Psychological review最新文献

{"title":"On the role of psychological and social factors in pharmacological analgesia: A psychosocial moderation hypothesis.","authors":"Ehda Gharavi, Dominik Mischkowski","doi":"10.1037/rev0000536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000536","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Identifying safe and efficient pharmaceutical pain treatments remains an enduring challenge. However, despite significant advancements in pharmacological pain management, the inconsistent effectiveness of many analgesics between people remains puzzling. To address this problem, we introduce a new hypothesis suggesting that psychosocial factors exacerbate or attenuate (i.e., moderate) pain-relieving effects of analgesics: the psychosocial moderation hypothesis of pharmacological analgesia. According to this hypothesis, psychosocial factors can be categorized into three groups: (a) dispositional psychological factors, (b) situational cognitive or affective factors, and (c) contextual and social factors. The psychosocial moderation hypothesis is intended to extend the biopsychosocial model of pain to pharmacological pain management, with the goals to deepen the understanding of how analgesic drugs function and to open new paths to pain research and management beyond the traditional biomedical approach in pharmacological pain treatment. This hypothesis thus points toward a more comprehensive, psychosocial approach to pharmacological pain management and encourages the development of analgesic models that take the psychosocial context of analgesic consumers into account. We hope that this hypothesis will stimulate novel empirical and theoretical efforts in identifying the most beneficial analgesic for different types of people in different situations and, thus, to optimize analgesic dosing to provide adequate pharmacological pain relief while minimizing adverse side effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143414987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Discourse referents in infancy.","authors":"Gabor Brody, Gergely Csibra","doi":"10.1037/rev0000545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000545","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human infants connect conceptual descriptions to objects in the first year of their life. Here, we explore the cognitive architecture that supports this capacity. We propose that early in development, the connection from descriptions to objects is mediated by a representational format proprietary to human communication: discourse referents. Discourse referents, just like other object representations, represent entities, but instead of being maintained based on spatiotemporal characteristics, they are created and maintained in relation to communicative contexts. After establishing criteria for what it would mean for preverbal infants to entertain such discourse referents, we review the evidence from developmental psychology. We find support for the idea that, in communicative episodes, infants create representations of entities that are encoded from a shared discourse perspective and which can be displaced or entirely perceptually unavailable. We conclude that infants cannot only represent \"entities at locations\" but also \"entities under discussion\" and that conceptual descriptions early in development are primarily elicited by and applied to this latter format. In this framework, successful referential communication about perceptually available objects can be understood as involving correspondences between perceptually created object representations and discourse referents. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143391630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prosocial religions as folk-technologies of mutual policing.","authors":"Léo Fitouchi, Manvir Singh, Jean-Baptiste André, Nicolas Baumard","doi":"10.1037/rev0000531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000531","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Why do humans believe in moralizing gods? Leading accounts argue that these beliefs evolved because they help societies grow and promote group cooperation. Yet recent evidence suggests that beliefs in moralizing gods are not limited to large societies and might not have strong effects on cooperation. Here, we propose that beliefs in moralizing gods develop because individuals shape supernatural beliefs to achieve strategic goals in within-group interactions. People have a strategic interest in controlling others' cooperation, either to extort benefits from them or to gain reputational benefits for protecting the public good. Moreover, they believe, based on their folk-psychology, that others would be less likely to cheat if they feared supernatural punishment. Thus, people endorse beliefs in moralizing gods to manipulate others into cooperating. Prosocial religions emerge from a dynamic of mutual monitoring, in which each individual, lacking confidence in the cooperativeness of conspecifics, attempts to incentivize others' cooperation by endorsing beliefs in supernatural punishment. We show how variations of this incentive structure explain the variety of cultural attractors toward which supernatural punishment converges, including extractive religions that extort benefits from exploited individuals, prosocial religions geared toward mutual benefit, and forms of prosocial religion where belief in moralizing gods is itself a moral duty. We review evidence for nine predictions of this account and use it to explain the decline of prosocial religions in modern societies. Supernatural punishment beliefs seem endorsed as long as people believe them necessary to ensure others' cooperation, regardless of their objective effectiveness in doing so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143391633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Referential retrieval and integration in language comprehension: An electrophysiological perspective.","authors":"Noortje J Venhuizen, Harm Brouwer","doi":"10.1037/rev0000530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000530","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Referential processing is part and parcel of language comprehension, but in neurocognitive theories and models of comprehension it typically does not take center stage. Models informed by event-related potentials focus on semantic and syntactic processing in terms of the two most salient event-related potentials components, the N400 and P600, while experimental findings have implicated the Nref component-a frontal, sustained negativity-in referential processing. Extant accounts of the Nref assume it reflects processes involved in establishing reference or association at a distance, but an important open question remains how these mechanisms can be reconciled with existing neurocognitive models. We here offer a mechanistic account of referential processing grounded in retrieval-integration (RI) theory, an integrated theory of language comprehension with broad empirical coverage. On RI theory, the conceptual knowledge associated with an incoming word in context is retrieved from long-term memory (N400), and accordingly integrated into the unfolding utterance representation (P600). We here argue that word meaning is not only defined by the conceptual knowledge associated with a word, but also by its referential knowledge (its presuppositions). Whenever this referential knowledge is inconsistent with what is anticipated given the context, increased referential retrieval effort ensues (Nref). In contrast to extant accounts, we do thus not implicate the Nref in the establishment of reference itself, but instead attribute referential resolution to the integrative processes underlying the P600. The resultant referential RI theory integrates the N400, Nref, and P600 in a single model, and its predictions are consistent with extant empirical evidence on referential processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143080913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The disencapsulated mind: A premotor theory of human imagination.","authors":"Peter Ulric Tse","doi":"10.1037/rev0000535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000535","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our premodern ancestors had perceptual, motoric, and cognitive functional domains that were modularly encapsulated. Some of these came to interact through a new type of cross-modular binding in our species. This allowed previously domain-dedicated, encapsulated motoric and sensory operators to operate on operands for which they had not evolved. Such operators could at times operate nonvolitionally, while at other times they could be governed volitionally. In particular, motoric operations that derive from the same circuits that compute hand motions for object manipulation could now be retooled for virtual manipulation in a mental workspace in the absence of any physical hand or other effector movements. I hypothesize that the creativity of human imagination and mental models is rooted in premotor simulation of sequential manipulations of objects and symbols in the mental workspace, in analogy with the premotor theory of attention, which argues that attention evolved from \"internalized\" eye movement circuitry. Overall, operator \"disencapsulation\" led to a bifurcation of consciousness in humans: a concrete form centered on perception of the body in the physical world and an abstract form focused on explanatory mental models. One of the consequences of these new abilities was the advent of psychotic disorders that do not exist in species possessed solely of the concrete type of consciousness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The theory of mind hypothesis of autism: A critical evaluation of the status quo.","authors":"Emily L Long, Caroline Catmur, Geoffrey Bird","doi":"10.1037/rev0000532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000532","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The theory of mind (ToM) hypothesis of autism is the idea that difficulties inferring the mental states of others may explain social communication difficulties in autism. In the present article, we critically evaluate existing theoretical accounts, concluding that none provides a sufficient explanation of ToM in autism. We then evaluate existing tests of ToM, identifying problems that limit the validity of the conclusions that may be drawn from them. Finally, as an example of how the identified issues may be resolved, we describe work developing a psychological account of ToM (the Mind-space framework) and a new test of ToM accuracy (the Interview Task). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grounding computational cognitive models.","authors":"Casimir J H Ludwig, Erik Stuchlý, Gaurav Malhotra","doi":"10.1037/rev0000533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000533","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cognitive scientists and neuroscientists are increasingly deploying computational models to develop testable theories of psychological functions and make quantitative predictions about cognition, brain activity, and behavior. Computational models are used to explain target phenomena such as experimental effects, individual, and/or population differences. They do so by relating these phenomena to the underlying components of the model that map onto distinct cognitive mechanisms. These components make up a \"cognitive state space,\" where different positions correspond to different cognitive states that produce variation in behavior. We examine the rationale and practice of such model-based inferences and argue that model-based explanations typically miss a key ingredient: They fail to explain <i>why</i> and <i>how</i> agents occupy specific positions in this space. A critical insight is that the agent's position in the state space is not fixed, but that the behavior they produce is the result of a <i>trajectory</i>. Therefore, we discuss (a) the constraints that limit movement in the state space; (b) the reasons for moving around at all (i.e., agents' objectives); and (c) the information and cognitive mechanisms that guide these movements. We review existing research practices, from experimental design to the model-based analysis of data, and through simulations we demonstrate some of the inferential pitfalls that arise when we ignore these dynamics. By bringing the agent's perspective into sharp focus, we stand to gain better and more complete explanations of the variation in cognition and behavior over time, between different environmental conditions, and between different populations or individuals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142932103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A unified neurocomputational model of prospective and retrospective timing.","authors":"Joost de Jong, Aaron R Voelker, Terrence C Stewart, Elkan G Akyürek, Chris Eliasmith, Hedderik van Rijn","doi":"10.1037/rev0000519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000519","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Time is a central dimension against which perception, action, and cognition play out. From anticipating when future events will happen to recalling how long ago previous events occurred, humans and animals are exquisitely sensitive to temporal structure. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that estimating time prospectively (i.e., in passing) is qualitatively different from estimating time in retrospect (i.e., after the event is over). Indeed, computational models that attempt to explain both prospective and retrospective timing assume a fundamental separation of their underlying processes. We, in contrast, propose a new neurocomputational model of timing, the unified temporal coding (UTC) model that unifies prospective and retrospective timing through common principles. The UTC model assumes that both stimulus and timing information are represented inside the same rolling window of input history. As a consequence, the UTC model explains a wide range of phenomena typically covered by specialized models, such as conformity to and violations of the scalar property, one-shot learning of intervals, neural responses underlying timing, timing behavior under normal and distracting conditions, common capacity limits in timing and working memory, and how timing depends on attention. Strikingly, by assuming that prospective and retrospective timing rely on the same principles and are implemented in the same neural network, a simple attentional gain mechanism can resolve the apparently paradoxical effect of cognitive load on prospective and retrospective timing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142931560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An entropy modulation theory of creative exploration.","authors":"Thomas T Hills, Yoed N Kenett","doi":"10.1037/rev0000511","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000511","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Compared to individuals who are rated as less creative, higher creative individuals tend to produce ideas more quickly and with more novelty-what we call faster-and-further phenomenology. This has traditionally been explained either as supporting an associative theory-based on differences in the structure of cognitive representations-or as supporting an executive theory-based on the principle that higher creative individuals utilize cognitive control to navigate their cognitive representations differently. Though extensive research demonstrates evidence of differences in semantic structure, structural explanations are limited in their ability to formally explain faster-and-further phenomenology. At the same time, executive abilities also correlate with creativity, but formal process models explaining how they contribute to faster-and-further phenomenology are lacking. Here, we introduce entropy modulation theory which integrates structure and process-based creativity accounts. Relying on a broad set of evidence, entropy modulation theory assumes that the difference between lower and higher creative individuals lies in the executive modulation of entropy during cognitive search (e.g., memory retrieval). With retrieval targets racing to reach an activation threshold, activation magnitude and variance both independently enhance the entropy of target retrieval and increase retrieval speed, reproducing the faster-and-further phenomenology. Thus, apparent differences in semantic structure can be produced via an entropy modulating retrieval process, which tunes cognitive entropy to mediate cognitive flexibility and the exploration-exploitation trade-off. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"239-251"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Learners restrict their linguistic generalizations using preemption but not entrenchment: Evidence from artificial-language-learning studies with adults and children.","authors":"Anna Samara, Elizabeth Wonnacott, Gaurav Saxena, Ramya Maitreyee, Judit Fazekas, Ben Ambridge","doi":"10.1037/rev0000463","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000463","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A central goal of research into language acquisition is explaining how, when learners generalize to new cases, they appropriately restrict their generalizations (e.g., to avoid producing ungrammatical utterances such as <i>*the clown laughed the man;</i> \"*\" indicates an ungrammatical form). The past 30 years have seen an unresolved debate between statistical preemption and entrenchment as explanations. Under preemption, the use of a verb in a particular construction (e.g., <i>*the clown laughed the man</i>) is probabilistically blocked by hearing that other verb constructions with similar meanings only (e.g., <i>the clown made the man laugh</i>). Under entrenchment, such errors (e.g., *<i>the clown laughed the man</i>) are probabilistically blocked by hearing any utterance that includes the relevant verb (e.g., by <i>the clown made the man laugh</i> and <i>the man laughed</i>). Across five artificial-language-learning studies, we designed a training regime such that learners received evidence for the (by the relevant hypothesis) ungrammaticality of a particular unattested verb/noun + particle combination (e.g., *<i>chila</i> + <i>kem</i>; *<i>squeako</i> + <i>kem</i>) via either preemption only or entrenchment only. Across all five studies, participants in the preemption condition (as per our preregistered prediction) rated unattested verb/noun + particle combinations as less acceptable for restricted verbs/nouns, which appeared during training, than for unrestricted, novel-at-test verbs/nouns, which did not appear during training, that is, strong evidence for preemption. Participants in the entrenchment condition showed no evidence for such an effect (and in 3/5 experiments, positive evidence for the null). We conclude that a successful model of learning linguistic restrictions must instantiate competition between different forms only where they express the same (or similar) meanings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141261274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}