{"title":"Exploring the underlying psychological constructs of self-report eating behavior measurements: Toward a comprehensive framework.","authors":"Clarissa Dakin, Graham Finlayson, R James Stubbs","doi":"10.1037/rev0000496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000496","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Food and eating are fundamental for survival but also have significant impacts on health, psychology, sociology, and economics. Understanding what motivates people to eat can provide insights into \"adaptive\" eating behavior, which is especially important due to the increasing prevalence of health-related conditions such as obesity. There has been considerable interest in developing theoretical models and associated constructs that explain individual differences in eating behavior. However, many of these models contain overlapping theories and shared theoretical mechanisms of action. Currently, there is no recognized standard framework that integrates psychological, physiological, and neurobiological theory to help explain human eating behavior. The aim of the current article was to review key psychological theories in relation to energy balance, homeostasis, energy intake, and motivation to eat and begin to develop a comprehensive framework of relevant factors that drive eating behavior. The key findings from this review suggest that eating behavior is conceptualized by elements of dual process models, which include conscious processing (reflective factors) and automatic responses to desires, environmental cues, habits, and associative learning. These processes are mediated by neurobiology and physiological signaling (homeostatic feedback) of energy balance, which is more tolerant of positive than negative energy balances. From a synthesis of available evidence, it is suggested that eating behavior constructs (traits) can be explained by three latent constructs: reflective, reactive, and homeostatic eating. By understanding the interplay between reflective, reactive, and homeostatic processes, interventions can be developed that tailor treatments to target key aspects of eating behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A flexible threshold theory of change perception in self, others, and the world.","authors":"Ed O'Brien","doi":"10.1037/rev0000490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000490","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>I propose a flexible threshold theory of change perception in self and social judgment. Traditionally, change perception is viewed as a basic cognitive process entailing the act of discriminating informational differences. This article takes a more dynamic view of change perception, highlighting people's motivations in interpreting those differences. Specifically, I propose people's change perceptions depend not only on the salience and quality of the evidence for change but they also depend on the adaptation implications of the change, as people are sensitive to whether their prompted response would be worth it. Variables that exacerbate perceived adaptation implications should thus lead people to contract their change perception thresholds (people should become less open to concluding things have changed and so less likely to act), while variables that alleviate perceived adaptation implications should thus lead people to expand their change perception thresholds (people should become more open to concluding things have changed and so more likely to act), all else equal in the evidence. Moreover, these effects should emerge for perceiving declines and improvements alike so long as change bears on adaptation implications. I review support for these proposals and use the theory to generate novel predictions, contributions, and applications. The theory can explain anew why people respond (or fail to respond) to changing climates and economies, worsening personal health, growing social progress, and many other self and social phenomena. Change perception is more than an act of discriminating differences-it also entails people's threshold judgments of whether and how these differences matter. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Networks of beliefs: An integrative theory of individual- and social-level belief dynamics.","authors":"Jonas Dalege, Mirta Galesic, Henrik Olsson","doi":"10.1037/rev0000494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000494","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We present a theory of belief dynamics that explains the interplay between internal beliefs in people's minds and beliefs of others in their external social environments. The networks of belief theory goes beyond existing theories of belief dynamics in three ways. First, it provides an explicit connection between belief networks in individual minds and belief dynamics on social networks. The connection, absent from most previous theories, is established through people's social beliefs or perceived beliefs of others. Second, the theory recognizes that the correspondence between social beliefs and others' actual beliefs can be imperfect, because social beliefs are affected by personal beliefs as well as by the actual beliefs of others. Past theories of belief dynamics on social networks do not distinguish between perceived and actual beliefs of others. Third, the theory explains diverse belief dynamics phenomena parsimoniously through the differences in attention and the resulting felt dissonances in personal, social, and external parts of belief networks. We implement our theoretical assumptions in a computational model within a statistical physics framework and derive model predictions. We find support for our theoretical assumptions and model predictions in two large survey studies (<i>N</i>₁ = 973, <i>N</i>₂ = 669). We then derive insights about diverse phenomena related to belief dynamics, including group consensus and polarization, group radicalization, minority influence, and different empirically observed belief distributions. We discuss how the theory goes beyond different existing models of belief dynamics and outline promising directions for future research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peter D Kvam, Konstantina Sokratous, Anderson K Fitch
{"title":"Decisions among shifting choice alternatives reveal option-general representations of evidence.","authors":"Peter D Kvam, Konstantina Sokratous, Anderson K Fitch","doi":"10.1037/rev0000500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000500","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Dynamic models of choice typically describe the decision-making process in terms of the degree or balance of support for available response options. However, these alternative-specific representations of support are liable to fail when the available options change during the course of a decision. We suggest that people may use alternative-general representations, where stimulus feature information-rather than option-specific support-is accumulated over time and mapped onto support for available options as they appear. We tested alternative-specific and alternative-general models of choice in two perceptual experiments where the available options could change during a trial. In the first study, we showed that changing the choice options partway through a trial resulted in no substantial difference in performance relative to a condition where the final options were always onscreen. This was supported by a quantitative model comparison that strongly favored an alternative-general (geometric) model over two alternative-specific models (diffusion and racing accumulator models). In the second study, the stimulus primed specific unavailable responses to test whether irrelevant support for unavailable options was integrated into the decision process. This study elicited a pattern of accuracy that could not have occurred unless participants accumulated support for options that were not yet available. Together, these experiments and modeling results indicate that the majority of participants rely on alternative-general representations of evidence during dynamic decisions among options that can change over time. Future work on decision behavior and its neural antecedents should explore the predictions of these alternative-general theories of choice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social exploration: How and why people seek new connections.","authors":"Shelly Tsang,Kyle Barrentine,Sareena Chadha,Shigehiro Oishi,Adrienne Wood","doi":"10.1037/rev0000499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000499","url":null,"abstract":"Just as animals forage for food, humans forage for social connections. People often face a decision between exploring new relationships versus deepening existing ones. This trade-off, known in optimal foraging theory as the exploration-exploitation trade-off, is featured prominently in other disciplines such as animal foraging, learning, and organizational behavior. Many of the framework's principles can be applied to humans' choices about their social resources, which we call social exploration/exploitation. Using known principles in the domain of social exploration/exploitation can help social psychologists better understand how and why people choose their relationships, which ultimately affect their health and well-being. In this article, we discuss the costs and benefits of social exploration and social exploitation. We then synthesize known person- and situation-level predictors of social decision making, reframing them in the language of the explore-exploit trade-off. We propose that people explore more when they find it more rewarding and less costly, and when the environment has many opportunities to do so. We conclude by discussing hypotheses generated by applying optimal foraging theory to social decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding self-control as a problem of regulatory scope.","authors":"Kentaro Fujita,Yaacov Trope,Nira Liberman","doi":"10.1037/rev0000501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000501","url":null,"abstract":"Although the focus of research for decades, there is a surprising lack of consensus on what is (and what is not) self-control. We review some of the most prominent theoretical models of self-control, including those that highlight conflicts between smaller-sooner versus larger-later rewards, \"hot\" emotions versus \"cool\" cognitions, and efficient automatic versus resource-intensive controlled processes. After discussing some of their shortcomings, we propose an alternative approach based on tenets of construal level theory (Trope et al., 2021) that integrates these disparate models while also providing novel insights. Specifically, we model self-control as a problem of regulatory scope-the range of considerations one accounts for in any decision or behavior. Self-control conflicts occur when the pursuit of specific local opportunities threatens the ability to address motivational priorities that span a broader array of time, places, individuals, and possibilities. Whereas a more contractive consideration of relevant concerns may prompt indulgence in temptation, a more expansive consideration of concerns should not only help people identify the self-control conflict but also successfully resolve it. We review empirical evidence that supports this new framework and discuss implications and new directions. This regulatory framework not only clarifies what is and what is not self-control but also provides new insights that can be leveraged to enhance self-control in all its various forms. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":"382 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The (absence of the) presence-absence distinction in motivation science.","authors":"Andrew J Elliot,E Tory Higgins,Emily Nakkawita","doi":"10.1037/rev0000508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000508","url":null,"abstract":"A focal stimulus (object, end state, outcome, event, experience, characteristic, possibility, etc.) may represent a presence, an occurrence, or something, or it may represent an absence, a nonoccurrence, or nothing. This presence-absence distinction has received extensive and explicit attention in cognitive psychology (it is the central figure), but it has received minimal and primarily implicit attention in motivation science (it is the ground, not the figure). Herein, we explicitly place the presence-absence distinction in the role of figure in a motivational account of behavior, and we do so in the context of the foundational approach-avoidance motivation distinction. We review pertinent literature in cognitive psychology and motivation science, and we provide a model integrating the approach-avoidance and the presence-absence distinctions, along with numerous examples, illustrations, and observations. We believe that attending to the presence-absence distinction in motivation science holds great promise for theory, research, and application, and we encourage researchers to attend to this distinction moving forward. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic retrieval of events and associations from memory: An integrated account of item and associative recognition.","authors":"Gregory E Cox","doi":"10.1037/rev0000486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000486","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Memory theories distinguish between item and associative information, which are engaged by different tasks: item recognition uses item information to decide whether an event occurred in a particular context; associative recognition uses associative information to decide whether two events occurred together. Associative recognition is slower and less accurate than item recognition, suggesting that item and associative information may be represented in different forms and retrieved using different processes. Instead, I show how a dynamic model (Cox & Criss, 2020; Cox & Shiffrin, 2017) accounts for accuracy and response time distributions in both item and associative recognition with the same set of representations and processes. Item and associative information are both represented as vectors of features. Item and associative recognition both depend on comparing traces in memory with probes of memory in which item and associative features gradually accumulate. Associative features are slower to accumulate, but largely because they emerge from conjunctions of already-accumulated item features. I apply the model to data from 453 participants, each of whom performed an item and performed associative recognition following identical study conditions (Cox et al., 2018). Comparisons among restricted versions of the model show that its account of associative feature formation, coupled with limits on the rate at which features accumulate from multiple items, explains how and why the dynamics of associative recognition differ from those of item recognition even while both tasks rely on the same underlying representations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141760645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephanie Y Dolbier, Macrina C Dieffenbach, Matthew D Lieberman
{"title":"Open-mindedness: An integrative review of interventions.","authors":"Stephanie Y Dolbier, Macrina C Dieffenbach, Matthew D Lieberman","doi":"10.1037/rev0000491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000491","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Partisan animosity has been growing in the United States and around the world over the past few decades, fueling efforts by researchers and practitioners to help heal the divide. Many studies have been conducted to test interventions that aim to promote open-mindedness; however, these studies have been conducted in disparate literatures that do not always use the same terminology. In this review, we integrate research on open-mindedness in order to facilitate cross-talk and collaboration between disciplines. We review various concepts related to open-mindedness and then offer a conceptual model to help guide the further development of interventions and research to understand open-mindedness. We propose that open-mindedness is multifaceted and dynamic, such that interventions should focus on targeting multiple psychological pathways in order to maximize and sustain their effects. Specifically, we propose that interventions that target cognitive and/or motivational pathways can induce open-mindedness initially. Then, training in emotion regulation and/or social skills can help to sustain and build on open-mindedness once individuals enter into a situation where their beliefs are challenged. We conclude with a discussion of potential future directions for research on open-mindedness interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141760647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tyler Giallanza, Declan Campbell, Jonathan D Cohen, Timothy T Rogers
{"title":"An integrated model of semantics and control.","authors":"Tyler Giallanza, Declan Campbell, Jonathan D Cohen, Timothy T Rogers","doi":"10.1037/rev0000485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000485","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Understanding the mechanisms enabling the learning and flexible use of knowledge in context-appropriate ways has been a major focus of research in the study of both semantic cognition and cognitive control. We present a unified model of semantics and control that addresses these questions from both perspectives. The model provides a coherent view of how semantic knowledge, and the ability to flexibly access and deploy that knowledge to meet current task demands, arises from end-to-end learning of the statistics of the environment. We show that the model addresses unresolved issues from both literatures, including how control operates over features that covary with one another and how control representations themselves are structured and emerge through learning, through a series of behavioral experiments and simulations. We conclude by discussing the implications of our approach to other fundamental questions in cognitive science, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141760644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}