PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Bloody Foreigners! Overseas Equity on the London Stock Exchange, 1869-1928","authors":"R. Grossman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2379681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2379681","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents data on quantity, capital gains, dividend, and total returns for domestic and overseas equities listed on the London Stock Exchange during 1869-1928. Indices are presented for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, Australia/New Zealand and for the finance, transportation, raw materials, and utilities sectors in each region. Returns and volatility were typically highest in emerging regions and the raw materials sector. Dividend yields were similar across regions and differences in total returns were due largely to disparities in capital gains. Returns of firms in more industrial markets were relatively highly correlated with each other and with developing regions with which they had substantial colonial or trade connections. Contingent liability was most extensively employed where leverage was high and the physical assets were either meager or inaccessible to creditors.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74890055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Reregulation after the Crisis is Feeble: Shadow Banking, Offshore Financial Centers and Jurisdictional Competition","authors":"T. Rixen","doi":"10.1111/REGO.12024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/REGO.12024","url":null,"abstract":"A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs). But instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? The paper develops an explanation based on a two-level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in jurisdictional competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the USA and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany and the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88303359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Regulation in the EU","authors":"Hossein Nabilou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2352373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2352373","url":null,"abstract":"In the aftermath of the financial crisis, hedge fund regulation was put at the top of the European regulators’ agenda for their alleged contribution to financial instability. This paper studies the recently enacted Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) in the EU and its attempt to address potential systemic externalities of hedge funds. To include all relevant pan-European regulations addressing the sources of potential systemic risks of hedge funds, a systematic review of the recently enacted laws, regulations and implementing measures has been conducted. The analysis is predicated upon the methodology of law and economics with a consequentialist approach according to which the merits of the AIFMD and relevant regulations will be evaluated in terms of the achievement of the intended goals. The legislative process of the AIFMD suggests that hedge fund regulation in the EU was a politically motivated overreaction to their perceived contribution to financial instability. The aim of the AIFMD is mostly achieving the single market objectives, rather than addressing systemic risks. The EU regulators’ emphasis on investor protection can also be understood in light of the aim of creating a single European market for financial services. However, since the investors in hedge funds are professional investors, the AIFMD’s focus on investor protection in hedge fund regulation seems to be a misallocation of limited regulatory resources. Despite the fact that the impetus for the enactment of the AIFMD mostly involved the concerns about their systemic aspects and their contribution to the financial instability, hedge fund regulation in the EU only marginally addresses systemic risks that hedge funds can potentially pose to the financial system. In addition, the AIFMD's focus on capital requirements, leverage limits, and remuneration policies and practices, and requirements for AIFM's depositaries does not address the real concerns about hedge funds which are their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and their potential herd behavior. Rather, imposing such limits is likely to undermine the benefits of hedge funds to European financial markets. Moreover, since the business model of a hedge fund can substantially differ from that of private equity, real estate funds, infrastructure funds or commodity funds, the one-size-fits-all regulatory approach adopted in the AIFMD will likely have adverse effects on hedge funds and undermine their benefits to the financial markets. Furthermore, hedge fund regulation is likely to put EU hedge funds in competitive disadvantage compared with their global competitors by overburdening EU hedge funds. Overall, it is primarily estimated that such direct and heavy-handed regulation of hedge funds imposing substantial costs to the industry can encourage regulatory arbitrage resulting in the ineffectiveness of the EU hedge fund regulation in the long run. This paper also sheds light on","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81633076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Motivation Puzzle: Can Investors Change Corproate Behavior by Conforming to ESG Pressures?","authors":"Kyoko Sakuma-Keck, Manuel Hensmans","doi":"10.1108/S2043-9059(2013)0000005023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S2043-9059(2013)0000005023","url":null,"abstract":"The financial crisis has exposed a behavioral paradox: although asset managers are putting significant effort into meeting institutional pressures to demonstrate transparency and responsible behavior, their actual investment behaviors seem to remain inconsistent with responsible ownership. We seek to understand asset managers’ motivations to use externally defined environment, social, and governance (ESG) information to engage in sustainable investment. We draw on insights from the sensemaking literature, as well as institutional, behavioral, and cognitive theories to shed new light on asset managers’ motivations to demonstrate conformance with ESG criteria. The more asset managers demonstrate conformance, the less likely they are to make an effort to integrate sustainability and long-term, return-making concerns in their investment behaviors. As a result of the organization’s decoupling strategy, asset managers who are obliged to justify responsible behavior tend to have a limited sense of responsibility for encouraging long-term changes in corporate behavior. We argue that calls for greater transparency in investment decisions under the guise of demonstrating conformance to ESG information requirements will not lead to more sustainable investment behavior.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81928731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Inter-American Development Bank and the Global Financial Crisis: Promoting Productive Development","authors":"Paul Cammack","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2334627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2334627","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the response of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to the 'global financial crisis', against the background of its analysis of regional development priorities prior to the crisis. Between 2003 and 2009 the Bank developed a focus on 'productive development': 'industrial' policies for open national economies in an integrated world economy, with an emphasis on productivity-enhancing social and labour-market reforms. Its response to the crisis reflected the fact that as far as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was concerned, it was short-lived, and gave way to a phase of global rebalancing in which conditions for renewed growth were largely benign (with easy access to capital and strong demand for commodities), but at the same time variable in their impact, and fraught with risk. The period between 2008 and 2013 was as much one of opportunity as crisis; production and trade were as significant as finance, though there were financial risks that needed to be managed; and intra-regional variation was as important as 'global' impact. The Bank consistently stressed the need to be ready to restore and maintain the momentum of productive development once the world economy as a whole emerged from the crisis period. In 2013, as the crisis drew to a close, the Bank again highlighted long-running problems of low productivity and domestic savings, and identified the prevalence of informal labour and inefficient firms as the principal obstacles to sustained growth. It argued, therefore, that policy should focus on the reallocation of resources, the elimination of perverse incentives, and the promotion of productivity-enhancing structural reform.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82894909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gambling for Resurrection in Iceland: The Rise and Fall of the Banks","authors":"F. M. Baldursson, R. Portes","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2361098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2361098","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the evolution of the Icelandic banking sector in its macroeconomic environment. The story culminates in the crisis of October 2008, when all three major banks in Iceland collapsed in three successive days. The country is still struggling to cope with the consequences. The paper follows on our report of autumn 2007. The macroeconomic boom that peaked in 2007 led to severe imbalances. The banks had expanded at a rapid pace and reported healthy profits, capital ratios and liquidity until their collapse. An official report (SIC, 2010) has, however, exposed severe weaknesses in the banks’ assets and governance. The Icelandic Financial Services Authority (FSA) clearly knew little of the magnitude of large, single exposures and lending to the banks’ owners, although they strongly maintained otherwise in autumn 2007. Neither the FSA nor the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) saw the systemic risks created by lending to owners and related parties, which increased greatly from September 2007. With the financial turmoil that began in August 2007, the banks’ access to capital markets was curtailed. They then gambled on resurrection, expanding their balance sheets and refinancing the investments of their owners and other big borrowers, while they should have been deleveraging and securing their liquidity positions in foreign currency. The banks also prevented their share prices from collapsing by purchases of their own shares in the stock market, offloading accumulated shares in private deals, usually financed by themselves. All this went on apparently unnoticed by regulators. The Icelandic banks did not buy toxic securities – but together, they administered their own potent mix of systemic poison.Only a month before the collapse of October 2008 the banks all reported strong liquidity positions. These reports were misleading, but we also show how financing unravelled over the course of a few days, and collapse became inevitable. The rapid evaporation of liquidity and market funding is one of the key lessons of the story. Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries had the resources to bail out their irresponsible and illiquid banks, Iceland did not, and it received little foreign help or even sympathy. Iceland’s response to the crisis, with its heterodox policies and aid from the IMF, has been relatively successful.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82741130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Forging the (Ir)Responsible Sovereign Creditor: The Modern Sovereign Debt Paradigm & Possibilities of Absolute Responsibility","authors":"Ariel Ricker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2317443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317443","url":null,"abstract":"This recently completed thesis provides an overview of the historical and current trends in international debt crises, especially concerning sovereign borrowing and lending practices. Particular attention is given to the rise of litigious vulture funds, as well as the possibilities of developing philosophical and practical creditor/debtor practices.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88586629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wealth Effects and the Consumption of Italian Households in the Great Recession","authors":"R. Bottazzi, Serena Trucchi, M. Wakefield","doi":"10.1920/WP.IFS.2013.1321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1920/WP.IFS.2013.1321","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate marginal propensities to consume from wealth shocks for Italian households. Large asset price shocks in 2008 underpin an IV estimator. A euro fall in financial or risky financial wealth resulted in cuts in annual total (non-durable) consumption of 5-9 (3.5-6) cents. There is evidence of effects for food spending. Responses of total and non-durable spending to changes in housing wealth are 0.2 to 0.4 cents/euro. Counterfactuals indicate financial wealth effects were important (relative to other factors) for consumption falls in 2008/09. Thus wealth effects on consumption can be important for households' welfare and aggregate outcomes.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83860196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The New Bail-In Regime and the Need for Stronger Market Discipline. What Can we Learn from the Greek Case?","authors":"Evangelos Vasileiou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2338453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2338453","url":null,"abstract":"Effective Market Discipline (MD) puzzles financial economists and regulators for decades, while the recent bail-in legislation for European banks extremely raises the need for even stronger MD. It may not be exaggeration to say that a new regime for the European banking market is born after the aforementioned decision. This paper’s objective is the broader MD examination, using variables that are not usually included in MD studies, but concern the European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the last years. In particular, apart from banking, deposit insurance and pure macroeconomic indicators, we also include governance and sovereign debt indices. The new regime may need a new MD approach. We choose Greece to implement our assumptions, because it is the country with the most severe economic, sovereign and governance problems in the EU. We employ data for the period 2002-10. The empirical evidence supports that market discipline is superficial, while there is ample evidence that MD is directly influenced by the poor governance performance and the excessive government debt. Greek authorities have to make major structural reforms in order to create the conditions for long-term stability, while our analysis points out some EMU’s shortfalls.","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89955946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Factorising Equity Returns in an Emerging Market Through Exogenous Shocks and Capital Flows","authors":"D. Wilcox, T. Gebbie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2283486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283486","url":null,"abstract":"A technique from stochastic portfolio theory [Fernholz, 1998] is applied to analyse equity returns of Small, Mid and Large cap portfolios in an emerging market through periods of growth and regional crises, up to the onset of the global financial crisis. In particular, we factorize portfolios in the South African market in terms of distribution of capital, change of stock ranks in portfolios, and the effect due to dividends for the period Nov 1994 to May 2007. We discuss the results in the context of broader economic thinking to consider capital flows as risk factors, turning around more established approaches which use macroeconomic and socio-economic conditions to explain Foreign Direct Investment (into the economy) and Net Portfolio Investment (into equity and bond markets).","PeriodicalId":20862,"journal":{"name":"PSN: International Financial Crises (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76800012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}