Gambling for Resurrection in Iceland: The Rise and Fall of the Banks

F. M. Baldursson, R. Portes
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

We examine the evolution of the Icelandic banking sector in its macroeconomic environment. The story culminates in the crisis of October 2008, when all three major banks in Iceland collapsed in three successive days. The country is still struggling to cope with the consequences. The paper follows on our report of autumn 2007. The macroeconomic boom that peaked in 2007 led to severe imbalances. The banks had expanded at a rapid pace and reported healthy profits, capital ratios and liquidity until their collapse. An official report (SIC, 2010) has, however, exposed severe weaknesses in the banks’ assets and governance. The Icelandic Financial Services Authority (FSA) clearly knew little of the magnitude of large, single exposures and lending to the banks’ owners, although they strongly maintained otherwise in autumn 2007. Neither the FSA nor the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) saw the systemic risks created by lending to owners and related parties, which increased greatly from September 2007. With the financial turmoil that began in August 2007, the banks’ access to capital markets was curtailed. They then gambled on resurrection, expanding their balance sheets and refinancing the investments of their owners and other big borrowers, while they should have been deleveraging and securing their liquidity positions in foreign currency. The banks also prevented their share prices from collapsing by purchases of their own shares in the stock market, offloading accumulated shares in private deals, usually financed by themselves. All this went on apparently unnoticed by regulators. The Icelandic banks did not buy toxic securities – but together, they administered their own potent mix of systemic poison.Only a month before the collapse of October 2008 the banks all reported strong liquidity positions. These reports were misleading, but we also show how financing unravelled over the course of a few days, and collapse became inevitable. The rapid evaporation of liquidity and market funding is one of the key lessons of the story. Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries had the resources to bail out their irresponsible and illiquid banks, Iceland did not, and it received little foreign help or even sympathy. Iceland’s response to the crisis, with its heterodox policies and aid from the IMF, has been relatively successful.
冰岛的复活赌博:银行的兴衰
我们研究了冰岛银行业在宏观经济环境中的演变。这个故事在2008年10月的危机中达到高潮,当时冰岛的三家主要银行在连续三天内全部倒闭。该国仍在努力应对其后果。这份报告是继我们2007年秋季报告之后发表的。2007年达到顶峰的宏观经济繁荣导致了严重的失衡。在倒闭之前,这些银行一直在快速扩张,并报告了健康的利润、资本比率和流动性。然而,一份官方报告(SIC, 2010)暴露了银行资产和治理方面的严重弱点。冰岛金融服务管理局(FSA)显然对大型单一风险敞口和向银行所有者提供贷款的规模知之甚少,尽管他们在2007年秋季坚称情况并非如此。FSA和冰岛中央银行(CBI)都没有意识到,从2007年9月起,贷款给业主和相关方所带来的系统性风险大幅增加。随着2007年8月开始的金融动荡,银行进入资本市场的渠道受到限制。然后,它们押注于复苏,扩大资产负债表,为所有者和其他大借款人的投资进行再融资,而它们本应去杠杆化,并确保自己的外币流动性头寸。银行还通过在股票市场上购买自己的股票来防止股价暴跌,抛售私人交易中积累的股票,这些交易通常由银行自己融资。监管机构显然没有注意到这一切。冰岛的银行没有购买有毒证券,但它们共同管理着自己的强大的系统性毒药组合。就在2008年10月金融危机爆发前一个月,所有银行都报告了强劲的流动性头寸。这些报道具有误导性,但我们也展示了融资是如何在几天内瓦解的,破产是不可避免的。流动性和市场资金的迅速蒸发是这个故事的关键教训之一。美国、英国和其他国家有资源救助它们不负责任和缺乏流动性的银行,冰岛却没有,它几乎没有得到外国的帮助,甚至没有得到同情。冰岛以其非正统的政策和国际货币基金组织的援助来应对危机,相对来说是成功的。
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