Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation最新文献_第5页

Long-run learning in games of cooperation 合作游戏中的长期学习

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602892

Winter A. Mason, Siddharth Suri, D. Watts

{"title":"Long-run learning in games of cooperation","authors":"Winter A. Mason, Siddharth Suri, D. Watts","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602892","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperation in repeated games has been widely studied in experimental settings; however, the duration over which players participate in such experiments is typically confined to at most hours, and often to a single game. Given that in real world settings people may have years of experience, it is natural to ask how behavior in cooperative games evolves over the long run. Here we analyze behavioral data from three distinct games involving 571 individual experiments conducted over a two-year interval. First, in the case of a standard linear public goods game we show that as players gain experience, they become less generous both on average and in particular towards the end of each game. Second, we analyze a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma where players are also allowed to make and break ties with their neighbors, finding that experienced players show an increase in cooperativeness early on in the game, but exhibit sharper \"endgame\" effects. Third, and finally, we analyze a collaborative search game in which players can choose to act selfishly or cooperatively, finding again that experienced players exhibit more cooperative behavior as well as sharper endgame effects. Together these results show consistent evidence of long-run learning, but also highlight directions for future theoretical work that may account for the observed direction and magnitude of the effects.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123311150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 18

Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity 同时贝叶斯拍卖和计算复杂度

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602877

Yang Cai, C. Papadimitriou

{"title":"Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity","authors":"Yang Cai, C. Papadimitriou","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602877","url":null,"abstract":"Bayesian equilibria of simultaneous auctions for individual items have been explored recently [Christodoulou et al. 2008; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Hassidim et al. 2011; Feldman et al. 2013] as an alternative to the well-known complexity issues plaguing combinatorial auctions with incomplete information, and some strong positive results have been shown about their performance. We point out some very serious complexity obstacles to this approach: Computing a Bayesian equilibrium in such auctions is hard for PP --- a complexity class between the polynomial hierarchy and PSPACE --- and even finding an approximate such equilibrium is as hard as NP, for some small approximation ratio (additive or multiplicative); therefore, the assumption that such equilibria will be arrived at by rational agents is quite problematic. In fact, even recognizing a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is intractable. Furthermore, these results hold even if bidder valuations are quite benign: Only one bidder valuation in our construction is unit demand or monotone submodular, while all others are additive. We also explore the possibility of favorable price of anarchy results for no-regret dynamics of the Bayesian simultaneous auctions game, and identify complexity obstacles there as well.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131695499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 47

Contract complexity 合同的复杂性

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602852

Moshe Babaioff, Eyal Winter

{"title":"Contract complexity","authors":"Moshe Babaioff, Eyal Winter","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602852","url":null,"abstract":"We study the complexity required for the implementation of multi-agent contracts under a variety of solution concepts. A contract is a mapping from strategy profiles to outcomes. Practical implementation of a contract requires it to be ''simple'', an illusive concept that needs to be formalized. A major source of complexity is the burden involving verifying the contract fulfillment (for example in a court of law). Contracts which specify a small number of outcomes are easier to verify and are less prone to disputes. We therefore measure the complexity of a contract by the number of outcomes it specifies. Our approach is general in the sense that all strategic interaction represented by a normal form game are allowed. The class of solution concepts we consider is rather exhaustive and includes Nash equilibrium with both pure and mixed strategies, dominant strategy implementation, iterative elimination of dominated strategies and strong equilibria. Some interesting insights can be gained from our analysis: Firstly, our results indicate that the complexity of implementation is independent of the size of the strategy spaces of the players but for some solution concepts grows with the number of players. Second, the complexity of {em unique} implementation is sometimes slightly larger, but not much larger than non-unique implementation. Finally and maybe surprisingly, for most solution concepts implementation with optimal cost usually does not require higher complexity than the complexity necessary for implementation at all.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"64 S293","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132228222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Modularity and greed in double auctions 双重拍卖中的模块化和贪婪

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602854

Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, T. Roughgarden

引用次数: 53

The complexity of fairness through equilibrium 平衡带来的公平的复杂性

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602855

Abraham Othman, C. Papadimitriou, A. Rubinstein

引用次数: 11

Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networks 网络中的中心性、八卦和信息扩散

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602958

M. Jackson

引用次数: 1

Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research 重新激励发现:研究中部分进展分享的机制

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602888

Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel, A. Krishnaswamy

{"title":"Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in research","authors":"Siddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel, A. Krishnaswamy","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602888","url":null,"abstract":"An essential primitive for an efficient research ecosystem is partial-progress sharing (PPS) -- whereby a researcher shares information immediately upon making a breakthrough. This helps prevent duplication of work; however there is evidence that existing reward structures in research discourage partial-progress sharing. Ensuring PPS is especially important for new online collaborative-research platforms, which involve many researchers working on large, multi-stage problems. We study the problem of incentivizing information-sharing in research, under a stylized model: non-identical agents work independently on subtasks of a large project, with dependencies between subtasks captured via an acyclic subtask-network. Each subtask carries a reward, given to the first agent who publicly shares its solution. Agents can choose which subtasks to work on, and more importantly, when to reveal solutions to completed subtasks. Under this model, we uncover the strategic rationale behind certain anecdotal phenomena. Moreover, for any acyclic subtask-network, and under a general model of agent-subtask completion times, we give sufficient conditions that ensure PPS is incentive-compatible for all agents. One surprising finding is that rewards which are approximately proportional to perceived task-difficulties, are sufficient to ensure PPS in all acyclic subtask-networks. The fact that there is no tension between local fairness and global information-sharing in multi-stage projects is encouraging, as it suggests practical mechanisms for real-world settings. Finally, we also characterize the efficiency of PPS -- we show that PPS is necessary, and in many cases, sufficient, to ensure a high rate of progress in research.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128120079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions 在下行时钟拍卖中优化价格

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602869

Tri-Dung Nguyen, T. Sandholm

{"title":"Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions","authors":"Tri-Dung Nguyen, T. Sandholm","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602869","url":null,"abstract":"A descending (multi-item) clock auction (DCA) is a mechanism for buying items from multiple potential sellers. In the DCA, bidder-specific prices are decremented over the course of the auction. In each round, each bidder might accept or decline his offer price. Accepting means the bidder is willing to sell at that price. Rejecting means the bidder will not sell at that price or a lower price. DCAs have been proposed as the method for procuring spectrum from existing holders in the FCC's imminent incentive auctions so spectrum can be repurposed to higher-value uses. However, the DCA design has lacked a way to determine the prices to offer the bidders in each round. This is a recognized, important, and timely problem. We present, to our knowledge, the first techniques for this. We develop a percentile-based approach which provides a means to naturally reduce the offer prices to the bidders through the bidding rounds. We also develop an optimization model for setting prices so as to minimize expected payment while stochastically satisfying the feasibility constraint. (The DCA has a final adjustment round that obtains feasibility after feasibility has been lost in the final round of the main DCA.) We prove attractive properties of this, such as symmetry and monotonicity. We develop computational methods for solving the model. (We also develop optimization models with recourse, but they are not computationally practical.) We present experiments both on the homogeneous items case and the case of FCC incentive auctions, where we use real interference constraint data to get a fully faithful model of feasibility. An unexpected paradox about DCAs is that sometimes when the number of rounds allowed increases, the final payment increases. We provide an explanation for this.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123386115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

The polarizing effect of network influences 网络影响的极化效应

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602899

M. Hajiaghayi, H. Mahini, David L. Malec

{"title":"The polarizing effect of network influences","authors":"M. Hajiaghayi, H. Mahini, David L. Malec","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602899","url":null,"abstract":"In social networks, opinions and behaviors tend to spread quickly. When an idea seeks to gain attention, success requires both attracting individual users and a careful understanding of cascading behavior -- an idea that attracts a small set of highly influential individuals can easily overwhelm an idea with a much larger, but less influential, support base. Understanding exactly how the choices of individuals propagate through a network, however, poses significant challenges. In this work, we consider a model recently studied by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Panconesi (EC 2012) to model cascading behavior when members of a social network must each choose one of two opposing ideas. The model captures the struggle between a desire to follow personal preferences and to match the choices of those you interact with. In this model, observed choices can look much different than the underlying preferences of individuals in the social network, due to cascading of behavior from individuals following their neighbors' lead. In this work, we seek to understand how these quantities can differ. We give strong bounds on adoption rates in terms of underlying preferences, strengthening results of the aforementioned work. Furthermore, our results hold both for richer types of influence between individuals and under weaker assumptions on the underlying preferences of individuals than those previously studied. Notably, we derive bounds that are robust to certain types of correlation between the personal preferences of agents, allowing for our results to be applied to a wider range of settings than prior works which required complete independence between individuals.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127728837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions 普遍帕累托支配和合理效用函数的福利

Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation Pub Date : 2014-06-01 DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602866

H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt

{"title":"Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions","authors":"H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt","doi":"10.1145/2600057.2602866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602866","url":null,"abstract":"We study Pareto efficiency in a setting that involves two kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty over the possible outcomes is modeled using lotteries whereas uncertainty over the agents’ preferences over lotteries is modeled using sets of plausible utility functions. A lottery is universally Pareto undominated if there is no other lottery that Pareto dominates it for all plausible utility functions. We show that, under fairly general conditions, a lottery is universally Pareto undominated iff it is Pareto efficient for some vector of plausible utility functions, which in turn is equivalent to affine welfare maximization for this vector. In contrast to previous work on linear utility functions, we use the significantly more general framework of skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982). Our main theorem generalizes a theorem by Carroll (2010) and implies the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem. We discuss three natural classes of plausible utility functions, which lead to three notions of ordinal efficiency, including stochastic dominance efficiency, and conclude with a detailed investigation of the geometric and computational properties of these notions.","PeriodicalId":203155,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121486437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 46