Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles最新文献_第8页

Low-overhead byzantine fault-tolerant storage 低开销拜占庭式容错存储

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294269

James Hendricks, G. Ganger, M. Reiter

引用次数: 141

DejaView: a personal virtual computer recorder DejaView:个人虚拟电脑记录器

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294289

Oren Laadan, Ricardo A. Baratto, Dan B. Phung, S. Potter, Jason Nieh

{"title":"DejaView: a personal virtual computer recorder","authors":"Oren Laadan, Ricardo A. Baratto, Dan B. Phung, S. Potter, Jason Nieh","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294289","url":null,"abstract":"As users interact with the world and their peers through their computers, it is becoming important to archive and later search the information that they have viewed. We present DejaView, a personal virtual computer recorder that provides a complete record of a desktop computing experience that a user can playback, browse, search, and revive seamlessly. DejaView records visual output, checkpoints corresponding application and file system state, and captures displayed text with contextual information to index the record. A user can then browse and search the record for any visual information that has been displayed on the desktop, and revive and interact with the desktop computing state corresponding to any point in the record. DejaView combines display, operating system, and file system virtualization to provide its functionality transparently without any modifications to applications, window systems, or operating system kernels. We have implemented DejaView and evaluated its performance on real-world desktop applications. Our results demonstrate that DejaView can provide continuous low-overhead recording without any user noticeable performance degradation, and allows browsing, search and playback of records fast enough for interactive use.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73755858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 58

Bouncer: securing software by blocking bad input Bouncer:通过阻止不良输入来保护软件

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294274

Manuel Costa, M. Castro, Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Marcus Peinado

{"title":"Bouncer: securing software by blocking bad input","authors":"Manuel Costa, M. Castro, Lidong Zhou, Lintao Zhang, Marcus Peinado","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294274","url":null,"abstract":"Attackers exploit software vulnerabilities to control or crash programs. Bouncer uses existing software instrumentation techniques to detect attacks and it generates filters automatically to block exploits of the target vulnerabilities. The filters are deployed automatically by instrumenting system calls to drop exploit messages. These filters introduce low overhead and they allow programs to keep running correctly under attack. Previous work computes filters using symbolic execution along the path taken by a sample exploit, but attackers can bypass these filters by generating exploits that follow a different execution path. Bouncer introduces three techniques to generalize filters so that they are harder to bypass: a new form of program slicing that uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to remove unnecessary conditions from the filter; symbolic summaries for common library functions that characterize their behavior succinctly as a set of conditions on the input; and generation of alternative exploits guided by symbolic execution. Bouncer filters have low overhead, they do not have false positives by design, and our results show that Bouncer can generate filters that block all exploits of some real-world vulnerabilities.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75206599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 39

Tolerating byzantine faults in transaction processing systems using commit barrier scheduling 在使用提交屏障调度的事务处理系统中容忍拜占庭错误

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294268

Ben Vandiver, H. Balakrishnan, B. Liskov, S. Madden

{"title":"Tolerating byzantine faults in transaction processing systems using commit barrier scheduling","authors":"Ben Vandiver, H. Balakrishnan, B. Liskov, S. Madden","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294268","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of areplication scheme to handle Byzantine faults in transaction processing database systems. The scheme compares answers from queries and updates on multiple replicas which are unmodified, off-the-shelf systems, to provide a single database that is Byzantine fault tolerant. The scheme works when the replicas are homogeneous, but it also allows heterogeneous replication in which replicas come from different vendors. Heterogeneous replicas reduce the impact of bugs and security compromises because they are implemented independently and are thus less likely to suffer correlated failures.\u0000 The main challenge in designing a replication scheme for transactionprocessing systems is ensuring that the different replicas execute transactions in equivalent serial orders while allowing a high degreeof concurrency. Our scheme meets this goal using a novel concurrency control protocol, commit barrier scheduling (CBS). We have implemented CBS in the context of a replicated SQL database, HRDB(Heterogeneous Replicated DB), which has been tested with unmodified production versions of several commercial and open source databases as replicas. Our experiments show an HRDB configuration that can tolerate one faulty replica has only a modest performance overhead(about 17% for the TPC-C benchmark). HRDB successfully masks several Byzantine faults observed in practice and we have used it to find a new bug in MySQL.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76581136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 101

Staged deployment in mirage, an integrated software upgrade testing and distribution system 在海市蜃楼分期部署，集成了软件升级测试和分发系统

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294283

Olivier Crameri, N. Knežević, Dejan Kostic, R. Bianchini, W. Zwaenepoel

引用次数: 93

Information flow control for standard OS abstractions 标准操作系统抽象的信息流控制

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294293

Max Krohn, A. Yip, Micah Z. Brodsky, Natan Cliffer, F. Kaashoek, E. Kohler, R. Morris

{"title":"Information flow control for standard OS abstractions","authors":"Max Krohn, A. Yip, Micah Z. Brodsky, Natan Cliffer, F. Kaashoek, E. Kohler, R. Morris","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294293","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized Information Flow Control (DIFC) is an approach to security that allows application writers to control how data flows between the pieces of an application and the outside world. As applied to privacy, DIFC allows untrusted software to compute with private data while trusted security code controls the release of that data. As applied to integrity, DIFC allows trusted code to protect untrusted software from unexpected malicious inputs. In either case, only bugs in the trusted code, which tends to be small and isolated, can lead to security violations.\u0000 We present Flume, a new DIFC model that applies at the granularity of operating system processes and standard OS abstractions (e.g., pipes and file descriptors). Flume was designed for simplicity of mechanism, to ease DIFC's use in existing applications, and to allow safe interaction between conventional and DIFC-aware processes. Flume runs as a user-level reference monitor onLinux. A process confined by Flume cannot perform most system calls directly; instead, an interposition layer replaces system calls with IPCto the reference monitor, which enforces data flowpolicies and performs safe operations on the process's behalf. We ported a complex web application (MoinMoin Wiki) to Flume, changingonly 2% of the original code. Performance measurements show a 43% slowdown on read workloadsand a 34% slowdown on write workloads, which aremostly due to Flume's user-level implementation.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90151537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 503

AutoBash: improving configuration management with operating system causality analysis AutoBash:通过操作系统因果分析改进配置管理

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294284

Ya-Yunn Su, Mona Attariyan, J. Flinn

引用次数: 136

Protection and communication abstractions for web browsers in MashupOS MashupOS中web浏览器的保护和通信抽象

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294263

Helen J. Wang, Xiaofeng Fan, Jon Howell, Collin Jackson

{"title":"Protection and communication abstractions for web browsers in MashupOS","authors":"Helen J. Wang, Xiaofeng Fan, Jon Howell, Collin Jackson","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294263","url":null,"abstract":"Web browsers have evolved from a single-principal platform on which one site is browsed at a time into a multi-principal platform on which data and code from mutually distrusting sites interact programmatically in a single page at the browser. Today's \"Web 2.0\" applications (or mashups) offer rich services, rivaling those of desktop PCs. However, the protection andcommunication abstractions offered by today's browsers remain suitable onlyfor a single-principal system--either no trust through completeisolation between principals (sites) or full trust by incorporating third party code as libraries. In this paper, we address this deficiency by identifying and designing the missing abstractions needed for a browser-based multi-principal platform. We have designed our abstractions to be backward compatible and easily adoptable. We have built a prototype system that realizes almost all of our abstractions and their associated properties. Our evaluation shows that our abstractions make it easy to build more secure and robust client-side Web mashups and can be easily implemented with negligible performance overhead.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76330180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 149

SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes SecVisor:一个小型管理程序，为商用操作系统提供终身内核代码完整性

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294294

Arvind Seshadri, M. Luk, Ning Qu, A. Perrig

{"title":"SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes","authors":"Arvind Seshadri, M. Luk, Ning Qu, A. Perrig","doi":"10.1145/1294261.1294294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1294261.1294294","url":null,"abstract":"We propose SecVisor, a tiny hypervisor that ensures code integrity for commodity OS kernels. In particular, SecVisor ensures that only user-approved code can execute in kernel mode over the entire system lifetime. This protects the kernel against code injection attacks, such as kernel rootkits. SecVisor can achieve this propertyeven against an attacker who controls everything but the CPU, the memory controller, and system memory chips. Further, SecVisor can even defend against attackers with knowledge of zero-day kernel exploits.\u0000 Our goal is to make SecVisor amenable to formal verificationand manual audit, thereby making it possible to rule out known classes of vulnerabilities. To this end, SecVisor offers small code size and small external interface. We rely on memory virtualization to build SecVisor and implement two versions, one using software memory virtualization and the other using CPU-supported memory virtualization. The code sizes of the runtime portions of these versions are 1739 and 1112 lines, respectively. The size of the external interface for both versions of SecVisor is 2 hypercalls. It is easy to port OS kernels to SecVisor. We port the Linux kernel version 2.6.20 by adding 12 lines and deleting 81 lines, out of a total of approximately 4.3 million lines of code in the kernel.","PeriodicalId":20672,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87778868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 716

Integrating concurrency control and energy management in device drivers 在设备驱动程序中集成并发控制和能量管理

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles Pub Date : 2007-10-14 DOI: 10.1145/1294261.1294286

K. Klues, V. Handziski, Chenyang Lu, A. Wolisz, D. Culler, David E. Gay, P. Levis

引用次数: 88