{"title":"最优公正选择","authors":"Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602836","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and by Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"51","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal impartial selection\",\"authors\":\"Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2600057.2602836\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and by Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.\",\"PeriodicalId\":203155,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"51\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602836\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602836","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and by Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation selects an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.
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