This network offers member states both a formalized procedure for the bilateral resolution of cases of alleged misapplication of EU law, and an informal network for general discussions on internal market topics and SOLVIT-related matters beyond specific case-resolution. Based on unique three-wave survey data, we develop a continuous-time model (stochastic actor-oriented model) to analyze the evolution of SOLVIT's informal interactions over time. In explaining these developments, we reflect on the importance of two crises: the exit of a central SOLVIT member (the United Kingdom), which drove informal interactions to a great extent, and COVID-19, which led to great sudden uncertainty and challenges for the implementation of internal market law. Our results show that the network is remarkably stable and despite, or rather because of, these crises, has become denser over time.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140076375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulation timing in the states: The role of divided government and legislative recess","authors":"Tracey Bark, Elizabeth Bell, Ani Ter-Mkrtchyan","doi":"10.1111/rego.12583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12583","url":null,"abstract":"Bureaucratic rulemaking is a key feature of American policymaking. However, rulemaking activities do not occur uniformly, but fluctuate throughout the year. We consider three mechanisms to explain these changes in rule volume, each of which produces unique expectations for rulemaking during periods of divided government and legislative recess. To test these expectations, we leverage an original dataset including all rules proposed by bureaucratic agencies in three U.S. states from 2004 to 2013 matched with data tracking periods of divided government and legislative recess. We find that state bureaucracies publish significantly more proposed rules during periods of divided government or a split legislature and are most productive in the months immediately following legislative recess. These results underscore the importance of bureaucratic policymaking and improve our understanding of the balance of power between branches of state governments.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"141 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139945365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner
{"title":"Policy complexity and implementation performance in the European Union","authors":"Maximilian Haag, Steffen Hurka, Constantin Kaplaner","doi":"10.1111/rego.12580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12580","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between the complexity of EU directives and their successful implementation at the national level. Moving beyond the state-of-the-art, we propose a comprehensive framework considering structural, linguistic, and relational dimensions of policy complexity. We argue that policy complexity entails higher transaction costs, hindering effective implementation. Using a novel dataset covering roughly 1000 directives from 1994 to 2022, we find strong evidence of policy complexity negatively impacting implementation performance. Moreover, we find that states with higher administrative capacity are better able to process high complexity efficiently and that Eurosceptic member states attract fewer infringement proceedings in highly complex policy environments than Europhile member states. This could alternatively point to strategic enforcement behavior of the Commission or to bureaucracies that are less Eurosceptic than their political masters might wish for. Our study thereby contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges of successful implementation of EU directives.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139573859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}