Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation最新文献_第8页

Local computation mechanism design 局部计算机制设计

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-11-15 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602839

A. Hassidim, Y. Mansour, Shai Vardi

引用次数: 22

Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games 大拥塞对策的渐近真实均衡选择

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-11-11 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602856

Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth

{"title":"Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion games","authors":"Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602856","url":null,"abstract":"Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large n player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the types of other players. Unfortunately, games in incomplete information settings lose many of the nice properties of complete information games: the quality of equilibria can become worse, the equilibria lose their ex-post properties, and coordinating on an equilibrium becomes even more difficult. Because of these problems, we would like to study games of incomplete information, but still implement equilibria of the complete information game induced by the (unknown) realized player types. This problem was recently studied by Kearns et al [Kearns et al. 2014], and solved in large games by means of introducing a weak mediator: their mediator took as input reported types of players, and output suggested actions which formed a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. Players had the option to play independently of the mediator, or ignore its suggestions, but crucially, if they decided to opt-in to the mediator, they did not have the power to lie about their type. In this paper, we rectify this deficiency in the setting of large congestion games. We give, in a sense, the weakest possible mediator: it cannot enforce participation, verify types, or enforce its suggestions. Moreover, our mediator implements a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. We show that it is an (asymptotic) ex-post equilibrium of the incomplete information game for all players to use the mediator honestly, and that when they do so, they end up playing an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In particular, truthful use of the mediator is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in any Bayesian game for any prior.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114605633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 45

On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism 论瓦尔拉斯机制的效率

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-11-04 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602850

Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, N. Nisan, R. Leme

{"title":"On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism","authors":"Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, N. Nisan, R. Leme","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602850","url":null,"abstract":"Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz (1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are strategic about their demands. This is captured by the Walrasian Mechanism that proceeds by collecting reported demands, finding clearing prices in the reported market via an ascending price tatonnement procedure, and returns the resulting allocation. Similar mechanisms are used, for example, in the daily opening of the New York Stock Exchange and the call market for copper and gold in London. In practice, it is commonly observed that agents in such markets reduce their demand leading to behaviors resembling bargaining and to inefficient outcomes. We ask how inefficient the equilibria can be. Our main result is that the welfare of every pure Nash equilibrium of the Walrasian mechanism is at least one quarter of the optimal welfare, when players have gross substitute valuations and do not overbid. Previous analysis of the Walrasian mechanism have resorted to large market assumptions to show convergence to efficiency in the limit. Our result shows that approximate efficiency is guaranteed regardless of the size of the market. We extend our results in several directions. First, our results extend to Bayes-Nash equilibria and outcomes of no regret learning via the smooth mechanism framework. We also extend our bounds to any mechanism that maximizes welfare with respect to the declared valuations and never charges agents more than their bids. Additionally, we consider other classes of valuations and bid spaces beyond those satisfying the gross substitutes conditions. Finally, we relax the no-overbidding assumption, and present bounds that are parameterized by the extent to which agents are willing to overbid.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132088973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 55

Optimal impartial selection 最优公正选择

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-10-31 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602836

Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm

引用次数: 51

Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem 近因、记录与回顾:简单决策问题中的学习与非平衡行为

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-10-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2339862

D. Fudenberg, A. Peysakhovich

引用次数: 52

Characterizing strategic cascades on networks 表征网络上的战略级联

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-10-09 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602848

T. Martin, G. Schoenebeck, Michael P. Wellman

{"title":"Characterizing strategic cascades on networks","authors":"T. Martin, G. Schoenebeck, Michael P. Wellman","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602848","url":null,"abstract":"Transmission of disease, spread of information and rumors, adoption of new products, and many other network phenomena can be fruitfully modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by nodes influence the subsequent behavior of neighbors in the network graph. Current literature on cascades tends to assume nodes choose myopically based on the state of choices already taken by other nodes. We examine the possibility of strategic choice, where agents representing nodes anticipate the choices of others who have not yet decided, and take into account their own influence on such choices. Our study employs the framework of Chierichetti et al. [2012], who (under assumption of myopic node behavior) investigate the scheduling of node decisions to promote cascades of product adoptions preferred by the scheduler. We show that when nodes behave strategically, outcomes can be extremely different. We exhibit cases where in the strategic setting 100% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting only an arbitrarily small ε do. Conversely, we present cases where in the strategic setting 0% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting (100-ε)% do, for any constant ε > 0. Additionally, we prove some properties of cascade processes with strategic agents, both in general and for particular classes of graphs.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130286688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists 使用最小黑名单操纵稳定匹配

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-07-28 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602840

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

{"title":"Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists","authors":"Yannai A. Gonczarowski","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602840","url":null,"abstract":"Gale and Sotomayor [1985] have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm [1962], the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each woman possibly blacklisting all but one man. As Gusfield and Irving have already noted in 1989, no results are known regarding achieving this feat by means other than such preference-list truncation, i.e. by also permuting preference lists. We answer Gusfield and Irving's open question by providing tight upper bounds on the amount of blacklists and their combined size, that are required by the women to force a given matching as the M-optimal stable matching, or, more generally, as the unique stable matching. Our results show that the coalition of all women can strategically force any matching as the unique stable matching, using preference lists in which at most half of the women have nonempty blacklists, and in which the average blacklist size is less than 1. This allows the women to manipulate the market in a manner that is far more inconspicuous, in a sense, than previously realized. When there are less women than men, we show that in the absence of blacklists for men, the women can force any matching as the unique stable matching without blacklisting anyone, while when there are more women than men, each to-be-unmatched woman may have to blacklist as many as all men. Together, these results shed light on the question of how much, if at all, do given preferences for one side a priori impose limitations on the set of stable matchings under various conditions. All of the results in this paper are constructive, providing efficient algorithms for calculating the desired strategies.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115536123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions 首价头寸拍卖的表现力和稳健性

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-07-19 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602846

Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, D. Parkes

引用次数: 14

Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structure 异质参与者的网络形成博弈与网络结构

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2013-07-15 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602862

E. Meirom, Shie Mannor, A. Orda

引用次数: 20